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Abstract 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to lessen the gap in the Islamic finance and 
investment literature by providing new answers to the most vital question raised in that 
literature: Is the adherence to the Shariah law associated with at any cost? 
The first chapter provides a primer on Islamic finance. It discusses several restrictions 
and necessary adaptations that must be made to have a Shariah-compliant product. The 
takeaway is that Shariah law mandates is related to fundamentals and, thus has a direct 
effect on the risk-return profile of all sorts of different products. This is referred to as the 
“Islamic-effect.” 
The second chapter investigates that Islamic-effect in a cross-sectional stock return 
context. This is done in two steps. First, looking at differences in stock returns between Islamic 
and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. 
Results indicate that there is a negative relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average 
returns. This is referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.” Second, examine whether that 
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor that 
affects cross-sectional expected stock returns. Time-series regressions results indicate that the 
Islamic risk factor (CMI) does indeed capture strong common variation in Saudi stock returns 
regardless what is included in the model. Also, findings suggest that using a four-factor model 
that controls for the Islamic-effect is more appropriate than using a single- or a three-factor 
model in Islamic finance applications that require estimates of expected stock returns. 
The third chapter investigates the Islamic-effect in a mutual fund context. A unique 
sample of 143 Saudi mutual funds (96-Islamic and 47-conventional) is used to assess the 
performance and riskiness of Saudi Islamic funds relative to Saudi conventional funds and 
relative to different Islamic and conventional indices for the period from July 2004 to January 
2010. Findings suggest that there is a benefit (cost) from adhering to the Shariah law when 
locally-focused (internationally-focused) fund portfolios are investigated. When Arab-focused 
fund portfolios are investigated, findings suggest that there is neither a cost nor a benefit 
from adhering to the Shariah law. 
 
Keywords: Shariah law, Islamic finance, Islamic risk factor, Islamic-effect, Islamic firms, 
Islamic mutual funds, conventional firms, conventional mutual funds, asset prices, risk-
return profile, Saudi Arabia. 
JEL Classification: G01, G11, G12, and G15 
1 
 
Preface 
The main purpose of this dissertation is to lessen the gap in the literature of Islamic 
finance and investment by empirically investigating one of most important issues in that 
literature. That issue is whether there is any cost associated with the adherence to the 
Shariah law or applying Islamic finance mandates. 
The first chapter of this dissertation provides an introduction to Islamic finance. It is 
worthy to note that the main purpose of this chapter is not to provide a comprehensive 
survey on Islamic finance, but instead to provide a primer on Islamic finance in order to lay 
the foundation stone for chapters two and three.  
To elaborate, chapter one discusses the several restrictions and necessary 
adaptations mandated by the Shariah law in order to have a Shariah-compliant product. 
These restrictions and adaptations, as will be shown in the chapter, are considered issues 
directly related and affect fundamentals such as the firm’s primary business activities, 
riskiness, operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues, leverage, etc.  
Based on this view, it is expected that applying Islamic finance mandates would 
have a direct effect on the risk-return profile of all sorts of different products that are 
characterized as Shariah-complaint. In this dissertation, that effect is referred to as the 
“Islamic-effect.”  
Now the purpose of chapters two and three of this dissertation is to investigate that 
Islamic-effect in two different contexts in order to find new answers to the most critical 
question raised in the Islamic finance and investment literature: Does adhering to the 
Shariah law come at any cost?  
2 
 
That is, chapter two investigates the Islamic-effect in a cross-sectional stock return 
context and chapter three investigates the issue in a mutual fund context. 
It is worth mentioning that both empirical studies discussed in chapters two and 
three carryout the Islamic-effect investigation to Saudi Arabia because it is considered one 
of the few countries that strictly adhere to the Shariah. 
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Chapter 1: Islamic Finance 
1. Introduction 
Islamic finance means that all financial transactions are conducted in accordance 
with the Shariah law, which is the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life 
both private and public. That legislative framework depends on four main sources: 1) The 
Holy Quraan: which is the literal words of Allah (may he be glorified and exalted); 2) 
sunnah: which refers to saying, actions, and approvals of the prophet and Allah’s messenger 
Mohammad (peace be upon him); 3) ijmah: which refers to the consensus that has been 
reached by Islamic scholars on a particular issue throughout the history; and 4) qiyas: 
which means analogy and it refers to rulings on issues where there is no explicit guidance 
in either the Quraan or the sunnah and, therefore are derived by qualified scholars with 
preference to rulings related to similar issues. 
Islamic finance is considered the only source of finance for Muslim investors that 
want to preserve their Islamic values and morals. This is because Islamic finance provides 
these Muslim investors with the opportunity to participate in different capital and financial 
markets without the fear that such participation is going be at the cost of their Islamic 
religious identity and values. In addition, Islamic finance started to become a vast global 
practice and a preferable source of finance for non-Muslim investors as well due to its 
ethical nature. That is, non-Muslim investors started to view investing in Shariah-compliant 
products as a form of socially responsible investing (SRI).  
As a result, the industry of Islamic finance, even though it is still relatively new when 
compared to the industry of conventional finance, has been experiencing an excellent and a 
rapid growth. According to McKenzie (2011), Shariah-compliant assets grew from USD 150 
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billion in the mid-1990s to around USD 551, 749, 947, and 1041 billion in 2006, 2007, 
2008, and 2009, respectively. Furthermore, McKenzie asserts that these Shariah-compliant 
assets are expected to sustain a growth rate of 10 to 15 percent per annum over a number 
of upcoming years. 
This chapter is considered an introduction to Islamic finance and not a 
comprehensive survey on Islamic finance. In this chapter, the main opportunities and 
challenges that face this relatively new field are highlighted. Furthermore, this chapter 
sheds the light on the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations that must be made 
to have a Shariah-compliant product. It is worth mentioning that these several restrictions 
and necessary adaptations are considered issues directly related to fundamentals such as 
the firms’ business activities, riskiness, revenues, leverage, etc. Thus, it is expected that 
applying Islamic finance mandates would have a direct effect on the risk-return profile of 
Shariah-compliant products such as Islamic stocks, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic bonds, 
etc. In this dissertation, such effect is referred to as the “Islamic-effect.” 
Also, it is worthy to note that all contracts in Islamic finance are deemed to be 
permissible unless violations to the Shariah law principles are present. Thus, the Islamic 
finance discussion in this chapter is not going to focus on what should be done to have a 
Shariah-compliant contract, but instead the discussion is going to focus on what should be 
avoided so contracts are not violating the Shariah law mandates (see section ‎2: 
Prohibitions in Islamic Finance) 
In addition, the following Islamic finance discussion will cover different financing 
modes that Shariah law views as beneficial and fruitful to society and, thus are considered 
alternatives to prohibited financing modes (see section ‎3: Permissions in Islamic Finance). 
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Finally, the Islamic finance discussion in this chapter will cover the issue of how 
equity investing became permissible and what are the Shariah screening filters proposed 
by Shariah scholars in order to identify Islamic firms (see section ‎4: Equity Investing in 
Islamic Finance).  
2. Prohibitions in Islamic Finance 
Every single element in the religion of Islam is based on one basic concept, which is 
to promote that which is good and prevent that which is evil. Based on this view, Shariah 
law specifies four main things that it believes are classified as “evil”, and thus need to be 
prevented. These four things are discussed in the following three subsections: the 
prohibition of riba (section ‎2.1), the prohibition of gharar and maysir (section ‎2.2), and the 
prohibition of “haram” trade (section ‎2.3).  
2.1. The Prohibition of Riba 
Riba is the Arabic term for interest rates or usury, and it is refers to a situation 
where a predetermined return is guaranteed for just lending money (interest-based 
financing). An example for riba is when a lender receives payments in excess of the 
principal. Thus, under the concept of riba, the rate of return is considered a function of 
money itself. In the religion of Islam, such practice is prohibited and condemned because 
the rate of return should not be guaranteed for just lending money. It is also worth 
mentioning that it is not only the religion of Islam that condemns and prohibits practices 
that deals with riba or usury. According to Cornell (2006), original versions of Christianity 
and Judaism also condemn and prohibit such practices. Apparently, the social welfare 
decline that results from usury is the primary motive behind these condemnation and 
prohibitions. 
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Based on this view, it is legitimate for people not familiar with the Shariah law to 
argue that such law prevents profiting from lending money and transfers banks and 
financial institutions from commercial entities to a more charitable ones because they will 
just be offering financial services without being able to profit from them. However, such 
argument can be refuted once the Shariah law perception of interest-based financing is 
understood.  
Shariah law requires lenders to decide beforehand on the reasons for lending their 
money. In other words, lenders should decide whether they want to lend their money 
because they want to 1) help other parties that need that money (lending money as a 
sympathetic act) or 2) share profits with borrowers. If the former is the case, Shariah law 
requires lenders to refrain from claiming any additional amounts in excess of the principal 
amount even if these additional amounts are to compensate lenders for an expected 
depreciation in the value of money or other factors such as inflation. This is because under 
Shariah law, money is considered a medium of exchange and has no value in itself. Thus, 
lending money on the basis of helping others should not be recognized as an income-
generating transaction by requiring interest payments, see Ahmad & Hassan (2006). 
However, if the main reason for lending money is to share profits with the borrower, 
then according to the Shariah law, lenders can claim a predetermined proportion of the 
profit provided that these lenders also share losses or risks with the other party. That is, 
the lender and the borrower should come together to form a joint venture whereby both of 
them have a joint stake in the business and share its outcome (whether it was a profit or a 
loss) on a fair and proportional basis. The main idea of sharing risk and return is to prevent 
7 
 
all forms of injustices that could face both borrowers and lenders when they resort to an 
interest-based financing system.  
For example, the interest-based financing system do the borrower no justice in 
situations where the lender wants to just guarantee his/her return while leaving the 
borrower’s return at the mercy of the actual business outcome. So if the borrower’s 
business goes down, then he/she will bear the total loss as well as be responsible for the 
interest payments. Also, the interest-based financing system do the lender no justice in 
situations where the borrower makes massive return from their businesses, while the 
lender is only restricted to a fixed rate of return that could be far less than what is deserved 
if the lender was sharing profits and losses with the borrower. It is worthy to note that 
such fixed rate of return that the lender receives is related to the market supply and 
demand for money and some other factors, but not to the actual business outcome. Under 
Shariah law, guaranteeing a lender a positive rate of return that is irrespective of the actual 
business outcome is not permitted and is considered one form of riba. 
Overall, reasons why Shariah law prohibits riba (interest-based financing) can be 
summarized in the following three points. First, riba as one way to create unbalanced 
atmosphere and a main reason that could bring injustice to either party: lenders and/or 
borrowers. Second riba implies improper appropriation of other people’s property. Khan & 
Mirakhor (1987) said that ”interest on money is regarded as representing unjustified 
creation of instantaneous property rights: unjustified, because interest is a property right 
claimed outside the legitimate framework of recognized property rights; instantaneous, 
because as soon as the contract for lending upon interest is concluded, a right to the 
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borrower’s property is created for the lender.” Third, riba leads to both society corruption 
and social welfare decline which, in turn, diminishes human personality and wealth. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that the prohibition of riba has a major implication on 
Islamic finance empirical studies. That is, techniques of cash-flow analysis, cost of capital 
estimation, and asset valuation models that are very well established in modern 
conventional finance have some form of interest rate component embedded in them. So 
does this mean that it is inappropriate to use such techniques in Islamic finance empirical 
studies? The answer is no, because the interest rate component in all these techniques 
could be replaced by a rate of return that is not in the context of interest-based debt. That 
is, replace the interest rate component with a rate of return on one of the permissible 
alternative financing sources such as Islamic bonds (sukuk).1  
2.1.1. Time Value of Money in Islamic Finance 
Conventional finance views money as a commodity, and therefore it can be freely 
traded (sold, bought, and speculated on). This implies that money has an intrinsic value 
and given it up for lending should not be free of charge. Thus, under conventional finance, 
lenders require a predetermined return in the form of interest rates to compensate them 
for the money’s time value. On the other hand, Islamic finance views money differently. 
Money is not considered a commodity, but instead it is considered a mean of exchange, and 
therefore does not have any value in itself because it cannot be utilized to directly fulfill 
human needs. Money only becomes useful and has an intrinsic value when it is used to 
acquire real assets or to buy goods and services. 
                                                        
1 Please see section ‎3.3: Asset-Based Financing Concept for more information on sukuk. 
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This implies two main issues. The first issue is that if money is traded for money, 
then time value of money does not exist in Islamic finance or it is not recognized by the 
Shariah law. This is because Shariah law views money as a medium of exchange and, thus 
has no value in itself. Thus, if money is exchanged for money, such as the case in borrowing 
or lending, the payment on both sides must be equal and no predetermined return in the 
form of interest (as a compensation for the money’s time value) is permissible. In other 
words, Shariah law does not recognize the time value of money when it is based on the 
exchange of monetary values, loans, and/or debt. 
The second issue is that if money takes another form other than money itself, such 
as when money is used to trade assets and commodities, then time value of money does 
exist in Islamic finance and it is recognized by the Shariah law. To elaborate, if money is 
used to buy an asset today at a certain price, then that same asset in the future is more 
likely to be worth more or less than the price at which it was originally bought for; leading 
to either a profit or a loss. Since that profit or loss is based on trading goods and not on 
trading money itself, it is recognized by the Shariah law. This implicitly assumes that 
Shariah law does recognize the time value of money, but it only does so when money is in 
another form other than money itself. Based on this view, Shariah law has no problem with, 
for example, buying on credit contracts (asset is delivered now and the price is paid some 
time later in the future). In these contracts, the agreed upon price that is paid in the future 
is usually higher than the asset’s spot price when the contract is made. That difference 
between the asset’s spot and future prices can be considered as compensation to the seller 
for the money’s time value. In Shariah law, time value of money in that form is permissible 
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and recognized because it is not based on money itself, but instead is based on trading that 
asset.2 
2.2. The Prohibition of Gharar and Maysir 
Gharar is the Arabic translation for a situation that involves risk, uncertainty, 
ambiguity, and/or deception. For example, selling something that is not owned or that 
cannot be described in accurate detail in terms of type, size, and amount, see El-Gamal 
(2000). However, because it is impossible to entirely avoid risk and uncertainty, Obaidullah 
(2005) argue that Shariah law allows for some (i.e. at the minimal) risk and uncertainty to 
be presented. What the Shariah law forbids and thus needs to be avoided are conditions 
where there exist excessive amount of risk and high level of uncertainty.   
Gharar, for example, can be observed in derivative transactions (such as forwards, 
futures, and options), short-selling, and conventional insurance activities (life insurance for 
example). Visser (2009) points out three main conditions that must be met in any financial 
contract in order to avoid engaging in gharar. First, both the subject and the price must 
exist and the other party has the ability to deliver it. Second, all characteristics and 
amounts of the counter-value must be specified. Third, quantity, quality, and date of future 
delivery must be defined beforehand. The main motives behind banning gharar can be 
summarized in the following three points: to promote transparency and fairness, prevent 
situations where potential injustice or deception to any party might occur, and avoid 
excessive risk and high level uncertainty. 
                                                        
2 Please see Obaidullah (2005) and Ahmad & Hassan (2006) for more discussion on the existence of the time 
value of money in Islamic finance.  
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Maysir is the Arabic translation for gambling or game of chance (lottery) and both 
are forbidden according to the Shariah law. Furthermore, Shariah law forbids investing in 
any business that is related to either gambling and/or game of chance.   
2.3. The Prohibition of “Haram” Trade 
Haram is the Arabic translation of impermissible or forbidden. There are some 
businesses and industries that Shariah law condemn and prohibit producing, consuming, 
distributing, and investing in because it believes that they are harmful and unfruitful to 
society. Examples for businesses and industries are, but not limited to, non-medical alcohol, 
pork production, illegal and intoxicating drugs, gambling, adult entertainment, tobacco and 
all other unethical businesses. 
3. Permissions in Islamic Finance 
Shariah law does not permit interest-based financing (riba), but it permits other 
financing modes because they apply one or more of the following three financing concepts 
that Shariah law believes would create and add real value to the economy, increase social 
welfare, minimize potential injustice, and enhance public good.  
The first concept is the profit-loss-sharing financing concept which can be 
represented by two financing modes: musharakah and mudarabah. The second concept is 
the trade-based financing concept which can be represented by four financing modes: 
murabahah, bay’mu’ajjal, salam, and ijarah. The third concept is the asset-based financing 
concept which can be represented by sukuk. 
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3.1. Profit-Loss-Sharing Financing Concept 
Musharakah is the Arabic translation of partnership. It refers to a situation where 
capital is raised by all parties of a contract. Thus, profits and losses are pro rata distributed 
and each partner has the right to participate in the decision making of the enterprise.  
Mudarabah is a special kind of musharakah where the party that has the investment 
capital and the party that has the expertise and management skills get together to 
undertake an investment project or to form a business venture. The generated profits are 
shared between parities according to a predetermined ratio that is agreed upon 
beforehand.  
However, unlike in musharakah, in mudarabah losses are only borne by the 
financier, i.e. the capital provider. As a result, the agency problem between the capital 
provider (as the principal) and the manager (as the agent) is more aggravated in 
mudarabah than in musharakah. One way to lessen the effect of this problem is to make 
managers fully liable when negligence, deliberate mismanagement, and/or clear violations 
are committed. Another way is to provide managers with more incentives to encourage 
positive behavior when they achieve specified targets or meet predefined performance 
criteria. 
Finally, there is one more condition that must be satisfied in order for both financing 
modes (musharakah and mudarabah) be Islamically acceptable. This condition is that the 
financier party cannot be guaranteed by the party being financed a positive return that is 
irrespective of the actual outcome of the project or business venture. Under Shariah law, 
guaranteeing a positive rate of return that is irrespective of the actual outcome is not 
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permitted and is considered one form of riba. Based on this view, preferred stocks are not 
permitted under Islamic finance because they guarantee the amount of dividends. 
3.2. Trade-Based Financing Concept 
Murabahah is referred to a situation where a commodity is resold with a markup on 
the original purchased price. So the way murabahah works is that a customer goes to an 
Islamic bank and specifies a commodity that he/she wants the bank to purchase. The bank 
purchases that commodity and then sells it to the customer at a markup price agreed upon 
beforehand. Note that for a murabahah contract to Islamically acceptable, there should not 
be any binding agreements between the bank and the customer. 
Looking closely at the process of murabahah, the situation can be described, to some 
extent, as a debt that arises from a credit purchase. A legitimate question could be raised 
here: Since both murabahah and interest-based financing are considered financing 
methods that creates debt, what makes murabahah and not interest-based financing 
Islamically acceptable?  
Note that the similarity between the two is only on the conceptual level where both 
are considered financing methods that creates debt. Technically, they are considered two 
different financing modes and they operate in a very dissimilar way. The main differences 
between the two financing methods can be summarized are as follows: 
First, unlike in interest-based financing, in murabahah the financier is financing an 
acquisition of an asset with acknowledged utility and known price and not a venture of 
uncertain results. Second, murabahah is based on real assets or real commodities, whereas, 
interest-based financing is based on money itself. Third, unlike in interest-based financing, 
in murabahah no further increases in the contracted price are allowed when payments are 
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delayed. Fourth, there are several risks that are associated with murabahah but not with 
interest-based financing, such as bearing all the risks of owning a real asset. Take for 
example a bank that engages in a murabahah contract with a customer to buy a car. Once 
the contract is made, that bank is responsible for anything that happens to the car, to the 
extent that the bank is obligated to replace it if damaged, as long as the ownership of that 
car is yet to be transferred to the customer. 
Bay’mu’ajjal refers to sale on credit where a commodity is delivered now and the 
price is paid some time later in the future. Salam is the opposite of bay’mu’ajjal where price 
is paid now and the commodity purchased is delivered later in the future. Payments in both 
cases may be at the time the contract is made or in installments. Finally, ijarah is referred 
to leasing. 
Finally, it is worthy to mention that in order to be Islamically acceptable, contracts 
of all discussed financing modes must not contain any of the discussed prohibited elements 
such as gharar (selling something that is not owned or cannot be described in accurate 
detail in terms of type, size, and amount) and/or guaranteeing the financier a positive rate 
of return that is irrespective of the actual outcome (riba).  
3.3. Asset-Based Financing Concept 
Sukuk are Islamic financial certificates that have characteristics that are similar to 
those of conventional bonds but a key difference is that they are asset backed. The way 
sukuk works is the issuer of a sukk sells a certificate on a real asset to an investor, who then 
rents it back to the issuer for a predetermined rental fee.3 Such fee is usually equivalent to 
                                                        
3 Sukk is the singular of sukuk. 
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an interest rate benchmark like LIBOR. The issuer also makes a contractual promise to buy 
back that certificate at a future date at the par value. 
Two main reasons that make sukuk and not conventional bonds Islamically 
acceptable. First, sukuk link their cash flows and rate of return to the purchased asset. This, 
in turn, creates a proportionate beneficial ownership in the underlying asset. This is not the 
case in conventional bonds where they link their cash flows and rate of return to money 
itself. Second, sukuk are issued on identifiable real assets that have intrinsic values, 
whereas, conventional bonds, are issued on money, which Shariah law views as a medium 
of exchange, and thus has no intrinsic value. 
4. Equity Investing in Islamic Finance   
According to Siddiqi (2002), since the mid 1980s, there were serious doubts that 
investing in the stock market is not “Islamically” acceptable. However, in the early 1990s, 
the Saudi Arabian Fiqh Academy, the leading authority on religious issues in the Muslim 
world, issued a decree ruling that within certain conditions, investing in equity is 
permissible under the Shariah law.4 Equity investing became permitted because Shariah 
scholars reached a consensus that, under certain conditions, trading stocks fulfill two 
important conditions in Islamic finance. First, trading stocks represent trading real assets 
that have intrinsic values and not just artificial ones. Second, capital gains and generated 
dividends from equity trading are comfortable with the Shariah law because they are based 
on the profit-loss sharing financing concept. 
In order for a firm to be considered Shariah-compliant, and thus its stock becomes 
permissible, it must abide by all Islamic finance principles discussed earlier. To pinpoint 
                                                        
4 Fiqh refers to the Islamic jurisprudence.  
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these firms and to distinguish them from conventional ones or to define the non-compliant 
financial practices and business activities in an Islamic firm, Shariah scholars proposed 
several rules or guidelines that can be summed up in the following two filters: the ethical 
filter and the financial filter. 
4.1. Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks    
In the light of the previous discussion, two Shariah screening filters (ethical and 
financial) are proposed in order to pinpoint firms that are compliant with the Islamic 
principles. The ethical filter evaluates the firm's overall activities and main businesses in 
order to ensure that the firm is not engaging in any of the following prohibited (haram) 
activities:5 
1. Activities that involve any form of riba (usury or interest rates). For example, 
borrowing and/or investing in interest-based instruments. Accordingly, this 
automatically excludes all interest-based financial institutions, such as conventional 
banks and conventional brokerage firms, from the Shariah-compliant firm category. 
2. Activities that are characterized with gharar. For example, activities that involve 
selling something that is not owned or cannot be described in specific detail in terms 
of size, shape, and amount. Such as trading on margin, engaging in short-selling, and 
using the future and option markets to engage in any sorts of trade. Also, some 
insurance policies, such as life insurance, are considered impermissible because they 
contain gharar elements. 
3. Activities that are related by any means to maysir or game of chance. 
                                                        
5 Please see section ‎2: Prohibitions in Islamic Finance. 
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4. Activities that are related to impermissible sectors such as businesses that deal with 
non-medical alcohol, tobacco, pork, adult entertainment, and all other unethical 
businesses. 
However, many firms find it quite difficult to devise, mange, and implement all these 
prohibitions, especially when it comes to avoiding interest rates (riba) because all financial 
systems are integrated, related, and inseparable. As a result, it is not uncommon to observe 
many firms fail to pass the ethical filter because they have a small portion of their revenues 
generated from impermissible activities (henceforth, these firms are referred to as partially 
contaminated firms).  
Taking into consideration that the majority of firms are partially contaminated 
firms, Shariah scholars eased the adherence to the Shariah law from strict adherence to 
conformity with some exceptions. This means that although they did not pass the ethical 
filter, partially contaminated firms can still be deemed Shariah-compliant if they meet two 
additional requirements and pass the financial filter. The first requirement is that these 
partially contaminated firms must be perceived by the public as exemplary firms and their 
main businesses or rendered services must be of public interest. The second requirement is 
that the permissible (halal) activities must represent the core activities of these firms, and 
the prohibited (haram) activities must be very negligible. Once these two requirements are 
met, partially contaminated firms must worry about passing the financial filter if they are 
interested in earning a Shariah-compliant title. 
The financial filter determines the level of mixed contribution from both prohibited 
and permissible activities towards the firm's revenue and profit. According to this filter, 
partially contaminated firms must maintain the following ratios to be considered as 
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Shariah-compliant: 1) the ratio of impermissible income to total income is less than 5 
percent; 2) the ratio of interest-based debt to total assets is less than 33 percent (or 30 
percent in some cases); 3) the ratio of account receivables to total assets is less than 45 
percent (or 33 percent in some cases); and 4) the ratio of interest-bearing cash and 
investments to total assets is less than 33 percent (or 30 percent in some cases). 
Note that some practitioners prefer replacing the total asset denominator with 
different forms of market capitalization such as market capitalization itself, 12-month 
market capitalization average, 24-month market capitalization average, or 36-month 
market capitalization average in order to value a company. Practitioners that prefer the 
market capitalization divisor argue that the total asset divisor is a pure accounting 
perspective that does not account for elements such as the firm’s management, staff, and 
acquired intellectual property. Practitioners that use the 12-month market capitalization 
average argue that such divisor smooth out irregular price movements. But, during the 
recent 2008 financial crisis period, it was found that such divisor undervalues firms. That 
undervaluation is not due to changes in the firm’s intrinsic value, but instead it is due to the 
bad market conditions. Thus, some practitioners suggest the use of the 24-month or the 36-
month market capitalization average instead of the 12-month market capitalization 
average; see Hassan & Mahlknecht (2011). 
5. Conclusion 
This chapter lays the foundation stone for the following two chapters where it 
provides a primer, and not a comprehensive survey, on Islamic finance. The takeaway from 
this chapter is that Islamic finance has many other implications other than identifying 
products that fit the religious preference of Muslim investors. One of these implications is 
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that Islamic finance or applying Islamic finance mandates is directly related to and affects 
fundamentals. For example, firms cannot earn an Islamic title unless they abide by all 
Shariah law restrictions and make the necessary adaptations to their regulatory, fiscal, and 
fundamental frameworks such as their business activities, operations, financing sources, 
profitability, revenues, riskiness, leverage, etc. In other words, firms cannot become Islamic 
until they successfully pass both ethical and financial filters. 
Since applying Islamic finance mandates is considered directly related to and affects 
fundaments, it is expected that the risk-return profile of all sorts of different Shariah-
compliant products would also be affected as well. In this dissertation, that effect is called 
the “Islamic-effect” and the main purpose of the following two chapters is to empirically 
investigate that Islamic-effect. Chapter two empirically investigates the issue in the cross-
sectional stock return context and chapter three empirically investigates the issue in a 
mutual fund context. 
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Chapter 2: The Islamic Risk Factor 
An Empirical Study in Saudi Arabia 
1. Introduction 
The increasing capital of Muslim investors and their strong demand to invest that 
capital in products that are only comfortable with the Shariah law stimulate the 
development of different Shariah-compliant products.6 As a result, there are now Islamic 
stocks, Islamic mutual funds, Islamic market indices, and Islamic bonds (sukuk). This opens 
the door wide for Muslim investors to participate in different capital and financial markets 
without the fear that such participation would destroy their Islamic identity or be at the 
cost of their Islamic values and morals. This also raises a legitimate question: Is the 
adherence to the Shariah law associated with at any cost? 
Several empirical studies investigate that issue by examining the Islamic-effect, 
which is the effect of applying Islamic finance mandates on the risk-return profile of 
different products, in different contexts. For example there are empirical studies that 
investigate the Islamic-effect in: 1) a mutual fund context [Kräussl & Hayat (2008), 
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009), and Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010)]; 2) a stock 
market index context [Hakim & Rashidian (2002, 2004), Hussein (2004, 2005), and Girard 
& Hassan (2008)]; and 3) a portfolio performance context [Derigs & Marzban (2009) and 
Donia & Marzban (2010)]. Unfortunately, the literature that discusses the impact of the 
Islamic-effect is still not adequate to draw a clear conclusion regarding the direction of that 
effect.  
                                                        
6 Shariah is an Arabic word. And Shariah law is the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life, both 
private and public. 
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That is, some studies find that there is a cost from adhering to the Shariah law, while 
other studies find that there is no cost from doing so. Studies, which conclude that there is a 
cost from adhering to the Shariah law, argue that Shariah-compliant products have less risk 
exposure, and thus reward investors with less return than conventional products. On the 
other hand, studies, which conclude that there is no cost from adhering to the Shariah law, 
argue that Shariah-compliant products are competitive to conventional products and that 
Islamic screens do not adversely affect the risk-return profile of these Shariah-compliant 
products. Additionally, there is another line of studies that argue that Shariah-compliant 
products could offer good hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. This is 
because Shariah law is based on principles that are conducive to enhancing public good, 
increasing social welfare, adding real value to the economy, minimizing potential injustice, 
and avoiding environmental and social crisis. For example, Shariah law prevents investing 
in instruments such as toxic assets and derivatives that have adversely affected 
conventional products and triggered the recent 2008 global financial crisis.  
In sum, results regarding the Islamic-effect are inconclusive. One main reason for 
such inconclusive results is that the Islamic finance and investment industry is still 
relatively new compared to its conventional counterpart and the literature in that field is 
still at its infancy. 
This paper contributes and lessens the gap in the existing Islamic finance and 
investment literature by investigating the impact of the Islamic-effect in a context that is 
different from that of previous studies. That is, this paper examines the Islamic-effect in the 
cross-sectional stock return context. To elaborate, this paper starts from the premise that 
adhering to the Shariah law is associated with a cost where Islamic firm stocks compensate 
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investors with lower return than conventional firm stocks. This is because Islamic firms are 
exposed to less overall risk than conventional firms due to the several restrictions and 
necessary adaptations to which these Islamic firms must commit in order for them to earn 
a Shariah-compliant title. Thus, it is expected to observe a negative relationship between 
Islamic firms and average return. In this paper, that negative relationship is referred to as 
the “negative Islamic-effect.” The main objective of this paper is to examine whether that 
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor 
that affects the cross-sectional expected stock returns. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that examines the Islamic-effect issue in such context. 
What motivates the choice of the ‘negative Islamic-effect’ to examine whether it is a 
priced risk that affects stock returns is the fact that such effect is directly related to firm 
fundamentals. To elaborate, the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations to 
which Islamic firms must commit in order for them to earn a Shariah-compliant title are 
considered issues directly related to and affect fundamentals (such as the firm’s primary 
business activities, riskiness, operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues, 
leverage, etc). Once firm fundamentals are affected, asset prices will also be affected as well 
and they will react accordingly. Thus, when examining the cross-sectional stock returns, it 
is expected to find that the negative Islamic-effect is, indeed, a risk factor that is systematic 
and cannot be diversified. In order to critically investigate this issue, this paper carries out 
the investigation to Saudi Arabia because it is one of the few countries that are known for 
their strict adherence to the Shariah law.  
Examining the Islamic-effect in stock returns is developed in two steps. The first 
step is to examine the existence of a negative Islamic-effect by investigating differences in 
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stock returns between Islamic and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia. This is done using 
two statistical methods: 1) a panel model and 2) a portfolio performance analysis. The 
second step is to examine the existence of an Islamic risk factor. That is, to test whether that 
negative Islamic-effect is considered a common (shared and undiversified) risk factor that 
affects the cross-sectional expected returns of common stocks in the Saudi Arabian market. 
This is done using time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French 
(1993). The sample period covers the period from January 2003 to April 2011. 
The panel data regression analysis reveal that after controlling for the systematic 
risk, Islamic firms, on average, earn 0.0055 less monthly returns than conventional firms 
(Table 2). Even though that effect is economically small, it is statistically significant at 5 
percent. Furthermore, the portfolio performance analysis shows that the Islamic portfolio 
underperforms the conventional portfolio using all risk-adjusted performance measures 
(Table 3). Also, when stock return portfolios are formed based on sorts of stocks on size 
and book-to-market equity, the results, in general, show that Islamic portfolios have lower 
averages of monthly excess returns than their respective conventional portfolios (Table 4 
panels B and C). All these results support the negative Islamic-effect hypothesis (negative 
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns), at least during the period 
from January 2003 to April 2011. 
Given that the negative Islamic-effect does indeed exist, an Islamic risk factor (CMI) 
is formed to test whether it could capture common variation is Saudi stock returns. CMI 
(conventional minus Islamic) is a portfolio meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related 
to the negative Islamic-effect and it is formed in a way where it focuses on the differences 
in return between conventional and Islamic firms and at the same time free, as much as 
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possible, from both size and book-to-market equity effects. The Islamic risk factor CMI is 
then augmented to a three-factor model that includes the excess market return portfolio 
(RM-RF) and both size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML) risk factors in order to 
perform asset pricing tests using time-series regressions.  
The results indicate that CMI does indeed capture strong common variation in Saudi 
stock returns not captured by the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and mimicking 
portfolios related to size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML) during the period from 
January 2003 to April 2011 (Table 7). 
Furthermore, the results from the time-series regressions indicate that the four-
factor model that includes the Islamic risk factor is considered superior to both the single-
factor model and the three-factor model in explaining common variation in Saudi stock 
returns. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section ‎2 discusses the previous literature. 
Section ‎3 discusses Saudi Arabia’s economy and stock market. Section ‎4 provides the 
hypotheses. Section ‎5 covers the data for the empirical study. Section ‎6 discusses the 
methodology. Section ‎7 provides the empirical results and discussion. And finally section ‎8 
is the conclusion. 
2. Previous Literature 
This section is divided into two subsections: previous literature on Shariah-
compliant investments (section ‎2.1) and previous literature on the cross-sectional stock 
returns (section ‎2.2). 
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2.1. Previous Literature on Shariah-Compliant Investments 
There are several studies that discuss the Islamic-effect issue in different contexts. 
The following lists previous studies that discuss the Islamic-effect in a mutual fund context 
(section ‎2.1.1), stock market index context (section ‎2.1.2), and portfolio performance 
context (section ‎2.1.3). 
2.1.1. The Islamic-Effect in a Mutual Fund Context 
Elfakhani & Hassan (2005) use a sample of 46 Islamic mutual funds from January 1, 
1997 to August 31, 2002 to examine the performance of Islamic mutual funds relative to 
Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. They employ different risk-adjusted 
performance measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Moreover, they employ 
an ANOVA statistical test. Overall, their findings suggest that there is no statistical evidence 
that there exist any performance differences between Islamic funds and the employed 
market benchmarks. However, their findings suggest that Islamic mutual funds do offer a 
good hedging opportunity against market downturns. 
Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad (2007) compare the performance of 14 Islamic funds 
relative to 51 conventional funds in Malaysia during the period from 1992 to 2001. They 
employ different measures such as the adjusted Sharpe, Treynor, adjusted Jensen alpha, 
Modigliani and Modigliani (MM) measure, and the information ratio. They find that 
conventional funds perform better than Islamic funds during bullish trends; but during 
bearish trends, Islamic funds perform better. They conclude that Islamic funds offer 
hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. They also find that conventional 
funds have diversification levels that are marginally better than Islamic funds, but both 
funds are unable to achieve at least 50 percent of the market diversification level. 
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Kräussl & Hayat (2008) use a sample of 59 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) to examine 
the performance of these funds relative to Islamic and conventional market benchmarks 
during the period from 2001 to 2006. They employ a set of measures such as the Jensen 
alpha, Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, and the information ratio. 
They find that, on average, there are no significant performance differences between IEFs 
and the employed market benchmarks (both Islamic and conventional). However, a closer 
look at the bear market of 2002, they document that IEFs significantly outperform the 
Islamic and conventional market indices using conditional CAPM. Analyzing the risk-return 
characteristics of IEFs, they find that IEFs possess superior systematic risk-to-return ratios. 
Therefore, they argue that these IEFs “seem most attractive as part of a larger fully 
diversified portfolio like a fund of funds.” 
Abderrezak (2008) examines the performance of 46 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) 
relative to conventional funds, ethical funds, and Islamic and conventional market indices 
during the period from January 1997 to August 2002. He employs several methodologies 
such as the Sharpe ratio, single-factor model, and Fama and French three-factor model. He 
finds that IEFs are 40 basis points more expensive than their conventional peers. 
Furthermore, he finds that IEFs consistently underperform their respective Islamic and 
conventional market benchmarks. Finally, he finds that there are no performance 
differences between IEFs and ethical funds. 
Muhammad & Mokhtar (2008) use weekly net asset values (NAVs) of nine Islamic 
equity funds in Malaysia in order to examine their performance relative to the Islamic 
market index, Kuala Lumpur Syariah Index (KLSI), for the period from 2002 to 2006. To 
assess the performance of these funds, they employ the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. They 
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find that eight of these funds underperform the KLSI. However, they find a bag of mixed 
results when they employ the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the 
systematic risk (beta) to assess the riskiness of these funds. 
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009) use a unique dataset of 262 Islamic equity funds 
from 20 countries and four regions in order to examine the performance of these funds 
relative to constructed portfolios that have exposure to national, regional, and global 
markets. Furthermore, they control for different investment styles by employing a 
conditional three level Carhart model. The results show that Islamic funds from eight 
nations (mostly from the western regions) significantly underperform their respective 
equity market benchmarks and Islamic funds from only three nations outperform their 
respective market benchmarks and that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks. 
Furthermore, they find that Islamic funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and 
Malaysia do not significantly underperform their respective market benchmarks nor they 
are biased towards small stocks. Finally, they argue that Islamic equity funds can offer 
hedging opportunities because their investment universe is limited to low debt-to-equity 
ratio stocks. 
Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010) use a sample of 28 Saudi mutual funds 
managed by HSBC in order to examine the performance of 12 Islamic funds relative to 16 
conventional funds during the period from January 2003 to January 2010. They use several 
performance measures such as the Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, 
and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they employ the Treynor and Mazuy model to examine the 
Saudi funds’ selectivity and market timing abilities. They find that Islamic funds 
underperform conventional funds during both full and bullish periods, but outperform 
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during bearish and financial crisis periods. Furthermore, they find that HSBC managers are 
good at showing timing and selectivity skills for Islamic funds during the bearish period, 
and for conventional funds during the bullish period. They also assert that Islamic mutual 
funds do offer hedging opportunities during economic downturns.   
2.1.2. The Islamic-Effect in a Stock Market Index Context  
Hassan (2001) employs several statistical tests such as serial correlation, variance 
ratio, and Dickey-Fuller tests in order to examine the market efficiency issue for the Dow 
Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI). He also examines the volatility of the DJIMI returns 
using a GARCH econometric framework. The sample covers the period from 1996 to 2000. 
The results show that the DJIMI is efficient and its return is normally distributed, but it 
suffers from operational inefficiencies that need to be corrected to make the risk behavior 
of the DJIMI stable overtime. 
Hakim & Rashidian (2002) use daily data from October 12, 1999 to September 4, 
2002 and find that the Dow Jones Islamic Market Index (DJIMI) outperforms the Wilshire 
5000 using the Sharpe ratio. Furthermore, a co-integration and a causality analyses reveal 
that the two indices are not integrated and that the DJIMI is also not integrated with the 
three-month Treasury bill. They conclude that Muslim investors are not penalized by 
investing in an Islamic index. And there are diversification benefits that investors could 
reap by investing in the DJIMI because it moves independently from the broad market 
index (Wilshire 5000) and the three-month Treasury bill. 
Hakim & Rashidian (2004) use the Treynor ratio and the conditional CAPM on a 
weekly data from January 2000 to August 2004 to analyze the Dow Jones Islamic Market 
Index (DJIMI) behavior and its risk characteristics relative to a broader market index [Dow 
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Jones World (DJW) Index] and an ethical index [Dow Jones Sustainability (DJS) World 
Index]. The results indicate that the total fluctuations in the DJIMI have been in line with 
both the DJW and the DJS during the studied period. Also, the results indicate that investors 
tracking the DJIMI are exposed to no more risk than investors tracking the DJW. However, 
when the performance of the DJIMI is compared to that of the DJS, they find that the DJIMI 
underperforms the DJS. 
Hussein (2004) uses risk-adjusted performance measures such as the Jensen alpha, 
Sharpe, and Treynor in order to examine whether there are any performance differences 
between the FTSE Global Islamic Index and both the FTSE All-World Index and the 
FTSE4Good (a socially responsible index). He also examines the long-run performance 
differences using cumulative returns (CRs) and the buy-and-hold returns (BHRs). The 
sample covers the period from July 1996 to August 2003. The results show that the FTSE 
Islamic Index performs as well as the FTSE All-World Index during the overall period. 
However, breaking the sample period into bull and bear periods, the results indicate that 
the FTSE Islamic Index outperforms (underperforms) the FTSE All-world Index during the 
bull (bear) period. The outperformance of the FTSE Islamic Index during the bull period is 
attributed to the fact that the index tracks large number of firms with low leverage ratios. 
However, the underperformance of the index during the bear period is attributed to the 
exclusion of liquor firms, which are considered best performers during bear periods. 
Hussein (2005) finds that the application of the Shariah screens does not adversely 
affect the performance of two Islamic indices [FTSE Global Islamic Index and Dow Jones 
Islamic Market Index (DJIMI)]. The results indicate that the short and long-term 
performance measures of these indices are no different from that of non-Islamic Indices 
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(FTSE All World Index and Dow Jones World Index). The sample period is from December 
1993 for Dow Jones indices and from January 1996 for FTSE indices to December 2004. 
Yusof & Abd. Majid (2007) use GARCH (1,1) and VAR models to investigate the effect 
of different monetary variables (narrow money supply, broad money supply, interest rates, 
exchange rates, and the industrial production index) on the conditional volatility of both 
Islamic and conventional stock market indices in Malaysia for the period from January 
1992 to December 2000. The employed Islamic and conventional stock market indices are 
the Rashid Hussain Berhad Islamic Index (RHBII) and the Kuala Lumpur composite Index 
(KLCI), respectively. They find that due to the application of Shariah screens, the RHBII is 
less vulnerable to volatilities in monetary policy variables (i.e. interest rates) than the KLCI. 
Girard & Hassan (2008) examine the performance of five FTSE Islamic indices and 
their corresponding non-Islamic indices during the period from December 1998 to 
December 2006. A set of different measures are used such as Sharpe, Treynor, Jensen 
alpha, and Fama (selectivity, net selectivity, and diversification) measures. Also, they 
examine the performance persistence of these indices using Carhart (1997) four-factor 
model. They find that there are no significant performance differences between Islamic and 
non-Islamic indices. They also find that Islamic indices are growth and small cap oriented, 
whereas conventional indices are more value and mid cap oriented. The co-integration 
analysis reveal that both types of indices are integrated for the overall period and the 
behavior of Islamic indices do not differ from that of conventional indices. 
Hashim (2008) utilize the CAPM to examine the application of Shariah screens on 
the FTSE Global Islamic Index during the period from January 1999 to May 2007. The 
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results indicate that the Islamic index outperforms the socially responsible index 
(FTSE4Good) and operates in line with the broader market index (FTSE All-World Index).  
2.1.3. The Islamic-Effect in a Portfolio Performance Context  
Derigs & Marzban (2009) use a Markowitz mean-variance model to examine the 
performance of Shariah-compliant portfolios relative to unconstrained conventional 
portfolios. When constructing the Shariah-compliant portfolios, they applied the Shariah 
screens on the portfolio level instead of on the asset level. The results show that the 
reduced investment universe adversely affects the overall risk and return of Shariah-
compliant portfolios when compared to conventional portfolios.  
Donia & Marzban (2010) compare the performance of Islamic and conventional 
portfolios during the recent 2009 financial crisis period using a mean-variance 
optimization model in order to construct a set of efficient portfolios. They find that Islamic 
portfolios are able to outperform conventional portfolios because Islamic portfolios benefit 
from the lower leverage feature that is documented to have a negative relationship with 
performance. They also find that Shariah-compliant portfolios outperform conventional 
portfolios of small-cap and large-cap US firms. 
2.2. Previous Literature on the Cross-Sectional Stock Return 
Sharpe (1964), Lintner (1965), Mossin (1966), and Black (1972) provide a turning 
point in the stock return behavior literature by independently developing what came to be 
recognized as the Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM). Such model implies that the market 
excess return portfolio is sufficient to explain the differences in the cross-sectional average 
returns (beta is all that matters). Since then, sizeable empirical studies came out and 
received much attention because they find contradicting evidence to the CAPM predictions.  
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One of the early empirical studies that find contradicting evidence to the CAPM is 
Basu (1977). He finds that there is significant evidence that stocks of firms with high 
earnings-to-price (E/P) ratios earn higher average returns than stocks of firms with low 
earnings-to-price ratios. His findings imply that differences in return could not be 
attributed to just differences in beta.  
Banz (1981) shows another contradiction to the CAPM. He finds that stocks of firms 
with low market capitalization have higher average returns than stocks of firms with large 
market capitalization. Furthermore, Basu (1983) finds that small firms continue to have 
higher average returns even after the earnings-to-price effect is controlled. 
Rosenberg, Reid, & Lanstein (1985) show a third contradiction to the CAPM by 
finding that stocks of firms with high book-to-market (B/M) equity ratios have higher 
average returns than stocks of firms with low B/M ratios. Chan, Hamao, & Lakonishok 
(1991) find similar results when studying the Japanese market.  
Bhandari (1988) shows a fourth contradiction to the CAPM. He finds that even when 
size and beta are controlled, there is a positive relationship between leverage and average 
returns. 
Jegadeesh (1990) and Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) provide a fifth contradiction to 
the CAPM by documenting the momentum effect. They show that short-tem winners 
(stocks that do well over the previous few months) will continue their momentum over the 
next month. However, short-term losers (stocks that have low returns in the previous few 
months) will continue their poor performance for another month. 
Fama & French (1992) examine beta, E/P, size, B/M, and leverage all together in a 
single cross-sectional study from 1963 to 1990. They find that the effect of beta disappears 
34 
 
when beta is allowed to vary in a manner unrelated to size. This result is a shot in the CAPM 
heart. Further, they find that size and B/M absorb the explanatory power of all other 
variables. Thus, they conclude that the cross-sectional average stock returns in the US can 
be nicely explained by these two variables.    
Fama & French (1993) introduce a three-factor model where they augment the 
single-factor model with two additional risk factors related to size (SMB) and book-to-
market equity (HML). They find that the factor loadings on all three risk factors (RM-RF), 
SMB, and HML are significant and the R-squared values for most portfolios are close to one. 
This means that SMB and HML capture independent sources of systematic risk not 
captured by (RM-RF). They conclude that the three-factor model very well explains the 
variation in the cross-sectional average returns of US common stocks during the period 
from 1963 to 1991. They also conclude that their results indicate that there is a risk story 
behind the dispersion in average returns, and not as several empirical studies argue that 
the market is inefficient. 
3. Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market 
Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy and its economy is considered the largest in 
the Middle Eastern region. According to Jadaw Investment 2010 annual report, Saudi 
Arabia’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) was around USD 435.8 billion and is 
expected to reach USD 507.3 billion in 2012.7 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is considered the 
largest oil producer, oil exporter, and oil proven reserves possessor worldwide.8 It has 
almost 20 percent of the world’s proven reserves and has a leading role in OPEC. The 
                                                        
7 Source is Jadaw Investment, a pioneer in the field of Shariah-compliant investment services: 
http://jadwa.com/about/pages/annualreports.aspx. 
8 Oil proven reserves are the stock of proved reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). Source is CIA world fact 
book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.   
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official currency is the Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) and since 1986 it has been effectively 
pegged to the US dollar where USD 1 = 3.75 SAR.  
The Saudi stock market is also considered by far the largest in the Middle Eastern 
region. The total equity market capitalization at the end of April 2011 reached SAR 1,346 
billion (around USD 358.93 billion).9 Furthermore, there are 146 firms listed on the 
exchange as of April 30, 2011. Table 1 provides descriptive statistics of all listed firms. In 
the table, the average, standard deviation, maximum, and minimum monthly returns are 
reported for the period from January 2003 to April 2011. 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of All 146 Listed Firms from January 2003 to April 
2011 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of all 146 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) as of 
April 30, 2011. Also, this table reports the descriptive statistics for the market index, Tadawul All Share Index 
(TASI), and the Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. In the table, the average, 
standard deviation, maximum, and minimum monthly returns are reported for the period from January 2003 
to April 2011. Also reported are the Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) for each firm and the firm’s ticker. 
Finally, the last column “Islamic Dates” shows which of the listed firms are Islamic and which are non-Islamic 
during the studied period. Furthermore, that column shows the dates when each of these listed firms was 
able to make it to the Shariah-compliant firm list issued by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi. 
SIC Ticker Avg Ret St. Dev Max Min Islamic Dates 
1. Insurance Sector 
8010 TAWUNIYA 0.30% 15.25% 57.94% -44.23% Not Islamic 
8020 MALATH -3.75% 16.24% 25.30% -39.83% Not Islamic 
8030 MEDGULF -0.90% 13.25% 29.59% -25.08% Not Islamic 
8040 ALLIANZ SF -2.28% 17.78% 44.48% -46.67% Not Islamic 
8050 SALAMA 0.00% 21.75% 71.05% -50.00% Not Islamic 
8060 WALAA INSURANCE -1.96% 16.38% 45.05% -36.36% Not Islamic 
8070 ARABIAN SHIELD -1.44% 17.07% 57.24% -36.00% Not Islamic 
8080 SABB TAKAFUL 0.14% 22.59% 69.10% -42.92% Not Islamic 
8090 SANAD -0.08% 30.18% 168.82% -33.91% Not Islamic 
8100 SAICO -1.97% 18.74% 50.89% -43.47% Not Islamic 
8110 SAUDI INDIAN -0.11% 21.78% 89.69% -38.78% Not Islamic 
8120 GULF UNION -1.75% 17.13% 47.30% -36.16% Not Islamic 
8130 ALAHLI TAKAFUL 0.75% 22.94% 81.71% -40.11% Not Islamic 
8140 AL-AHLIA -0.20% 24.73% 70.14% -44.65% Not Islamic 
8150 ACIG 0.41% 24.05% 88.60% -46.19% Not Islamic 
8160 AICC 2.09% 17.10% 53.73% -22.35% Not Islamic 
8170 TRADE UNION 2.99% 17.04% 56.80% -16.05% Not Islamic 
8180 SAGR INSURANCE 3.30% 24.11% 90.19% -45.19% Not Islamic 
8190 UCA 0.48% 14.72% 41.00% -23.13% Not Islamic 
                                                        
9 Information is based on the April-2011 monthly Statistical Report issued by the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul). 
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8200 SAUDI RE 1.13% 9.72% 25.00% -9.42% Not Islamic 
8210 BUPA ARABIA 3.16% 15.95% 52.78% -20.16% Not Islamic 
8220 WEQAYA TAKAFUL -3.21% 13.20% 24.74% -24.22% Not Islamic 
8230 AL RAJHI TAKAFUL -0.17% 15.46% 38.30% -21.89% Not Islamic 
8240 ACE -1.77% 12.44% 32.51% -16.57% Not Islamic 
8250 AXA-COOPERATIVE 1.85% 17.99% 53.47% -16.33% Not Islamic 
8260 GULF GENERAL -2.62% 9.43% 9.39% -12.69% Not Islamic 
8270 BURUJ 5.13% 17.55% 23.47% -17.14% Not Islamic 
8280 AL ALAMIYA -0.19% 12.19% 33.67% -18.96% Not Islamic 
8290 SOLIDARITY 6.45% 17.36% 24.92% -10.21% Not Islamic 
8300 WATANIYA 5.00% 19.08% 22.34% -13.14% Not Islamic 
8310 AMANA INSURANCE 25.96% 30.76% 61.69% -12.89% Not Islamic 
2. Agriculture & Food Industries Sector 
2050 SAVOLA 1.81% 12.84% 47.01% -47.41% Not Islamic 
2100 FPCO 3.24% 24.67% 133.71% -60.03% 200301-201104 
2270 SADAFCO 0.21% 18.53% 81.18% -48.30% 200807-201104 
2280 ALMARAI 1.21% 12.71% 52.50% -34.74% 200407-200906 
4061 ANAAM HOLDING 3.89% 29.59% 132.03% -60.83% 200508-201104 
6001 HB 3.19% 14.35% 57.92% -14.72% Not Islamic 
6002 HERFY FOODS 1.18% 3.68% 5.59% -3.33% 200907-201104 
6010 NADEC 2.54% 15.25% 66.28% -45.19% 200301-201104 
6020 QAACO 3.51% 20.55% 73.79% -57.36% 200301-201104 
6040 TAACO 2.37% 18.47% 66.28% -51.39% 200301-201104 
6050 SFICO 5.53% 28.50% 177.30% -60.00% 200706-200806 
6060 SHARQIYA DEV CO 3.91% 21.83% 91.76% -62.27% 200612-201104 
6070 JADCO 3.01% 18.76% 75.25% -56.21% 200301-201104 
6080 BISACO 6.41% 25.76% 126.84% -58.82% Not Islamic 
6090 GIZACO 3.10% 18.52% 56.41% -54.31% Not Islamic 
3. Building & Construction Sector 
1310 MMG -0.80% 11.00% 25.17% -18.12% 200706-201104 
1320 SSP -1.26% 9.18% 21.11% -11.48% 200907-201104 
1330 ALKHODARI 8.07% 23.39% 42.78% -7.83% Not Islamic 
2040 SCERCO 3.24% 14.41% 55.83% -44.20% 200301-201104 
2090 NGCO 0.65% 12.44% 70.60% -29.38% 200301-201104 
2110 SCACO 2.60% 19.48% 86.48% -51.40% Not Islamic 
2130 SIDC 3.39% 19.76% 64.74% -56.75% 200706-200806 
2160 SAAC 0.96% 15.53% 46.28% -42.86% Not Islamic 
2200 APCO 2.17% 18.23% 59.57% -43.44% Not Islamic 
2240 ZIIC 1.07% 13.18% 48.02% -35.21% Not Islamic 
2320 AL BABTAIN -0.11% 11.53% 28.19% -26.40% Not Islamic 
2360 SVCP -0.77% 12.57% 22.22% -34.64% Not Islamic 
2370 MESC -1.75% 13.49% 28.89% -32.01% Not Islamic 
4230 RED SEA HOUSING 0.42% 12.85% 40.64% -36.53% Not Islamic 
4. Petrochemical Industries Sector 
2001 CHEMANOL 1.23% 8.85% 21.30% -18.26% Not Islamic 
2002 PETROCHEM 3.67% 12.45% 35.67% -15.63% Not Islamic 
2010 SABIC 2.53% 12.89% 40.16% -35.90% Not Islamic 
2020 SAFCO 2.49% 12.75% 37.87% -46.48% Not Islamic 
2060 NIC 3.32% 15.85% 48.14% -39.00% Not Islamic 
2170 ALCO 4.55% 23.88% 109.55% -53.82% 200407-200603 
2210 NAMA 3.03% 18.61% 66.16% -57.94% Not Islamic 
2250 SIIG 0.75% 15.87% 53.49% -46.43% Not Islamic 
2260 SPC 0.00% 17.94% 55.25% -40.06% 200301-200611 
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2290 YANSAB 2.18% 14.12% 27.11% -36.27% Not Islamic 
2310 SIPCHEM 0.29% 11.31% 34.08% -25.60% Not Islamic 
2330 ADVANCED 0.55% 14.88% 40.29% -34.50% 200807-201104 
2350 KAYAN 0.12% 11.64% 26.32% -27.48% Not Islamic 
2380 PETRO RABIGH 2.33% 10.64% 21.73% -26.35% Not Islamic 
5. Industrial Investment Sector 
1210 BCI 2.54% 9.62% 31.29% -11.63% Not Islamic 
1211 MA’ADEN 3.42% 8.84% 25.29% -17.11% Not Islamic 
1212 ASTRA 2.28% 10.55% 39.09% -15.43% 200807-201104 
1213 ALSORAYAI 2.97% 7.79% 13.70% -3.22% 200907-201104 
1214 SHAKER 1.69% 9.21% 11.28% -9.47% 200907-201104 
2070 SPIMACO 1.93% 16.60% 71.33% -46.35% Not Islamic 
2150 ZOUJAJ 2.14% 14.85% 49.82% -38.02% Not Islamic 
2180 FIPCO 1.99% 18.41% 59.39% -61.84% 200301-201104 
2220 NMMCC 3.99% 21.29% 103.00% -51.55% 200706-201104 
2230 SCCO 1.89% 14.82% 41.71% -42.14% Not Islamic 
2300 SPM 0.13% 9.67% 24.14% -21.07% 200604-201104 
2340 ALABDULLATIF -0.99% 9.35% 29.06% -26.22% 200612-201104 
4140 SIECO 2.40% 19.67% 63.66% -51.00% 200807-201104 
6. Banks and Financial Services Sector 
1010 RIBL 0.90% 9.35% 28.88% -17.91% Not Islamic 
1020 BJAZ 1.78% 12.37% 40.01% -37.25% 200807-201104 
1030 SAIB 0.61% 10.91% 34.32% -23.37% Not Islamic 
1040 AAAL 0.69% 10.73% 36.34% -30.31% Not Islamic 
1050 BSFR 1.21% 9.12% 25.52% -23.44% Not Islamic 
1060 SABB 1.64% 9.17% 29.99% -23.62% Not Islamic 
1080 ARNB 1.28% 10.47% 33.46% -23.13% Not Islamic 
1090 SAMBA 1.57% 11.02% 39.67% -27.53% Not Islamic 
1120 RJHI 1.98% 11.65% 36.54% -33.16% 200301-201104 
1140 ALBI -2.63% 12.64% 23.81% -32.72% 200407-201104 
1150 ALINMA -0.10% 6.24% 17.77% -11.69% 200706-201104 
7. Cement Sector 
3010 ARCCO 0.87% 11.26% 41.55% -29.32% 200301-201104 
3020 YACCO 1.13% 10.74% 52.91% -35.73% Not Islamic 
3030 SACCO 0.84% 10.01% 27.98% -45.06% 200706-201104 
3040 QACCO 1.32% 11.73% 62.89% -33.65% 200508-201104 
3050 SOCCO 0.63% 8.09% 27.45% -27.20% 200706-201104 
3060 YNCCO 0.39% 9.16% 27.45% -22.56% 
200301-200406 
& 200706-200806 
3080 EACCO 0.44% 9.05% 30.14% -24.45% 200612-201104 
3090 TACCO 0.54% 10.27% 41.95% -31.36% 200706-201104 
3091 JOUF CEMENT 3.47% 12.30% 19.70% -8.16% Not Islamic 
8. Retail Sector 
4001 A.OTHAIM MARKET 3.47% 8.61% 26.34% -15.79% 200807-201104 
4002 MOUWASAT 2.76% 7.66% 17.52% -8.19% 200907-201104 
4050 SASCO 2.56% 20.11% 127.27% -38.71% 200508-201104 
4160 THIMAR 3.85% 23.95% 81.92% -51.09% 200807-201104 
4180 AHFCO 1.48% 18.23% 73.83% -48.85% Not Islamic 
4190 JARIR 1.68% 7.85% 41.91% -12.19% Not Islamic 
4200 ALDREES 0.08% 10.97% 29.31% -25.00% 200508-201104 
4240 ALHOKAIR 0.89% 10.58% 28.43% -26.56% 200706-201104 
4290 ALKHALEEJ TRNG -0.57% 11.60% 36.45% -31.60% Not Islamic 
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9. Real Estate Development Sector 
4020 SRECO 1.12% 14.77% 45.60% -45.15% Not Islamic 
4090 TIRECO 1.86% 14.65% 71.09% -39.94% 200301-201104 
4100 MCDCO 0.82% 15.58% 92.01% -46.65% 200301-201104 
4150 ADCO 1.79% 17.00% 73.66% -47.93% 200301-201104 
4220 EMAAR EC -1.36% 9.92% 23.61% -28.74% 200706-201104 
4250 JABAL OMAR -0.81% 5.04% 10.39% -9.64% 200706-201104 
4300 DAR AL ARKAN -2.88% 8.48% 21.91% -29.89% 200706-201104 
4310 KEC 3.21% 13.18% 18.90% -8.55% 200907-201104 
10. Multi-Investment Sector 
2030 SARCO 3.56% 21.60% 134.26% -44.49% Not Islamic 
2120 SAICO 4.29% 23.19% 83.52% -58.56% 200807-201104 
2140 AADC 2.75% 23.35% 149.40% -57.09% Not Islamic 
2190 SISCO 2.97% 21.19% 103.82% -49.48% 200807-201104 
4080 ATTMCO 2.12% 16.86% 70.39% -41.30% Not Islamic 
4130 ABDICO 4.70% 28.20% 90.10% -73.98% 200706-201104 
4280 KINGDOM 0.38% 17.11% 58.95% -22.31% Not Islamic 
11. Telecommunication & Information Technology Sector 
7010 STC -0.12% 9.07% 25.39% -23.23% Not Islamic 
7020 EEC -1.03% 12.32% 41.94% -29.95% 200301-201104 
7030 ZAIN KSA -1.02% 7.14% 21.05% -16.67% 200706-200906 
7040 ATHEEB TELECOM -4.01% 9.49% 4.11% -24.69% 200807-201104 
12. Transport Sector 
4030 NSCSA 1.01% 13.50% 41.49% -35.34% Not Islamic 
4040 SAPTCO 1.02% 14.30% 53.11% -43.73% 200301-201104 
4110 SLTCO 1.93% 18.44% 73.66% -49.30% 200301-201104 
4260 BUDGET SAUDI -1.32% 13.61% 45.63% -31.17% 200706-201104 
13. Media and Publishing  Sector 
4070 TAPRCO 3.75% 21.39% 79.81% -56.99% Not Islamic 
4210 RESEARCH -2.00% 8.04% 16.13% -23.03% Not Islamic 
4270 SPPC -1.96% 10.06% 34.15% -21.85% Not Islamic 
14. Energy & Utilities Retail  Sector 
2080 NGIC 0.59% 12.61% 48.01% -46.32% 200407-201104 
5110 SECO 1.03% 10.99% 46.24% -33.49% Not Islamic 
15. Hotel & Tourism Sector 
4010 SHARCO 2.24% 19.22% 124.83% -56.17% 200807-201104 
4170 TECO 3.90% 23.98% 86.55% -55.38% 200612-201104 
Market Index and Risk-Free rate 
 
TASI 1.28% 8.55% 19.25% -21.58% 
 
 
SIBOR 1Month 0.21% 0.15% 0.43% 0.03% 
 
Table 1 shows that the Amana Insurance Company has the highest average monthly 
returns for the entire studied period with around 25.96 percent, and the Atheeb 
Telecommunication Company has the lowest average monthly returns with a loss of 
around 4.01 percent. The table also shows that all the 146 firms fall under 15 different 
sectors. The insurance sector has the largest number of firms (31 firms) and both sectors 
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(the energy and utilities retail sector and the hotel and tourism sector) have the least 
number of firms (2 firms in each sector). Table 1 also reports the descriptive statistics for 
the market index: Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) and the Saudi Interbank Offering Rate 
(SIBOR) with one-month maturity. TASI and SIBOR have average monthly returns of 
around 1.28 and 0.21 percent, respectively. 
Table 1 also reports a column named “Islamic Dates” that provides the dates when 
each of the 146 listed firms was able to make it to the Shariah-compliant firm list that is 
issued by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi.10 Dr. Al-Osaimi thoroughly studies all listed 
firms on a regular basis in order to determine which of these firms are considered Shariah-
compliant. Dr. Al-Osaimi is a very well respected scholar in the Islamic finance field, thus 
his list of Islamic firms is considered an essential guide for Muslim investors to identify 
Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia. 
4. Hypotheses 
4.1. Hypothesis I 
Islamic firms must abide by all Shariah law restrictions and make the necessary 
adaptations to their regulatory and fiscal frameworks before they can be considered 
Islamic. An example of these restrictions and adaptations is that Islamic firms must avoid 
all interest-based financing sources (riba) or, in some specific situations, must maintain a 
very low interest-based debt ratio (no more than 33 or 30 percent). Thus, Islamic firms are 
believed to be inherently less susceptible to financial risk and changes in interest rates than 
                                                        
10 Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi is an Associate Professor in the College of Economics and 
Administrative Science at Al Emam Mohamed bin Saud Islamic University. Also, Dr. Al-Osaimi is the general 
manager of the “Shariah Group” unit at Albilad Bank and a member of the bank’s Shariah board. He was also 
the ex-manager of the department of Shariah audit at Al-Rajhi Bank. The main website for Dr. Al-Osaimi can 
be found at the following link: www.halal2.com. 
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are conventional firms. Another example is that Islamic firms cannot utilize risky 
instruments such as toxic assets and derivatives that have adversely affected conventional 
firms and triggered the recent 2008 global financial crisis. A third example is that Islamic 
firms must avoid all gharar (uncertainty, ambiguity, and excessive risk) elements in all 
financial transactions and contracts, whereas, conventional firm are not obligated to do so. 
All these restrictions and necessary adaptations to which Islamic firms must commit 
in order to earn a Shariah-compliant title make these firms have some unique business 
characteristics and a distinguished risk-return profile when compared to conventional 
firms. And this is what will be examined under this hypothesis.  
Hypothesis I states that it is expected that Islamic firms are less vulnerable to 
instability and have less risk exposure when compared to conventional firms due to the 
application of Islamic finance mandates. Consequently, according to the risk-return 
tradeoff theory which suggests that low risk is associated with low return and high risk is 
associated with high return, it is expected that Islamic firm stocks provide investors with 
lower return than conventional firm stocks because of the lower level of risk assumed 
when Islamic stocks are held. In other words, it is expected that there is a negative 
relationship between Islamic firms and average returns (negative Islamic-effect). 
4.2. Hypothesis II 
Adhering to the Shariah law is considered an issue that could affect stock prices 
since it is directly related to and affects firm fundamentals. That is, applying Islamic finance 
mandates does, in one way or another, affect firms’ primary business activities, riskiness, 
operations, financing sources, profitability, revenues, leverage, etc. Since this is the case, 
this hypothesis tests whether that negative Islamic-effect (from hypothesis I) is considered 
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a common, systematic, and undiversified risk factor that affects cross-sectional stock 
returns.  
To do so, a portfolio that mimics the risk factor in returns related to the negative 
Islamic-effect is constructed. That portfolio is called CMI (conventional minus Islamic) or 
the “Islamic risk factor” and it represents risk premiums for holding conventional stocks 
over Islamic stocks. CMI is then augmented to a three-factor model that includes the excess 
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and both size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML) 
risk factors in order to perform asset pricing tests using time-series regressions.  
If that negative Islamic-effect indeed proxy for a common risk factor in returns, then 
CMI should capture common variation in stock returns not captured by (RM-RF), SMB, and 
HML risk factors. That is, loadings on CMI should be significant and negative (positive) 
when the Islamic (conventional) portfolio is used as the dependent variable in the time-
series regressions, regardless of the size and book-to-market equity orientation of that 
Islamic (conventional) portfolio. This implies that even if the market, size, and book-to-
market equity effects are controlled, investors holding Islamic stocks require lower rate of 
return than investors holding conventional stocks because firms that adhere to the Shariah 
law are less risky than firms that do not adhere to such law. 
Furthermore, if CMI captures common variation in stock returns, the following 
should be observed when CMI is augmented to the three-factor model: 1) an increase in the 
adjusted R-squared values and 2) a decrease in the standard error of regression s(e) values 
because s(e) represents the firm-specific unsystematic and thus diversifiable risk. 
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5. The Data 
5.1. Data Sources 
From the main website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), the following has 
been collected: the daily stock prices for the entire 146 listed firms from January 1, 2002 to 
April 30, 2011; the book value of equity for all 146 firms at December 31 for each year from 
2002 to 2010; and the daily number of shares outstanding for all 146 firms from January 1, 
2002 to April 30, 2011.11 Also collected are the daily values of the market index: Tadawul 
All Share Index (TASI) for the period from January 1, 2003 to April 30, 2011. It is worthy to 
note that the selected sample is free from the survivorship bias.12 As mentioned earlier, the 
list of Shariah-compliant Saudi firms used in this empirical study is based on the list 
provided by Dr. Muhammad bin Saud Al-Osaimi. 
From Bloomberg, the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with 
one-month maturity is collected for the period from January 2003 to April 2011. In this 
empirical study, SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the monthly risk-
free rate. As discussed earlier, it would be more appropriate to use the rate of return on 
sukuk instead of the rate of the risk-free asset since Shariah law forbids any return that is in 
the context of debt. But the problem is that data on sukuk rates are still not fully available to 
be used in Islamic finance empirical studies. 
                                                        
11 The main website of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul) can be found at the following link: 
http://www.tadawul.com.sa.  
12 Bishah Agriculture Development Company (SIC=6080) is the only firm that was suspended from trading. It 
has been suspended since January 10, 2007. Even though it is suspended, Bishah is included in the firm 
sample for this empirical study.   
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5.2. Preparing the Monthly Time-Series Data 
The sample period covers the period from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly 
data). The computed monthly variables used in this empirical study are: the monthly stock 
and TASI returns, the firm’s monthly market value (size), and the firms’ monthly book-to-
market equity that is based on the year ending in December 31 of (t-1). They are calculated 
as follows: 
- The monthly stock and TASI returns are calculated as follows: 
(1)      
                             
                             
     
where     is the monthly return at month (M) for either firm (i) or TASI.  
- The firm’s monthly market value (size) is calculated as follows: 
(2) 
                                   
                                          
where        is the monthly size at month (M) for firm (i).  
- The firm’s monthly book-to-market equity is computed using values of the year ending 
in December 31 of (t-1) in order to make sure that the book value of equity is already 
known. It is calculated as follows: 
(3)        
          
          
 
 where: 
                Book-to-market equity at month (M) for firm (i) of the year (t) 
             Book value of equity for firm (i) on the last day of December of year (t-1) 
            Market value for firm (i) on the last day of December of the year (t-1) and it is 
calculated as follows:                                              
                                                         
It is worthy to note that it is considered a common practice in finance to exclude 
firms from both financial and utility sectors when performing standard asset pricing tests 
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due to their unique financial structure. These firms use leverage or borrowed funds 
extensively and therefore are more sensitive to financial risks and changes in interest rates 
than firms in other sectors. When interest rates increase, share prices of these firms 
normally decrease. This could be a serious issue when performing standard asset pricing 
tests. For example, a study by Foerster & Sapp (2005) show that including firms in the 
financial sector does, indeed, affect the significance results of the explanatory power of 
different risk factors in these tests. 
In this empirical study, however, including firms in both financial and utility sectors 
is believed to be necessary and a must. To elaborate, firms that are classified as Shariah-
compliant are expected to adhere to all Shariah law principles regardless of their sector. 
Therefore, the issue that firms are more or less sensitive to financial risks and changes in 
interest rates is irrelevant when assessing the firms’ strict adherence to the Shariah law. 
Firms have only two choices: either they are Shariah-compliant or not. Thus, for this 
empirical study, it is necessary to include all firms, including those in both financial and 
utility sectors, since the main objective is to examine the Islamic-effect and whether that 
effect is considered a systematic risk factor that affects cross-sectional stock returns. 
6. Methodology 
The role of the Islamic-effect in stock returns for the period from January 2003 to 
April 2011 is developed in two steps. The first step is to examine the existence of a negative 
Islamic-effect (section ‎6.1). The second step is to examine the existence of an Islamic risk 
factor (section ‎6.2). 
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6.1. Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect 
A negative Islamic-effect exists if there is statistical evidence that Islamic firms in 
Saudi Arabia underperform conventional firms. Two statistical methods are used to 
investigate this issue: a panel model (section ‎6.1.1) and a portfolio performance analysis 
(section ‎6.1.2). 
6.1.1. The Panel Model 
The main reason for using a panel model is to control for any significant firm effects. 
Usually when estimating a panel model, a choice between three different models [a pooled 
regression model (OLS), a fixed effect model (FEM), or a random effect model (REM)] must 
be made. That choice depends on which model best fits the sample data in hand.  
OLS is used when all constant terms are equal. That is, there are no significant firm 
effects. In such cases, data are pooled and an ordinary least squares (OLS) regression is 
preformed. Under the assumption of equality constant terms, the OLS estimator is 
considered efficient and consistent. OLS is estimated as follows:   
(4)                                        
where: 
                  Return for firm (i) at month (t) 
                 Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t) 
                   The intercept of the model 
                   The systematic or market risk 
               The return on the market index (TASI) at month (t) 
                  Coefficient on the Islamic dummy variable. It represents the difference in stock 
returns between Islamic and conventional firms. Thus, this coefficient 
represents the Islamic-effect 
            Dummy variable that give 1 when firm (i) is considered Islamic during month 
(t) and zero otherwise 
                   The error term with zero mean for firm (i) 
FEM is used when there are significant firm effects. That is, constant terms are not 
equal. If so, OLS estimator is biased and inconsistent due to the variable omission problem. 
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In order test the significance of the firm effects, an F-test is performed to test the null 
hypothesis that constant terms are all equal (Ho:   =  ). Failing to reject the null hypothesis 
indicates that OLS should be used because it is efficient and FEM is not. However, rejecting 
the null hypothesis indicates that FEM should be used because it is consistent and OLS is 
not. The FEM is estimated as follows: 
(5)                                                              
where   -     are firm-specific constant terms,      -        are firm dummy variables 
to designate a particular firm, and the rest is defined as in equation (4). 
REM is used when there are significant firm effects but omitting such effects from 
the model will not affect the consistency of the model because it is assumed that they are 
not correlated with the independent variables. That is, the REM treats firm-specific 
constant terms as randomly distributed variables across cross-sectional units. The 
advantage of the REM is that it uses far less estimated parameters, and therefore is more 
efficient than the FEM if there is no correlation between the omitted firm-specific effects 
and the independent variables. The disadvantage of this model is that it could be 
inconsistent if there is correlation between the unobserved firm effects and the 
independent variables.  
To test which model to use, FEM or REM, a Hausman’s specification test is 
preformed. Under the null hypothesis of no correlation; both models (FEM and REM) are 
consistent, but the FEM is inefficient. Under the alternative hypothesis; the FEM is 
consistent, but the REM is not. Thus, failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of 
the REM, whereas, the rejection of the null hypothesis supports the use of the FEM. REM is 
estimated as follows: 
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(6)                                          
where    is the firm-specific random element and the rest is defined as in equation (4). 
Regardless what model is used, a statistically significant and negative coefficient on 
the “Islamic” dummy variable (i.e. the D coefficient) indicates that there is statistical 
evidence that Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia produce average returns that are lower than 
conventional firms. That is, there is a negative Islamic-effect and such effect is attributed to 
the fact that Saudi Islamic firms are strictly adhering to the Shariah law. 
6.1.2. Portfolio Performance Analysis 
One advantage of this method is that the idiosyncratic risk (firm-specific risk) will 
be diversified away when stocks are held in a portfolio. Based on this view, two value-
weighted return portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are formed and three common risk-
adjusted performance measures (Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha) are computed for 
each portfolio in order to test the existence of the negative Islamic-effect. The market 
benchmark used to assess the performance of both Islamic and conventional portfolios is 
the created market return portfolio (RM) as shown in equation (11). The three risk-
adjusted performance measures are: 
6.1.2.1. Sharpe Ratio 
The Sharpe ratio is derived by Sharpe (1966) as an absolute risk-adjusted 
performance measure. Thus, no market benchmark is needed to calculate the Sharpe ratio. 
The idea of this ratio is to see how much additional return is received for the additional 
volatility of holding the risky asset over the risk-free asset. The risk in the Sharpe ratio is 
measured by the portfolio’s standard deviation, which represents the total risk (diversified 
and undiversified risks). This ratio is useful in ranking portfolios because a higher ratio is 
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only warranted if return is higher with the same level of risk or if the risk is lower with the 
same level of return. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows: 
(7)     
             
  
 
where:  
     Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p) 
         The average rate of return for portfolio (p) 
        The average risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity 
     Standard deviation of portfolio (p) 
6.1.2.2. Treynor Ratio 
Treynor ratio is considered a relative risk-adjusted measure. Thus, a market 
benchmark is needed to calculate it. This ratio measures the excess returns over the 
riskless asset that could be earned per unit of market risk. Market risk or systematic risk is 
measured by the portfolio’s beta, which measures the co-movement of the portfolio with 
the market.  It is calculated as follows: 
(8)      
             
  
 
where                   are defined as in equation (7) and: 
     Treynor ratio for portfolio (p) 
       Beta for Portfolio (p). Estimated using CAPM as shown in the following equation: 
(9)                              
where: 
        Rate of return for portfolio (p) at month (t) 
        Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t) 
        The intercept and it is also called the Jensen alpha index 
         Portfolio's beta or the market risk 
      The return on the created market return portfolio at month (t) as shown in equation (11) 
         The error term with zero mean 
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6.1.2.3. Jensen Alpha Index 
The Jensen alpha index is a relative risk-adjusted performance measure that was 
first introduced by Jensen (1967) to determine the abnormal return of a portfolio over the 
theoretical expected return using a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). Thus, the Jensen 
alpha index is the constant term in the single-factor model presented in equation (9). A 
portfolio is considered outperforming the market index if the Jensen alpha is positive and 
statistically significant. 
In addition to the created Islamic and conventional value-weighted return 
portfolios, an Islamic and a conventional value-weighted size and book-to-market equity 
portfolios are formed. The Islamic and conventional value-weighted return, size, and book-
to-market equity portfolios are calculated as follows: 
(10)               
       
        
  
    
           
  
    
 
where: 
             Represents the following variables: the value-weighted return (   ), size 
(       , and book-to-market equity (    ) for portfolio (p = Islamic or 
conventional) at month (M) 
                         is defined as in equation (2) for month (M) and firm (i). The subscript (p) 
refers to the portfolio (Islamic or conventional) 
         
  
    
  
Is the sum of sizes for all (N) firms in portfolio (p = Islamic or conventional) at 
month (M)  
                    Represents the following variables: the monthly return (   ), size (       , and 
book-to-market equity (     ) as defined, respectively, in equations (1), (2), and 
(3) for firm (i) in portfolio (p = Islamic or conventional) at month (M) 
The averages of the monthly value-weighted portfolios of return (   ), size 
(       , and book-to-market equity (    ) are calculated by just taking the simple 
average values of these portfolios (see Table 3). 
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6.2. Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor  
This section discusses the methodology used to test if the negative Islamic-effect is 
considered a common (shared and undiversified) risk factor that affects the cross-sectional 
expected returns of common stocks in the Saudi Arabian market. The methodology used is 
the time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French (1993).  
6.2.1. The Dependent Variables 
The dependent variables are eight value-weighted excess return portfolios formed 
on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah compliancy 
(Islamic and conventional). The dependent variables’ monthly return, size, and book-to-
market equity are calculated as shown in equations (1), (2), and (3), respectively.  
In each month (M), stocks are split into two groups: Islamic (I) and conventional (C). 
Then for each of these two groups, the following is performed. Stocks are ranked on size 
and then the median size is used to split stocks into two groups: small (S) and big (B). Then 
stocks are ranked again but this time the ranking is based on the book-to-market equity 
and then the median book-to-market equity is used to split stocks into two groups: Low (L) 
and High (H). It is worthy to note that because there are relatively few listed firms (only 
146 firms) on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul), it is better and more appropriate to 
split each of the size and book-to-market equity stocks into maximum two groups in order 
to avoid a skewed distribution.  
Then eight stock portfolios are formed based on the intersection of the two Shariah 
compliancy groups (I and C), two size groups (S and B), and two book-to-market equity 
groups (L and H). The eight portfolios are as follows: (ISL, ISH, IBL, IBH, CSL, CSH, CBL, and 
CBH). For example, the ISL portfolio contains stocks in the Islamic group that are also in the 
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small size and low book-to-market equity groups. The CBH portfolio contains stocks in the 
conventional group that are also in the big size and high book-to-market equity groups.  
Finally, the monthly value-weighted return, size, and book-to-market equity for the 
eight portfolios are calculated. The calculation of these value-weighted portfolios is as 
shown in equation (10). Then the averages of the monthly value-weighted return, size, and 
book-to-market equity portfolios are calculated by just taking the simple average value of 
these portfolios (see Table 4 panels B and C).  
6.2.2. The Explanatory Variables 
The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and 
portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB), 
book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI). The time-series of the 
(RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI are also called monthly risk premiums for risk factors related 
to the market, size, book-to-market equity, and the negative Islamic-effect, respectively. 
The market return portfolio RM is calculated as shown below and then the excess 
market return portfolio (RM-RF) is calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate (SIBOR with 
one-month maturity) from RM. 
(11)    
 
 
                                   
As discussed in the literature review, it is very well documented that there is a 
negative relationship between size and average returns. Thus, SMB (small minus big) is 
calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the two small Islamic and the 
two small conventional portfolios minus the average return on the two big Islamic and the 
two big conventional portfolios. This difference is expected to make the created portfolio 
that mimics the risk factor that is related to size free, as much as possible, from both the 
52 
 
book-to-market equity and the Islamic-effect influences and more focused on the 
differences in return between small and big stocks. SMB is calculated as follows: 
(12)      
 
 
                                       
Also as discussed in the literature review, it is very well documented that there is a 
positive relationship between book-to-market equity and average returns. Thus, HML (high 
minus low) is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the two high 
Islamic and the two high conventional portfolios minus the average return on the two low 
Islamic and the two low conventional portfolios. This difference is expected to make the 
created portfolio that mimics the risk factor that is related to the book-to-market equity 
free, as much as possible, from both the size and the Islamic-effect influences and more 
focused on the differences in return between value (high book-to-market equity) and 
growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. HML is calculated as follows: 
(13)     
 
 
                                       
Based on hypothesis I, it is expected that there is a negative relationship between 
Saudi Islamic firms and average returns (negative Islamic-effect). Thus, a portfolio meant to 
mimic the risk factor in returns that is related to the negative Islamic-effect is created and 
in this paper that portfolio is referred to as CMI (conventional minus Islamic) or the 
“Islamic risk factor.” It is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the four 
conventional portfolios minus the average return on the four Islamic portfolios. Forming 
CMI in that manner makes the created portfolio that mimics the risk factor that is related to 
the negative Islamic-effect more focused on differences in return between conventional 
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and Islamic firms and at the same time free, as much as possible, from both size and book-
to-market equity effects. CMI is calculated as follows: 
(14)     
 
 
                                       
Finally, averages of all independent variables (averages of monthly risk premiums 
for the market, size, book-to-market equity, and Islamic risk factors) are just the simple 
average values of these variables (see Table 4 panel A). 
6.2.3. The Four-Factor Model 
The time-series regressions are estimated as follows: 
(15)                                                          
where: 
          Rate of return for the portfolio (p) at month (t) 
         Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at month (t) 
          The intercept of the model 
           Portfolio's beta or the market risk  
        Return on the created market portfolio at month (t) as shown in equation (11) 
           Loadings on the size risk factor for portfolio (p) 
      (Small minus big) size risk factor 
           Loadings on the book-to-market equity risk factor for portfolio (p) 
      (High minus low) book-to-market equity risk factor 
            Loadings on the Islamic risk factor for portfolio (p) 
        (Conventional minus Islamic) Islamic risk factor. 
           The error term with zero mean 
It is worthy to note that it is essential to test the null hypothesis of zero intercepts in 
order to assess how well the cross-sectional average returns are sufficiently explained by 
averages of risk premiums of common risk factors related to the market (RM-RF), size 
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI).  
If this four-factor model is very well specified, then intercepts should be 
indistinguishable from zero (insignificant and close to zero). This is because averages of 
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SMB, HML, and CMI are expected to explain the differences in average returns across 
stocks, and the average excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) is expected to explain why 
stock returns are, on average, above the risk-free rate (SIBOR with one-month maturity).  
7. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The following empirical results discussion is divided into two main sections. The 
first section (section ‎7.1) discusses the results from examining the existence of a negative 
Islamic-effect. In this section, the results from utilizing a panel model (section ‎7.1.1) as well 
as the results from employing a portfolio performance analysis (section ‎7.1.2) is presented. 
The second section (section ‎7.2) discusses the results from examining the existence of an 
Islamic risk factor using time-series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & 
French (1993). In this section, the descriptive statistics results for both independent and 
dependent variables (section ‎7.2.1) as well as the results from the time-series regressions 
(section ‎7.2.2) are presented. 
7.1. Results from Examining the Existence of a Negative Islamic-Effect 
7.1.1. The Panel Model Results 
Table 2 presents the results from testing the existence of a negative Islamic-effect 
using a panel model. As shown from the table, the null hypothesis that all constant terms 
are equal cannot be rejected. That is, the F-statistics is around 0.7693 and it is insignificant 
at all conventional levels (p-value is 0.9815). This supports the use of the OLS over the FEM 
because no significant firm effects are present (OLS is efficient, but FEM is not). 
Looking at the OLS results, the coefficient on the Islamic dummy variable is 
approximately -0.0055 and it is significant at 5 percent (t-statistics is -2.162). This supports 
the existence of a negative Islamic-effect where Islamic firms earn, on average, 0.0055 less 
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monthly returns than conventional firms. Even though the return difference between 
Islamic and conventional firms is economically small, the significance of such difference 
cannot be disregarded. 
Table 2: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Panel Model 
The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011. The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi 
Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The proxy for the market index is the Tadawul All 
Share Index (TASI). The dependent variable is the excess monthly stock returns over the monthly risk-free 
rate for all 146 firms listed on the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul). The independent variables are the 
monthly excess market returns over the monthly risk-free rate and the Islamic dummy variable, which gives 1 
if the firm (i) is Islamic during month (t) and zero otherwise. There are three models reported: ordinary least 
squares (OLS), fixed effect model (FEM), and random effect model (REM). The adjusted R-squared from each 
model is also reported. Also, reported are the F-statistics and the p-value for testing the hypothesis that all 
constant terms are equal (         . Failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of OLS, however, 
rejecting the null supports the use of the FEM. Also, reported are the Hausman test and the p-value for testing 
the hypothesis of choosing the REM over the FEM. Failing to reject the null hypothesis supports the use of the 
REM, whereas, rejecting the null supports the use of the FEM. Finally, all standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. 
OLS :                                       
FEM:                                                             
REM:                                          
 
OLS FEM REM 
Intercept 0.0085 
 
0.0084 
T-stat 4.902*** 
 
3.569*** 
(RM-RF) 1.0690 1.0640 1.0670 
T-stat 42.29*** 42.66*** 63.56*** 
Islamic  -0.0055 -0.0157 -0.0077 
T-stat -2.162** -2.564** -2.061** 
Adjusted R-Squared 29.96% 29.71% 29.96% 
Number of Firms    146   
Number of Observations (Unbalanced Data) 9404 
 
F (145, 9256) of Ho: OLS, Ha: FEM 
 
0.7693 
 
P-value 
 
0.9815 
 
Hausman test, Chi Square (2) of Ho: REM, Ha: FEM 3.9501 
 
P-value   13.88%   
              *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
7.1.2. The Portfolio Performance Analysis Results 
Table 3 presents the results of the created value-weighted Islamic and conventional 
portfolios. The results show that averages of the monthly value-weighted Islamic and 
conventional return portfolios (non risk-adjusted average returns) are 2.16 and 1.82 
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percent per month and they are significantly different from zero at 10 and 5 percent, 
respectively. Furthermore, the results show that the non risk-adjusted average return for 
the Islamic portfolio is only marginally 0.34 percent higher than that of the conventional 
portfolio [t-statistics is only (0.229)]. 
Table 3: Testing the Negative Islamic-Effect Using a Portfolio Performance Analysis 
Two value-weighted return portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are formed and three common risk-
adjusted performance measures (Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha) are calculated for each portfolio in order 
to test for the negative Islamic-effect existence. In addition to the Islamic and conventional value-weighted 
return portfolios, an Islamic and a conventional value-weighted size and book-to-market equity portfolios are 
formed. The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011. The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly 
Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The market benchmark used is the created 
market return portfolio as shown in equation (11). The mean, size, and BM refer to the averages of the value-
weighted monthly return, size, and book-to-market equity portfolios, respectively. SAR refers to the Saudi 
Arabian riyal. Firms refers to the average of monthly number of firms in the portfolio. The t(mean) refers to 
the t-statistics of a zero-mean test. Difference and t(difference) refer to the difference in average returns 
between Islamic and conventional portfolios and the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero mean-
difference, respectively. The Jensen alpha index and the beta, which is used in the Treynor ratio calculation, 
are estimated using a standard single-factor model and all standard errors are corrected for 
heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test.  
Portfolio Islamic Conventional 
Mean 2.160% 1.820% 
t(mean) 1.846* 2.053** 
Difference 0.34% 
t(difference) 0.2290 
Sharpe 16.60% 18.10% 
Treynor 1.960% 2.390% 
Jensen Alpha -0.0014 0.0019 
Size (Thousands of SAR) 32,045,383.46 80,586,674.91 
BM 1.347 1.508 
Firms 32.34 61.70 
                            *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
However, when risk is adjusted, the results indicate that the Islamic portfolio 
slightly underperforms its counterpart the conventional portfolio using both the Sharpe 
and Treynor ratios. The Sharpe ratios for both Islamic and conventional portfolios are 
around 16.60 and 18.10 percent per month, respectively. The Treynor ratios for both 
Islamic and conventional portfolios are around 1.960 and 2.390 percent per month, 
respectively. Looking at the Jensen alpha index, the results indicate that the Islamic 
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portfolio slightly underperforms the market benchmark by 0.0014 per month, whereas, the 
conventional portfolio slightly outperforms the market benchmark by 0.0019 per month. 
However, that under- and out-performance is only marginal. 
Furthermore, the results show that the average of the Islamic size-portfolio is SAR 
32 billion (approximately USD 8.5 billion) and it is considerably lower than the average of 
the conventional size-portfolio of SAR 80.6 billion (approximately USD 21.5 billion). Also 
the average of the Islamic book-to-market-equity-portfolio is 1.347 and it is somewhat 
lower than the average of the conventional book-to-market-equity-portfolio of 1.508. 
Additionally, the average number of firms in the Islamic portfolio (32.34) is considered 
almost one-half of the average number of firms in the conventional portfolio (61.7). 
7.1.3. Interpretation 
The results from both methods (panel model and portfolio performance analysis) 
are very much consistent and indicate, as hypothesized, that there is a negative 
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns. That negative relationship is 
referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.” In other words, investors holding Saudi Islamic 
firm stocks are rewarded with lower return than investors holding Saudi conventional firm 
stocks, at least during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. This could be attributed 
to the fact that Saudi Islamic firms are more conservative, less vulnerable to instability, and 
have less risk exposure when compared to Saudi conventional firms. This is not surprising 
given the several restrictions and the necessary adaptations to which Islamic firms must 
commit to earn a Shariah-compliant title. 
However, it is worthy to note that although Saudi Islamic firms underperform Saudi 
conventional firms, that underperformance is considered somewhat economically small. 
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This is considered good news for Muslim investors because for them it is a relief to know 
that there is not a great cost for preserving their Islamic values, morals, and identity. 
These findings lead to the second part of this paper which is to examine if that 
negative Islamic-effect is associated with a common risk factor that might explain the 
negative relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns. 
7.2. Results from Examining the Existence of an Islamic Risk Factor 
7.2.1. Descriptive Statistics Results  
This section reports the descriptive statistics for both the independent (section 
‎7.2.1.1) and the dependent (section ‎7.2.1.2) variables used in the time-series regressions.  
7.2.1.1. Descriptive Statistics for the Independent Variables 
Table 4 panel A reports the mean, standard deviation, and t-statistics for testing the 
hypothesis of zero-mean for the market return portfolio (RM), excess market return 
portfolio (RM-RF), size risk factor (SMB), book-to-market equity risk factor (HML), and the 
Islamic risk factor (CMI). Also, panel A reports the correlation coefficients between (RM-
RF), (SMB), (HML), and (CMI) which are considered the independent variables in the time-
series regressions. As discussed earlier, (RM-RF), (SMB), (HML), and (CMI) are also called 
risk premiums for risk factors related to the market, size, book-to-market equity, and 
negative Islamic-effect, respectively.     
The results indicate that the average risk premium for the market risk factor (RM-
RF) during the entire sample period (January 2003 to April 2011) is around 2.10 percent 
per month and it is significantly, at 10 percent, different from zero (t-statistics is 1.913). 
This is quite large from and investment perspective (around 25.2 percent per year).  
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In order to understand why it is quite large, (RM-RF) is investigated during two 
different Saudi stock market trends: bull (from January 2003 to February 2006) and bear 
(from March 2006 to April 2011). The results (not tabled) indicate that during the bull 
(bear) period, the average risk premium for (RM-RF) is approximately 7.14 (-0.64) percent 
per month or 85.68 (-7.68) percent per year. This means that the observed large average 
risk premium for (RM-RF) during the entire sample period can be attributed to the 
aggressive bullish market activities that took place during the period from January 2003 to 
February 2006. 
On the other hand, averages of risk premiums for risk factors related to size (SMB), 
book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI) are all less than one 
percent per month (0.747, 0.344, and 0.042 percent per month, respectively). Furthermore, 
they are all insignificantly different from zero at all conventional levels due to their high 
standard deviations (8.10, 4.14, and 4.24 percent per month for SMB, HML and CMI, 
respectively). Nevertheless, the results from (Table 7) show that the effect of these 
independent variables (SMB, HML, and CMI) on the estimated spread in monthly stock 
returns is quite significant. Not only that, but also the estimated spread in returns due to 
both size and book-to-market equity risk factors is considered quite large.  
For example, the significant slopes on SMB cover a range from 0.424 to 0.564 (when 
slopes are positive) and from -0.433 to -0.556 (when slopes are negative). This means that 
the estimated spread in monthly returns due to the size risk factor is very large and 
significant where it ranges from 31.67 percent (0.747 x 0.424) to 42.13 percent (0.747 x 
0.564) when slopes are positive and from -32.35 percent (0.747 x -0.433) to -41.53 percent 
(0.747 x -0.556) when slopes are negative. 
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Similarly, the significant slopes on HML cover a range from 0.214 to 0.857 (when 
slopes are positive) and from -0.520 to -0.883 (when slopes are negative).13 This means 
that the estimated spread in monthly returns due to the book-to-market equity risk factor 
is also very large and significant where it ranges from 7.36 percent (0.344 x 0.214) to 29.48 
percent (0.344 x 0.857) when slopes are positive and from -17.89 percent (0.344 x -0.520) 
to -30.38 percent (0.344 x -0.883) when slopes are negative. 
Finally, the significant slopes on CMI cover a range from 0.345 to 0.785 (when 
slopes are positive) and from -0.316 to -0.814 (when slopes are negative). This makes the 
significant estimated spread in the monthly returns due to the Islamic risk factor ranges 
from 1.45 percent (0.042 x 0.345) to 3.30 percent (0.042 x 0.785) when slopes are positive 
and from -1.33 percent (0.042 x -0.316) to -3.42 percent (0.042 x -0.814) when slopes are 
negative. It is worthy to note that the estimated spread in the monthly returns due CMI is 
considered small and not as large as that due to either SMB or HML. That small spread is 
very much consistent with the results obtained from examining the negative Islamic-effect 
existence (section ‎7.1) where results show that there is a negative Islamic-effect, but that 
effect is somewhat small. 
Panel A also reports the correlation coefficients between the independent variables 
used in the time-series regressions: (RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI. The results provide clear 
evidence that the way SMB, HML, and CMI are calculated does, in fact, separate, as much as 
possible, the effects of the size, book-to-market equity, and negative Islamic-effect from 
each other. This minimizes the multicollinearity problem in the four-factor model. The 
                                                        
13 Note that excluded from that range is the slope of 0.123 when the CBL portfolio is used as the dependent 
variable in the time-series regressions. This is because results from (Table 7: Four-Factor Model) show that 
such slope is insignificantly different from zero at all conventional levels. 
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correlation coefficient between SMB and both HML and CMI is -0.0282 and -0.147, 
respectively. And the correlation between HML and CMI is only 0.0751. 
Table 4: Descriptive Statistics for Independent and Dependent Variables in the 
Time-Series Regressions 
The dependent variables are eight value-weighted excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), 
book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent 
variables are the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk 
factors in return related to size (SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI). 
The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free rate is the 
monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. The market benchmark used (RM) 
is the created market return portfolio as shown in equation (11). Panel A reports the mean and standard 
deviation for the explanatory variables along with the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero means. 
Also reported in panel A is the correlation coefficients between all explanatory variables used in the time-
series regressions. Panels B and C report the descriptive statistics for the Islamic and conventional portfolios 
(dependent variables), respectively. In each panel, averages of monthly value-weighed excess return, size, 
and book-to-market equity portfolios are reported along with averages of monthly number of firms in each 
portfolio. Also reported are the t-statistics for testing the hypothesis of zero means for each of the eight 
excess return portfolios. SAR refers to the Saudi Arabian riyal. 
Panel A: Explanatory Variables 
Variable Mean Std. t(mean) Correlation 
RM 2.310% 11.000% 2.108** RM-RF SMB HML CMI 
RM-RF 2.100% 11.000% 1.913* 1 
   
SMB 0.747% 8.100% 0.922 0.568 1 
  
HML 0.344% 4.140% 0.831 -0.194 -0.0282 1 
 
CMI 0.042% 4.240% 0.0981 -0.189 -0.147 0.0751 1 
           *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
7.2.1.2. Descriptive Statistics for the Dependent Variables 
Table 4 panels B and C report the descriptive statistics results for all Islamic and 
conventional portfolios (dependent variables), respectively. In each panel, averages of 
monthly value-weighed excess return, size, and book-to-market equity portfolios are 
reported along with averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio. The average 
excess return results for both portfolios, Islamic (left-hand side of panel B) and 
conventional (left-hand side of panel C), are considered the range of cross-sectional 
average returns that risk premiums for common risk factors in returns (independent 
variables) are attempting to explain in the time-series regressions. 
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Table 4 Continued 
 
Dependent variables: portfolios sorted based on Shariah compliance (Islamic and conventional), size (small and big), 
and book-to-market equity (high and low) 
 
 
Panel B: Islamic Portfolios 
Averages of monthly value-weighted excess return portfolios 
                                                        Averages of monthly value-weighted 
                                                    size and book-to-market (BM) portfolios 
                                    and averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio 
Size Quintile 
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles 
Size Quintile 
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles 
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Means Std t(mean) Size (Thousands of SAR) BM Firms 
Small 2.160% 2.290% 13.30% 14.20% 1.621 1.613 Small 889,224.7 887,740.6 1.0360 3.3540 8.410 7.850 
Big 2.110% 1.770% 14.20% 9.990% 1.489 1.768* Big 41,572,233.1 13,216,526.8 0.7260 2.3370 8.270 7.810 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
 
 
 
Panel C: Conventional Portfolios 
Averages of monthly value-weighted excess return portfolios 
                                                        Averages of monthly value-weighted 
                                                    size and book-to-market (BM) portfolios 
                                    and averages of monthly number of firms in each portfolio 
Size Quintile 
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles 
Size Quintile 
Book-to-Market Equity Quintiles 
Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High Low High 
Means Std t(mean) Size (Thousands of SAR) BM Firms 
Small 2.210% 3.240% 15.40% 14.80% 1.435 2.186** Small 851,981.4 916,841.7 1.3010 2.9870 15.30 15.150 
Big 1.240% 1.80% 9.210% 8.990% 1.351 1.998** Big 118,092,960.6 22,343,710.7 1.0640 2.1740 14.740 16.510 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
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The results confirm findings of previous studies that there is a negative relationship 
between size and average return. That is, the results indicate that average excess return 
decreases with size in both book-to-market equity quintiles for both Islamic and 
conventional portfolios. For example, when moving from the small to the big quintile under 
the low quintile, average excess return decreases from 2.16 to 2.11 percent per month for 
Islamic portfolios (panel B) and from 2.21 to 1.24 percent per month for conventional 
portfolios (panel C). Also, when moving from the small to the big quintile under the high 
quintile, average excess return decreases from 2.29 to 1.77 percent per month for Islamic 
portfolios (panel B) and from 3.24 to 1.8 percent per month for conventional portfolios 
(panel C). 
The results, in general, also confirm findings of previous studies that there is a 
positive relationship between book-to-market equity and average returns. That is, the 
results indicate that average excess return increases with book-to-market equity in both 
size quintiles for both Islamic and conventional portfolios except for the big-Islamic 
portfolio. For example, when moving from the low to the high book-to-market equity 
quintile under the small quintile, average excess return increases from 2.16 to 2.29 percent 
per month for Islamic portfolios (panel B) and from 2.21 to 3.24 percent per month for 
conventional portfolios (panel C). Also, when moving from the low to the high book-to-
market equity quintile under the big quintile, average excess return increases from 1.24 to 
1.80 percent per month for conventional portfolios (panel C); but decreases from 2.11 to 
1.77 percent per month for Islamic portfolios (panel B). 
Looking at the left-hand side of both panels B and C, the results show that the 
average excess return decreases when moving from conventional (panel C) to Islamic 
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(panel B) stock portfolios, regardless of the size and book-to-market equity orientations of 
these portfolios. The results indicate that the monthly average excess return decreases 
from: 1) 2.21 to 2.16 percent when moving from CSL to ISL; 2) 3.24 to 2.29 percent when 
moving from CSH to ISH; and 3) 1.80 to 1.77 percent when moving from CBH to IBH. These 
results are very much consistent with other previously obtained results and provide 
additional evidence that supports the hypothesis of a negative Islamic-effect in Saudi Stock 
returns, at least during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. However, there is one 
exception to the above results. That is, the average excess return increases from 1.24 to 
2.11 when moving from the CBL to IBL. 
Note that the hypothesis of zero-means cannot be rejected for five out of eight 
portfolios (ISL, ISH, IBL, CSL, and CBL). These results are not surprising given that stock 
returns are very volatile (high standard deviations that are around 14 percent per month). 
The good news is that such results will not have an adverse affect on the power of the 
asset-pricing tests. This is because, as shown in (Table 7), the created common risk factors 
in returns are going to absorb most of the variation in stock returns, and therefore the 
asset-pricing tests on the intercepts in the time-series regressions are going to show that 
all intercepts are indistinguishable from zero. In other words, the model is well specified. 
Looking at the right-hand side of panels B and C in (Table 4), the results show that 
averages for size-portfolios range from SAR 887.7 million (around USD 236.7 million) to 
SAR 41.6 billion (around USD 11.1 billion) for Islamic portfolios (panel B); and from SAR 
852 million (around USD 227.2 million) to SAR 118.1 billion (around USD 31.5 billion) for 
conventional portfolios (panel C). Furthermore, the results show that averages for book-to-
market equity portfolios range from 0.726 to 3.354 for Islamic portfolios (panel B); and 
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from 1.064 to 2.987 for conventional portfolios (panel C). Finally, results show that 
averages of monthly number of firms in the Islamic portfolios (panel B) range from 7.81 to 
8.41, whereas, that range is around 14.74 to 16.51 in the conventional portfolios (panel C). 
7.2.2. Time-Series Regressions Results 
Examining the existence of a common Islamic risk factor in Saudi stock returns is 
developed in three steps. First, utilize a single-factor model. Regressions based on the 
single-factor model employ only the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) to explain the 
excess return on eight stock return portfolios. Second, utilize a three-factor model. 
Regressions based on the three-factor model employ the excess market return portfolio 
(RM-RF) and mimicking return portfolios for factors related to size (SMB) and book-to-
market equity (HML) to explain the excess return on eight stock return portfolios. Third, 
utilize a four-factor model. Regressions based on the four-factor model employ the excess 
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and mimicking return portfolios for factors related to size 
(SMB), book-to-market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI) to explain the 
excess return on eight stock return portfolios.  
Note that results from the four-factor model show that the model works very well, 
but the single-factor and three-factor models help explain why.  
Table 5 shows the results from the single-factor model. The results show that the 
excess return on the market portfolio (RM-RF) do indeed, as expected, capture significant 
amount of variation in stock returns. The   coefficients from all regressions are positive 
and highly significant at 1 percent. Furthermore, the results show that both Islamic-small 
portfolios (ISL and ISH) are less sensitive to market movements than their corresponding 
conventional-small portfolios (CSL and CSH). The  s for ISL and ISH portfolios are 1.117 
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and 1.152, whereas the  s for CSL and CSH portfolios are 1.311 and 1.257, respectively. 
The opposite is true when looking at the big-size quintiles. That is, Islamic-big portfolios 
are more sensitive to market movements than conventional-big portfolios. The  s for IBL 
and IBH portfolios are 1.104 and 0.772, whereas the  s for CBL and CBH portfolios are 
0.614 and 0.672, respectively. 
Table 5: Single-Factor Model 
This table reports the results from the single-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted 
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah 
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variable is only the excess market return portfolio 
(RM-RF). The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free 
rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. All standard errors are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. s(e) is standard error of 
regression. 
                             
   
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles 
 
Size 
Quintile  
Islamic Conventional 
   
Low High Low High 
  
Small 
Coef -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 0.006 
T-stat -0.403 -0.210 -0.967 1.133 
Big 
Coef -0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 
T-stat -0.368 0.255 -0.071 0.768 
  
Small 
Coef 1.117 1.152 1.311 1.257 
T-stat 20.231*** 18.013*** 22.486*** 22.503*** 
Big 
Coef 1.104 0.772 0.614 0.672 
T-stat 9.071*** 13.269*** 7.096*** 11.794*** 
s(e) 
Small 5.18% 6.51% 5.46% 5.44% 
Big 7.34% 5.30% 6.30% 5.16% 
Adj. 
R-Squared 
Small 84.90% 79.00% 87.40% 86.60% 
Big 73.10% 71.90% 53.20% 67.10% 
        *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Even though the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) seems to capture 
significant amount of common variation in stock returns, the adjusted R-squared results 
indicate that there is plenty of room for other factors to also capture common variation in 
stock returns. For example, the highest (lowest) adjusted R-squared value among Islamic 
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portfolios is only 84.90 (71.90) percent for the ISL (IBH) portfolio. And the highest (lowest) 
adjusted R-squared value among conventional portfolios is only 87.40 (53.20) percent for 
the CSL (CBL) portfolio. 
Finally, testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts is one way to test how well the 
average risk premium for the market risk factor can explain the cross-sectional average 
returns of all eight portfolios. The results from (Table 5) indicate that all intercepts are 
economically low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant. 
Table 6 shows the results from the three-factor model after adding the SMB and 
HML to the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF). The results indicate that still the 
excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) captures significant amount of common variation 
in stock returns. All  s are positive and highly significant at 1 percent. Also, the results 
show that still small-Islamic portfolios are less sensitive to the market than small-
conventional portfolios, and big-Islamic portfolios are more sensitive to the market than 
big-conventional portfolios. 
The results of all SMB coefficients ( ) reveal that they are all highly significant at 1 
percent which means that SMB clearly captures common variation in stock returns that is 
missed by both: the excess market portfolio (RM-RF) and HML. Furthermore, the results 
confirm the negative relationship between average return and size. In both book-to-market 
equity quintiles (low and high) for both Islamic and conventional portfolios, SMB 
coefficients decrease by around 200 percent when moving from the small- to the big-size 
quintile. 
Similarly, the results of all HML coefficients ( ) reveal that they are all highly 
significant, except for the coefficient of the conventional-big-low (CBL) portfolio. This 
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means that HML, in general, captures common variation in stock returns that is missed by 
both: the excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) and SMB. Furthermore, the results 
confirm the positive relationship between average return and book-to-market equity. In 
both size quintiles (small and big) for both Islamic and conventional portfolios, HML 
coefficients increase when moving from the low to the high book-to-market equity quintile. 
Table 6: Three-Factor Model 
This table reports the results from the three-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted 
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah 
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio 
(RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB) and book-
to-market equity (HML). The sample period is from January 2003 to April 2011 (monthly data). The proxy for 
the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with one-month maturity. All 
standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. s(e) is 
standard error of regression. 
                                                   
   
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles 
 
Size 
Quintile  
Islamic Conventional 
   
Low High Low High 
  
Small 
Coef 0.001 -0.005 -0.001 0.005 
T-stat 0.369 -1.213 -0.389 1.358 
Big 
Coef 0.002 -0.002 -0.002 0.002 
T-stat 0.330 -0.425 -0.393 0.518 
  
Small 
Coef 0.896 1.011 1.028 1.065 
T-stat 18.348*** 18.693*** 27.588*** 20.460*** 
Big 
Coef 1.206 0.998 0.869 0.927 
T-stat 14.859*** 14.901*** 11.408*** 16.193*** 
  
Small 
Coef 0.435 0.483 0.553 0.530 
T-stat 5.133*** 6.840*** 9.948*** 6.214*** 
Big 
Coef -0.405 -0.445 -0.582 -0.568 
T-stat -4.446*** -3.816*** -7.094*** -6.608*** 
  
Small 
Coef -0.535 0.833 -0.704 0.406 
T-stat -4.089*** 4.502*** -10.133*** 3.250*** 
Big 
Coef -0.921 0.530 0.160 0.231 
T-stat -2.645*** 4.116*** 0.611 2.335** 
s(e) 
Small 3.90% 4.30% 3.20% 3.64% 
Big 5.56% 4.02% 5.01% 3.49% 
Adj. 
R-Squared 
Small 91.40% 90.90% 95.70% 94.00% 
Big 84.60% 83.80% 70.40% 84.90% 
       *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
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Overall, the significant loadings on all three risk factors indicate that they capture 
strong common variation in stock returns. Thus, it is not surprising to observe a large 
increase in the adjusted R-squared when moving from the single-factor model to the three-
factor model. The results, indeed, indicate that the three-factor model is a better fit than the 
single-factor model in explaining the excess return of all eight portfolios because all 
adjusted R-squared values from the three-factor model are higher than that from the 
single-factor model.  
For example, results from regressing the Islamic portfolios indicate that the highest 
(lowest) adjusted R-squared value belongs to the ISL (IBH) portfolio and it increased from 
84.90 (71.90) percent in the single-factor model to 91.40 (83.80) percent in the three-
factor model. Also, results from regressing the conventional portfolios indicate that the 
highest (lowest) adjusted R-squared value belongs to the CSL (CBL) portfolio and it 
increased from 87.40 (53.20) percent in the single-factor model to 95.70 (70.40) percent in 
the three-factor model. 
Also, the standard error s(e) of regression results, which are considered a proxy for 
the diversifiable risk, indicate that the three-factor model is superior to the single-factor 
model in capturing common variation in stock returns. Results indicate that all s(e) values 
of all eight portfolios are lower than those from the single-factor model. For example, 
results from regressing the Islamic (conventional) portfolios indicate that the highest s(e) 
value belongs to the IBL (CBL) portfolio and it decreased from 7.34 (6.30) percent in the 
single-factor model to 5.56 (5.01) percent in the three-factor model. Finally, the results 
from testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts indicate that all intercepts are economically 
low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant. 
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Table 7: Four-Factor Model 
This table reports the results from the four-factor model. The dependent variables are eight value-weighted 
excess return portfolios formed on size (small and big), book-to-market equity (low and high), and Shariah 
compliancy (Islamic and conventional). The independent variables are the excess market return portfolio 
(RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the underlying risk factors in returns related to size (SMB), book-to-
market equity (HML), and the negative Islamic-effect (CMI). The sample period is from January 2003 to April 
2011 (monthly data). The proxy for the risk-free rate is the monthly Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) 
with one-month maturity. All standard errors are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s 
(1980) correction test. s(e) is standard error of regression. 
                                                    
   
Book to Market (BM) Quintiles 
 
Size 
Quintile  
Islamic Conventional 
   
Low High Low High 
  
Small 
Coef 0.002 -0.004 -0.002 0.004 
T-stat 0.516 -1.097 -0.623 1.284 
Big 
Coef 0.003 -0.001 -0.003 0.001 
T-stat 0.696 -0.31 -0.84 0.401 
  
Small 
Coef 0.879 0.982 1.047 1.092 
T-stat 20.723*** 23.054*** 29.791*** 29.631*** 
Big 
Coef 1.161 0.978 0.913 0.947 
T-stat 19.188*** 18.516*** 17.442*** 21.308*** 
  
Small 
Coef 0.424 0.465 0.564 0.547 
T-stat 5.744*** 7.887*** 10.233*** 9.806*** 
Big 
Coef -0.433 -0.456 -0.556 -0.555 
T-stat -3.708*** -4.746*** -6.795*** -8.413*** 
  
Small 
Coef -0.52 0.857 -0.720 0.383 
T-stat -2.999*** 7.141*** -7.484*** 3.998*** 
Big 
Coef -0.883 0.546 0.123 0.214 
T-stat -3.819*** 3.536*** 0.854 2.592** 
  
Small 
Coef -0.316 -0.524 0.345 0.495 
T-stat -2.036** -3.875*** 3.486*** 4.781*** 
Big 
Coef -0.814 -0.347 0.785 0.376 
T-stat -4.397*** -2.626** 5.543*** 3.778*** 
s(e) 
Small 3.68% 3.71% 2.86% 3.00% 
Big 4.40% 3.76% 3.78% 3.13% 
Adj. 
R-Squared 
Small 92.30% 93.20% 96.50% 95.90% 
Big 90.40% 85.80% 83.20% 87.90% 
        *, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Table 7 shows the results from the four-factor model after augmenting CMI, which is 
a portfolio mimicking the risk factor in returns related to the negative Islamic-effect, to the 
three-factor model. The results of  , s, and h coefficients are very much similar to those 
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obtained from the three-factor model (Table 6). However, the new issue in (Table 7) is the 
results of the ( ) coefficients, which are loadings on the Islamic risk factor (CMI). As 
hypothesized, the loadings on CMI for all Islamic portfolios: ISL (-0.316), ISH (-0.524), IBL 
(-0.814), and IBH (-0.347) are negative and highly significant at 5, 1, 1, and 5 percent, 
respectively. Also, loadings on CMI for all conventional portfolios: CSL (0.345), CSH (0.495), 
CBL (0.785), and CBH (0.376) are positive and highly significant at 1 percent. 
These results indicate that there is a significant negative relationship between Saudi 
Islamic firms and average returns, and a significant positive relationship between Saudi 
conventional firms and average returns. These results are also considered clear evidence 
that CMI captures common variation in stock returns that are not captured by the (RM-RF), 
SMB, and HML. 
Furthermore, the adjusted R-squared results show that the four-factor model that 
includes CMI is considered a better fit than the single-factor and the three-factor models in 
explaining the excess return of all eight stock portfolios. That is, when CMI is added in the 
four-factor model, all adjusted R-squared values increase and are considered the highest 
relative to the adjusted R-squared values obtained from both the single-factor model and 
the three-factor model. 
Furthermore, all standard error of regression s(e) values obtained from the four-
factor model are considered lower than those obtained from either the single-factor or the 
three-factor models. This supports the notion that the four-factor model is superior to both 
the single-factor and the three-factor models in capturing common variation in stock 
returns. The highest s(e) value when Islamic portfolios are regressed is only 4.40 percent 
and it belongs to the IBL portfolio. It is lower than the 5.56 percent obtained from the 
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three-factor model. Also, the highest s(e) value when conventional portfolios are regressed 
is only 3.78 percent and it belongs to CBL portfolio. It is lower than the 5.01 percent 
obtained from the three-factor model. 
Finally, the results from testing the hypothesis of zero intercepts indicate that all 
intercepts are economically low (indistinguishable from zero) and insignificant. Such 
results suggest that a model that uses (RM-RF), SMB, HML, and CMI does, indeed, a good 
job in explaining the cross-sectional average returns of Saudi common stocks; at least 
during the period from January 2003 to April 2011. 
8. Conclusion 
This paper attempts to lessen the gap in the Islamic finance and investment 
literature by providing new insights to whether the adherence to the Shariah law is 
associated with any costs. This is done by investigating the Islamic-effect issue in the cross-
sectional stock return context. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that investigates the 
Islamic-effect issue in such context.  
The paper starts from the assessment that there is a negative relationship between 
Islamic firms and average return due to the application of Islamic finance mandates or 
Shariah screens. This assessment is investigated by looking at dispersion in stock return 
between Islamic and conventional firms in Saudi Arabia during the period from January 
2003 to April 2011. The results do confirm that negative relationship and show that there 
is a small cost from adhering to the Shariah law. That is, Saudi Islamic stocks, on average, 
compensate investors with slightly less return than Saudi conventional stocks. In this 
paper, that negative relationship between Islamic firms in Saudi Arabia and average return 
is referred to as the “negative Islamic-effect.” 
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Then this paper examines if that negative Islamic-effect is associated with a common 
(shared and undiversified) risk factor in returns that might explain the negative 
relationship between Saudi Islamic firms and average returns. This is done using time-
series regressions similar to those developed by Fama & French (1993). The results 
indicate that the portfolio that is constructed to mimic the risk factor related to the 
negative Islamic-effect (CMI), which can also be referred to as the “Islamic risk factor”, do 
capture strong common variation in stock returns even in the presence of the excess 
market return portfolio (RM-RF) and portfolios meant to mimic the risk factors related to 
size (SMB) and book-to-market equity (HML).  
This indicates that the dispersion in average return of Saudi common stocks can be 
explained by a new risk story other than the market, size, and book-to-market equity risk 
stories. In other words, even when the market, size, and book-to-market equity are 
controlled, Saudi firms that apply Islamic finance mandates are considered less risky than 
Saudi firms that do not apply such mandates (adhering to the Shariah law makes Saudi 
firms have less risk exposure). As a result, investors holding Saudi Islamic stocks should 
require lower rate of return than investors holding Saudi conventional stocks because 
investors holding Saudi Islamic stocks assume less risk. 
The main reason for existence of the Islamic risk factor is the fact that adhering to 
the Shariah law represents more than just a preference of Muslim investors. That is, 
adhering to the Shariah law is an issue that is related to firm fundamentals such as the 
firm’s profitability, riskiness, earnings, revenues, leverage, and all other fundamental 
issues. And as long as firm fundamentals are affected, it follows that asset prices (stock 
prices) would also be affected as well. 
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Furthermore, results show that the four-factor model that controls for the Islamic 
risk factor (CMI) does a better job than both the single-factor and the three-factor models 
in explaining dispersion in average return of Saudi common stocks. Such findings suggest 
that using a model that controls for the Islamic-effect issue, like the proposed four-factor 
model, is more appropriate in all Islamic finance applications that require estimates of 
expected stock returns than using any other model that does not control for such effect. 
This is because the Islamic-effect issue is considered common, systematic, and 
undiversified risk that affects asset prices and therefore must be controlled in all these 
applications. 
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Chapter 3: Islamic Mutual Funds 
A Case Study in Saudi Arabia 
1. Introduction 
The number of Islamic mutual funds and the market value of these funds have 
experienced an excellent growth since the early period of the 1990s. This, as a result, gave 
birth to several empirical studies that want to investigate the performance and riskiness of 
these funds relative to conventional mutual funds such as [Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad 
(2007), Abderrezak (2008), and Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010)] as well as relative to 
both Islamic and conventional market indices such as [Elfakhani & Hassan (2005), Kräussl 
& Hayat (2008), and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009)]. 
However, given that the Islamic finance and investment industry is relatively new 
compared to its conventional counterpart and the literature on Islamic mutual funds is still 
at its infancy, findings across these empirical studies still do not provide a definite answer 
to the most important question raised in that literature: Is investing in Islamic mutual 
funds associated with any cost?  That is, some of these studies conclude that investing in 
Islamic mutual funds comes at no cost where their findings indicate that there is no 
evidence that there exist any performance differences between Islamic and conventional 
funds as well as between Islamic mutual funds and both Islamic and conventional market 
indices. On the other hand, there are other studies that conclude that there is a cost 
associated with investing in Islamic mutual funds where such funds provide investors with 
lower return than conventional mutual funds. 
Now, to critically investigate whether investing in Islamic mutual funds is associated 
with any cost, this paper carries out the investigation to Saudi Arabia. It is worthy to note 
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that there are two main reasons that make Saudi Arabia an ideal experiential environment 
to conduct this empirical study. First, Saudi Arabia alone possesses the largest amount of 
Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide (it possesses around 52 percent of the total 
Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide).14 Second, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the 
few countries that strictly adhere to the Shariah law. Thus, studying Islamic mutual funds 
located in Saudi Arabia is a good place to start investigating the Islamic-effect issue in 
mutual funds.  
Overall, the main objective of this paper is to investigate if there is any cost from 
investing in Islamic mutual funds by assessing the performance and riskiness of Saudi 
Islamic mutual funds relative to Saudi conventional mutual funds as well as relative to 
different Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. This investigation covers the 
period from July 2004 to January 2010. It is worthy to note that Merdad, Hassan, & 
Alhenawi (2010) address the same issue, but their paper is only a case study that focuses 
on mutual funds managed by HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited. To my knowledge, this is the first 
paper that comprehensively examines the Islamic mutual fund issue in the context of Saudi 
Arabia. 
The contribution of this paper to the Islamic mutual fund literature is fivefold. First, 
this study uses a very unique sample of Saudi mutual funds: out of a total of 234 mutual 
funds available in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010, this paper uses a sample of 143 Saudi 
mutual funds (96 funds are Islamic and 47 funds are conventional) from July 2004 to 
                                                        
14 See “GCC Mutual Fund Industry Survey 2010.” Dr. Gıyas Gökkent is the Group Chief Economist in the 
National Bank of Abu Dhabi and he is the editor and author of the “GCC Mutual Fund Industry Survey 2010” 
which was released on Feb 9, 2011. The study can be found in the following link: 
http://www.nbad.com/economic/countries/gcc_mf_industry_survey2010.php.  
Note that Shariah is an Arabic word that refers to the legislative framework that regulates all aspects of life, 
both private and public. 
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January 2010. That sample very much represents the Saudi mutual fund industry in terms 
of geographical focuses, diversity, investment objectives, Shariah compliancy, and 
institutional management. This is an important aspect, especially when discussing Saudi 
Islamic mutual funds.  
That is, the sample of Saudi Islamic mutual funds used in this empirical study is 
superior to any other sample of Saudi Islamic mutual funds used in any other study of 
Islamic mutual funds. This is because studies that examine the Islamic mutual fund issue 
like Abderrezak (2008), Kräussl & Hayat (2008), and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009) 
have relatively a small number of Saudi Islamic mutual funds in their entire sample set 
compared to that used in this sample set. This is very much understandable given that their 
objective is to examine Islamic mutual funds in general not Saudi Islamic mutual funds in 
particular. As a result, findings of these studies better fit Islamic mutual funds than Saudi 
Islamic mutual funds. 
On the other hand, since this study uses a sample of only Saudi mutual funds and the 
fact that such sample fairly represents the entire industry of Saudi mutual funds, including 
Islamic mutual funds, then findings from this study are going to be more relevant to Saudi 
Islamic mutual funds. Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that assessing Saudi Islamic mutual 
funds is a key factor in assessing Islamic mutual funds in general. This is because, as 
mentioned earlier, the largest amount of Shariah-compliant fund assets worldwide is 
located in Saudi Arabia. 
Second, studies like Ahmed (2001) and Dabbeeru (2006a, 2006b, and 2006c) are 
considered among the first to provide a primer analysis on the performance of Saudi Arabia 
mutual funds. However, their findings very much lack statistical sophistication. This paper, 
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however, overcomes this issue by employing very commonly known methods, statistical 
tests, and models including a constructed multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997) 
four-factor model to control for different equity investment styles when assessing the risk-
return profile of Saudi mutual funds. 
Third, one way to enhance comparability is to control for different geographical or 
regional focuses of mutual funds. In Saudi Arabia, mutual funds have six different regional 
focuses: local, international, Arab, Asia, US, and Europe. To facilitate comparison, all mutual 
funds that are US-, Asia-, Europe-, and internationally-focused are grouped together under 
one regional focus called “internationally-focused funds.” As a result, the sample of Saudi 
mutual funds used in this empirical study has only three main geographical focuses: local, 
Arab, and international. Locally-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located only in 
Saudi Arabia. Arab-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located only in countries 
that are members in the Arab league, excluding Saudi Arabia. Internationally-focused funds 
are funds that invest in assets located in all countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and those 
that belong in the above Arab group. 
Fourth, to enhance reliability and robustness of results, this paper not only explores 
the Saudi Islamic mutual fund issue during the overall sample period (July 2004 to January 
2010), but also during three other periods that are based on trends in the Saudi Arabian 
stock market. These periods are: bull period (July 2004 to February 2006), bear period 
(March 2006 to January 2010), and the recent 2008-financial crisis period (September 
2008 to January 2010). 
Fifth, the methodology used to assess the risk-return profile of funds is not based on 
using individual funds, but instead it is based on using a portfolio approach in order to 
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diversify away fund-specific risks. Thus, Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are 
grouped into portfolios based on the following characteristics: the funds’ geographical 
focuses (local, Arab, and international), the funds’ Shariah compliancy (Islamic and 
conventional), and four different Saudi stock market trends (overall, bull, bear, and the 
recent 2008 financial crisis periods). 
Findings suggest that there is a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law when 
locally-focused fund portfolios are investigated. On the other hand, there is a cost from 
adhering to the Shariah law when internationally-focused fund portfolios are investigated. 
Finally, when Arab-focused fund portfolios are investigated, findings suggest that there is 
neither a cost nor a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law. All these results hold 
regardless of the sample period under examination (overall, bull, bear, and financial crisis). 
Also, all these results are robust regardless of different appropriate market benchmarks 
used to adjust for risk. 
The rest of the paper unfolds as follows: section ‎2 discusses Islamic mutual funds. 
Section ‎3 discusses the previous literature. Section ‎4 discusses Saudi Arabia’s economy and 
stock market. Section ‎5 discusses Saudi Arabia’s mutual funds. Section ‎6 provides the 
hypothesis. Section ‎7 covers the data for the empirical study. Section ‎8 discusses the 
methodology. Section ‎9 provides the empirical results. Section ‎10 discusses the empirical 
results. And finally section ‎11 is the conclusion. 
2. Islamic Mutual Funds 
Many money managers and financial institutions, whether they are from the Arab or 
western world, start to offer different Shariah-compliant assets that fit Muslim religious 
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preferences. One important and highly demanded asset among these Shariah-compliant 
assets is the Islamic mutual fund.  
2.1. History of Islamic Mutual Funds 
According to Kräussl & Hayat (2008), the first Islamic equity fund (IEF) was founded 
in 1986 by the North American Islamic Trust to manage the funding of mosques in the US. 
Since then and until 1992, the number of Islamic funds and the value of assets invested in 
them were growing at a decreasing rate. However, after 1992, Islamic funds experienced an 
excellent growth mainly due to the consensus that Shariah scholars reached during the 
early period of the 1990s regarding the permissibility of equity investing. For example, 
according to Elfakhani & Hassan (2005), the number of Islamic funds increased from eight 
funds prior to 1992 to 95 funds with a total market value of USD 5 billion in 2000. 
Furthermore, McKenzie (2010, 2011) documents that the number of Islamic funds grew 
from 200 funds in 2003 (with a total market value of USD 20 billion) to 760 funds by the 
end of the first quarter of 2010 (with a total market value of USD 52.3 billion). Equity funds 
had the lion’s share with almost 35 percent of these Islamic funds. 
All these statistics show how popular these Islamic mutual funds became in a short 
period of time. It is worthy to note that this popularity of Islamic mutual funds is not only 
among Muslim Investors, but also among non-Muslim investors as well. There are two 
factors that could explain the reasons why these funds are gaining tremendous popularity 
among both Muslim and non-Muslim investors. 
The first factor is very intuitive and does not distinguish whether the investor is 
Muslim or non-Muslim. That is, both Muslim and non-Muslim investors are attracted to 
Islamic mutual funds because of the already existing appealing features that are embedded 
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in mutual funds in general regardless if these funds are Islamic or conventional. That is, 
mutual funds, in general, are considered an ideal choice for investors seeking liquidity, 
portfolio diversification, and investment expertise. Also, mutual funds provide investors 
with more flexibility in the sense that they provide investors with a wide range of funds 
that have different asset allocations, various objectives, and a number of investment styles 
so that investors can choose what best fit their investment goals, risk tolerance, liquidity 
needs, as well as religious and ethical preferences. 
The second factor, however, distinguishes between the two types of investors. To 
elaborate, Muslim investors, like all other investors, want to benefit and prosper from the 
developments in both capital and financial markets. However, Muslim investors want to do 
so while preserving their Islamic values and morals. Fortunately, the birth of Islamic 
mutual funds provides them with opportunity to participate in these capital and financial 
markets without the fear that doing so will come at the cost of their Islamic identity and 
values. And this is the main reason why these Islamic funds are gaining a lot of attention 
and popularity among Muslim investors. 
On the other hand, the popularity of Islamic mutual funds among non-Muslim 
investors does not come from the fact that these funds are comfortable with the Shariah 
law. In fact, non-Muslim investors are not even concerned whether these funds are 
adhering to the Shariah law or not. Instead, the popularity of these Islamic funds comes 
from the fact that these funds possess an ethical nature. This ethical nature is a result of the 
restrictions that Shariah law imposes on these funds. For example, Islamic funds are not 
allowed to invest in firms that deal with tobacco, adult entertainment, non-medical and 
toxic drugs, gambling, etc. This ethical-nature feature is the main reason why some non-
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Muslim investors are attracted to such funds because they view investing in these Islamic 
funds as a form of Social Responsibility Investing (SRI).  
Due to this unprecedented popularity and growth in Islamic mutual funds, several 
proper benchmarks were launch by the late 1990s in order to help benchmark the 
performance of these Islamic funds. For example, there is the Dow Jones Islamic market 
index (DJIMI) which was launched in 1999, FTSE Global Islamic Index Series (GIIS) which 
was launched at the end of 1998, MSCI global Islamic indices, and the Global Gulf 
Cooperation Council (GCC) Islamic index which was launched in 2006. 
2.2. The Shariah Law Effect on Islamic Mutual Funds  
Because of their adherence to the Shariah law, Islamic mutual funds differ in many 
aspects from conventional mutual fund. The following discusses two of these aspects:  
The first aspect is the asset allocation aspect. Managers of Islamic mutual funds 
must only invest in assets that are in accordance with the Shariah law. That is, fund 
managers are restricted to invest in only securities that pass both the ethical and the 
financial filters.15 This causes the asset allocation of Islamic mutual funds to be completely 
different from that of conventional mutual funds. In other words, the investment universe 
of Islamic funds is considerably smaller than that of conventional funds. 
The second aspect is the income purification aspect. Shariah law is a law that is 
concerned about increasing social welfare, enhancing public good, implementing economic 
justice, and providing sustenance to the economically unfortunate. Thus, Shariah law, 
under certain conditions, requires all Muslims to pay a form of charity called zakat to those 
in need and those that are economically unfortunate to purify both wealth and earned 
                                                        
15 Please see Chapter 1: Islamic Finance, section ‎4.1: Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks for more details 
on the ethical and financial filters. 
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income. Zakat is paid on Muslim’s personal wealth if such wealth is held idle for one lunar 
year, is considered over what is necessary to satisfy basic needs, and exceeds a minimum 
amount (called nisab in Arabic).  
It is worthy to note that different types of assets have different zakat rates. The 
zakat rate for most forms of monetary wealth and earned income is 2.5 percent. This 
implies that if all zakat conditions are met, a 2.5 percent on any generated income from 
mutual funds, even if these funds are Islamic, must be paid by Muslim investors as a form of 
purification. 
Another form of income purification is purifying “impure” earnings. Note that 
partially contaminated Islamic firms (firms that are Islamic but have a small portion of 
their earnings generated from impermissible activities) can still keep their Islamic title as 
long as they pass the financial filter. This implies that there is no problem for Islamic 
mutual funds to extend their investment universe to include such firms.  
If managers of Islamic mutual funds decide to include these partially contaminated 
firms, then Shariah scholars argue that the portion of earnings that is generated from 
impermissible activities (impure earnings) should be cleansed or purified by donating such 
earnings to charity. For example if a firm has a three percent interest-based income, then 
three percent of every dividend payment must be donated to charities as a form of 
purification. 
The purification of impure earnings is usually executed in two ways. The first way is 
done by Islamic fund managers before distributing any income. The second way is by 
reporting to investors the necessary financial ratios so that they can purify earnings 
themselves. 
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While all Shariah scholars agree on purifying dividends and believe that it is a must, 
purifying capital gains is still debatable, see Obaidullah (2005). That is, some Shariah 
scholars argue that there is no need to purify capital gains while others see otherwise. As 
for those that argue that there is no need to purify capital gains, they assert that the stock 
price of a partially contaminated Islamic firm represents the price of only the permissible 
(halal) assets. This is because the small portion of assets created from impure activities is 
considered negligible and to some extend unknown when compared to the firm’s bulk of 
halal assets. As for those that argue that capital gains must be purified, they assert that 
what is prohibited still remains prohibited and needs to be avoided even if it was 
negligible. Based on this view, the stock price of a partially contaminated Islamic firm 
represents the price of both permissible (halal) and impure (haram) assets. Therefore, 
capital gains need to be cleanses or purified. 
3. Previous Literature 
This section contains two subsections: previous literature on conventional mutual 
funds (section ‎3.1) and previous literature on Islamic mutual funds (section ‎3.2). 
3.1. Previous Literature on Conventional Mutual Funds 
There are tremendous studies that have been addressing the mutual funds’ 
performance issue and some of these studies go back to the 1960s. For example, based on 
the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) developed by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965), 
Jensen (1967) derived a risk-adjusted performance measure (known as the ‘Jensen alpha’) 
in order to estimate the fund manager’s ability to earn an abnormal return. He uses this 
measure to examine the ability of 115 mutual fund managers to earn abnormal returns 
during the period from 1945 to 1964. Jensen document that, on average, these funds are 
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not able to outperform the market benchmark of the Standard and Poor Composite 500 
Price Index (S&P500). 
Using a sample of 123 mutual funds during the period from 1960 to 1969, McDonald 
(1974) also finds that the majority of funds did not outperform the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE).  
Also Kon & Jen (1979) use a sample of 49 mutual funds from January 1960 to 
December 1971 to examine the non-stationary of the market-related risk for mutual funds 
over time. They divide their sample into different risk regimes and then run regular OLS 
regressions for each regime. They find that there are multiple levels of beta that exists for 
37 funds. They conclude that many funds are engaging in market timing activities. 
Kon (1983) examines the existence of both the selectivity and market timing skills 
using 37 mutual funds from January 1960 to June 1976. He finds that six funds have 
positive performance in both timing and selectivity and 22 funds exhibit a trade-off 
between the two activities. However, Chen, Cheng, Rahman, & Chan (1992) find that there 
exist no market timing skills using 93 mutual funds from January 1977 to March 1984. 
Using 279 mutual funds from December 31, 1974 to December 31, 1984; Grinblantt 
& Titman (1992) find that there are performance differences between funds and they 
attribute these differences to the fund manager’s ability to earn abnormal returns. 
Using the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model; Annuar, Shamsher, & Ngu (1997) 
examine the existence of both selectivity and market timing skills of 31 Malaysian funds 
from July 1990 to August 1995. Their findings show that there is statistical evidence that 
these funds possess selectivity skills, but not market timing skills. Furthermore, they find 
that these funds did not achieve their expected level of diversification. 
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Shamsher, Annuar, & Taufiq (2000) examine 41 actively- and passively-managed 
Malaysian funds during the period from 1995 to 1999. They find no statistical significance 
when examining the performance of both actively- and passively-managed funds using 
measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they find no differences 
in the selection skills between actively- and passively-managed funds. Also, they find that 
both types of funds possess no market timing abilities. 
Finally, Dabbeeru provides three simple studies as a primer analysis on the 
performance of mutual funds in Saudi Arabia. Unfortunately, all three studies lack 
statistical sophistication. In his first paper, Dabbeeru (2006a) discusses mutual funds in 
Saudi Arabia during the period from January 1, 2006 to June 15, 2006. He employs only the 
standard deviation, risk per return, and non risk-adjusted returns to assess the 
performance and riskiness of Saudi mutual funds. In his second paper, Dabbeeru (2006b) 
examines the performance of 97 Saudi equity mutual funds during the period from 
February 2005 to October 2006. In this study, Dabbeeru examines the past performance of 
these funds where he reports the year-to-date (YTD) returns for both funds and the Saudi 
market index (Tadawul).16 Finally, in his final paper, Dabbeeru (2006c) examines balanced, 
debt, and liquid funds instead of equity funds. 
3.2. Previous Literature on Islamic Mutual Funds 
Ahmed (2001) provides a primer on the performance of 13 Islamic equity funds in 
Saudi Arabia. These funds are managed by only two institutional managers: the National 
Commercial Bank (NCB) and Al-Baraka Group. However, no statistical tests are reported in 
his study. 
                                                        
16 Tadawul is now called Tadawul All Share Index (TASI). 
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Elfakhani & Hassan (2005) use a sample of 46 Islamic mutual funds from January 1, 
1997 to August 31, 2002 to examine the performance of Islamic mutual funds relative to 
Islamic and conventional market benchmarks. They employ different risk-adjusted 
performance measures such as Sharpe, Treynor, and Jensen alpha. Moreover, they employ 
an ANOVA statistical test. Overall, their findings suggest that there is no statistical evidence 
that there exist any performance differences between Islamic funds and the employed 
market benchmarks. However, their findings suggest that Islamic mutual funds do offer a 
good hedging opportunity against market downturns. 
Abdullah, Hassan, & Mohamad (2007) compare the performance of 14 Islamic funds 
relative to 51 conventional funds in Malaysia during the period from 1992 to 2001. They 
employ different measures such as the adjusted Sharpe, Treynor, adjusted Jensen alpha, 
Modigliani and Modigliani (MM) measure, and the information ratio. They find that 
conventional funds perform better than Islamic funds during bullish trends; but during 
bearish trends, Islamic funds perform better. They conclude that Islamic funds offer 
hedging opportunities against adverse market trends. They also find that conventional 
funds have diversification levels that are marginally better than Islamic funds, but both 
funds are unable to achieve at least 50 percent of the market diversification level. 
Kräussl & Hayat (2008) use a sample of 59 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) to examine 
the performance of these funds relative to Islamic and conventional market benchmarks 
during the period from 2001 to 2006. They employ a set of measures such as the Jensen 
alpha, Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, and the information ratio. 
They find that, on average, there are no significant performance differences between IEFs 
and the employed market benchmarks (both Islamic and conventional). However, a closer 
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look at the bear market of 2002, they document that IEFs significantly outperform the 
Islamic and conventional market indices using conditional CAPM. Analyzing the risk-return 
characteristics of IEFs, they find that IEFs possess superior systematic risk-to-return ratios. 
Therefore, they argue that these IEFs “seem most attractive as part of a larger fully 
diversified portfolio like a fund of funds.” 
Abderrezak (2008) examines the performance of 46 Islamic equity funds (IEFs) 
relative to conventional funds, ethical funds, and Islamic and conventional market indices 
during the period from January 1997 to August 2002. He employs several methodologies 
such as the Sharpe ratio, single-factor model, and Fama and French three-factor model. He 
finds that IEFs are 40 basis points more expensive than their conventional peers. 
Furthermore, he finds that IEFs consistently underperform their respective Islamic and 
conventional market benchmarks. Finally, he finds that there are no performance 
differences between IEFs and ethical funds. 
Muhammad & Mokhtar (2008) use weekly net asset values (NAVs) of nine Islamic 
equity funds in Malaysia in order to examine their performance relative to the Islamic 
market index, Kuala Lumpur Syariah Index (KLSI), for the period from 2002 to 2006. To 
assess the performance of these funds, they employ the Sharpe and Treynor ratios. They 
find that eight of these funds underperform the KLSI. However, they find a bag of mixed 
results when they employ the standard deviation, coefficient of variation, and the 
systematic risk (beta) to assess the riskiness of these funds. 
Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009) use a unique dataset of 262 Islamic equity funds 
from 20 countries and four regions in order to examine the performance of these funds 
relative to constructed portfolios that have exposure to national, regional, and global 
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markets. Furthermore, they control for different investment styles by employing a 
conditional three level Carhart model. The results show that Islamic funds from eight 
nations (mostly from the western regions) significantly underperform their respective 
equity market benchmarks and funds from only three nations outperform their respective 
market benchmarks and that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks. Furthermore, 
they find that Islamic funds from the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) and Malaysia do not 
significantly underperform their respective market benchmarks nor they are biased 
towards small stocks. Finally, they argue that Islamic equity funds can offer hedging 
opportunities because their investment universe is limited to low debt-to-equity ratio 
stocks. 
Merdad, Hassan, & Alhenawi (2010) use a sample of 28 Saudi mutual funds 
managed by HSBC in order to examine the performance of 12 Islamic funds relative to 16 
conventional funds during the period from January 2003 to January 2010. They use several 
performance measures such as the Sharpe, Treynor, Modigliani and Modigliani (MM), TT, 
and Jensen alpha. Furthermore, they employ the Treynor and Mazuy model to examine the 
Saudi funds’ selectivity and market timing abilities. They find that Islamic funds 
underperform conventional funds during both full and bullish periods, but outperform 
during bearish and financial crisis periods. Furthermore, they find that HSBC managers are 
good at showing timing and selectivity skills for Islamic funds during the bearish period, 
and for conventional funds during the bullish period. They also assert that Islamic mutual 
funds do offer hedging opportunities during economic downturns. 
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4. Saudi Arabia’s Economy and Stock Market 
Saudi Arabia is an oil-based economy and its economy is considered the largest in 
the Middle Eastern region. According to Jadaw Investment 2010 Annual Report, Saudi 
Arabia’s nominal gross domestic product (GDP) is around USD 435.8 billion and is expected 
to reach USD 507.3 billion in 2012.17 Furthermore, Saudi Arabia is considered the largest 
oil producer, oil exporter, and oil proven reserves possessor worldwide.18 It has almost 20 
percent of the world’s proven reserves, and has a leading role in OPEC. 
The official currency is the Saudi Arabian riyal (SAR) and since 1986 it has been 
effectively pegged to the US dollar where USD 1 = 3.75 SAR. Furthermore, the Saudi stock 
market is also considered by far the largest in the Middle Eastern region. As of January 31, 
2010, there are 135 firms listed on the exchange and the total equity market capitalization 
reached SAR 1,242.09 billion (around USD 331.22 billion).19  
The market index is called Tadawul All Share Index (TASI) and it reached a market 
high of 20,634.86 points at the end of February 2006 before it declined to 8,757.04 points 
at the end of August 2008. Starting from September 2008, the effect of the recent 2008 
financial crisis started to become acute. As a result, TASI started to decline until it reached 
its all time low of 4,130.01 points at the beginning of March 2009.  
Overall, the period before March 2006 has all the characteristics of a bullish market 
in terms of price and trading volume increases. The period from March 2006 until January 
2010 is marked by bearish market activities. Finally, the period from September 2008 until 
                                                        
17 Source is Jadaw Investment, a pioneer in the field of Shariah-compliant investment services: 
http://jadwa.com/about/pages/annualreports.aspx. 
18 Oil proven reserves are the stock of proved reserves of crude oil in barrels (bbl). Source is CIA world fact 
book: https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/sa.html.   
19 Information is based on the January-2010 monthly Statistical Report issued by the Saudi Stock Exchange 
(Tadawul). 
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January 2010 represents the period where the recent financial crisis started to negatively 
affect economies and financial markets worldwide including Saudi Arabia’s economy and 
stock market. 
5. Saudi Arabia’s Mutual Funds 
Table 1: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Institutional Managers 
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are categorized 
based on institutional managers that manage these funds. The second column shows the name of the 
institutional manager, the third column shows the number of funds under their management, and the last 
column is the percentage of funds each manager manages in a descending order.  
No Fund Manager 
No. of 
MFs 
% 
1 RIYADH CAPITAL 31 13.25 
2 NCB CAPITAL 27 11.54 
3 SAMBA CAPITAL & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 25 10.68 
4 HSBC SAUDI ARABIA LIMITED 21 8.97 
5 ANB INVEST 18 7.69 
6 SAUDI HOLLANDI CAPITAL 15 6.41 
7 AL RAJHI CAPITAL 14 5.98 
8 JADWA INVESTMENT 14 5.98 
9 CAAM SAUDI FRANSI 12 5.13 
10 SAIB BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT 10 4.27 
11 FALCOM FINANCIAL SERVICES 6 2.56 
12 ALBILAD INVESTMENT 5 2.14 
13 ALJAZIRA CAPITAL 5 2.14 
14 KSB CAPITAL GROUP 5 2.14 
15 AL TAWFEEK FINANCIAL GROUP 3 1.28 
16 AUDI CAPITAL 3 1.28 
17 SHUAA CAPITAL SAUDI ARABIA 3 1.28 
18 ALAWWAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CO 2 0.85 
19 BAKHEET INVESTMENT GROUP 2 0.85 
20 GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE SAUDI 2 0.85 
21 KHALIJIA INVEST 2 0.85 
22 RASMALA INVESTMENTS SAUDI 2 0.85 
23 THE INVESTOR FOR SECURITIES 2 0.85 
24 EFG-HERMES KSA 1 0.43 
25 MIDDLE EAST FINANCIAL INVESTMENT 1 0.43 
26 MORGAN STANLEY SAUDI ARABIA 1 0.43 
27 RANA INVESTMENT 1 0.43 
28 WATAN INVESTMENT & SECURITIES 1 0.43 
Total 234 100 
As of April 1, 2010, there are 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia managed by 28 
financial institutions (Table 1). The results from this table show that Riyadh Capital 
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manages the largest number of funds with 31 funds (13.25 percent). Following Riyadh 
Capital are NCB Capital, Samba Capital and Investment Management, and then HSBC Saudi 
Arabia Limited with 27, 25, and 21 funds (11.54, 10.68, and 8.97 percent), respectively. 
The results from (Table 1) also show that there are five financial institutional 
managers that manage only one fund. This means that these five financial institutional 
managers manage only 0.43 percent of the total number of mutual funds available in Saudi 
Arabia. These financial institutional managers are: EFG-Hermes KSA, Middle East Financial 
Investment, Morgan Stanley Saudi Arabia, Rana Investment, and Watan Investment & 
Securities. 
Table 2: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Security Type, Geographical 
Focus, and Investment Goal 
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are divided based 
on their security type (stocks, bonds, money markets, trade finance, balanced, real estate, and guar & secure), 
geographic focus (local, international, US, Europe, Asia, and Arab), and investment goal [growth (G), income 
(I), income & growth (I&G), and capital preservation (CP)]. The final column presents the percentage of funds 
in both the security type and geographical focus categories (in a descending order). The final row presents 
the percentage of funds in each investment goal classification. 
No 
Security Type 
and 
Geographical Focus 
Categories 
Investment Goal Classification 
Total No.  
of MFs 
% 
G I I&G CP 
1 Local stocks 51 1 5 0 57 24.36 
2 International stocks 30 0 3 0 33 14.10 
3 Balanced international 17 1 9 3 30 12.82 
4 Arab stock 20 0 0 0 20 8.55 
5 Trade finance Local 4 8 0 8 20 8.55 
7 Trade finance International 2 9 1 2 14 5.98 
8 Money market local 1 4 0 6 11 4.70 
9 Asia stock 10 0 0 0 10 4.27 
10 Money market international 2 3 2 3 10 4.27 
11 Bond international 1 2 5 0 8 3.42 
12 EURO stock 7 0 0 0 7 2.99 
13 US stocks 6 0 0 0 6 2.56 
14 Balanced local 3 0 2 0 5 2.14 
15 Real estate local 2 0 0 0 2 0.85 
16 Guar & secure local 0 0 0 1 1 0.43 
Total 156 28 27 23 
234 100 
% 66.67 11.97 11.54 9.83 
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Table 2 presents all mutual funds in Saudi Arabia based on their security type 
(stocks, bonds, money markets, trade finance, balanced, real estate, and guar & secure), 
geographic focus (local, international, US, Europe, Asia, and Arab), and investment goal 
(growth, income, income & growth, and capital preservation,).  
There are 16 categories of mutual funds based on their security type and 
geographical focus. Most funds are locally-focused and invest in equity: 57 out of 234 funds 
(24.36 percent). There is only one fund that is locally-focused and invests in Guar & secure. 
Furthermore, funds also vary by investment goals. There are four investment goals under 
which all funds in Saudi Arabia fall: growth (156 funds, 66.67 percent), income (28 funds, 
11.97 percent), income & growth (27 funds, 11.54 percent), and capital preservation (23 
funds, 9.83 percent). 
Table 3: All Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia Based on Shariah Compliancy and 
Investment Goal 
The following table presents all 234 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia as of April 1, 2010. Funds are broken down 
based on their Shariah compliancy subcategory (Islamic and conventional) and investment goal classification 
[growth (G), income (I), income & growth (I&G), and capital preservation (CP)]. The percentage of funds is 
reported for each subcategory and classification. 
Subcategory 
Investment Goal Classification Total No. of 
MFs 
% 
G % I % I&G % CP % 
Islamic Funds 98 41.88 19 8.12 12 5.13 17 7.26 146 62.39 
Conventional Funds 58 24.79 9 3.85 15 6.41 6 2.56 88 37.61 
Total 156 
 
28 
 
27 
 
23 
 
234 100 
% 66.67 11.97 11.54 9.83 
Table 3 presents all mutual funds in Saudi Arabia based on their Shariah compliancy 
and investment goal. The new issue in this table is that it shows that Saudi Arabia 
possesses 146 out of 234 (62.39 percent) Islamic funds, and 88 out 234 (37.61 percent) 
conventional funds. Furthermore, this table shows that almost 41.88 percent (98 funds) of 
the total 234 funds are Islamic funds with a growth investment goal, whereas, conventional 
funds with the same goal are only 24.79 percent (58 funds). Also, Islamic funds are the least 
96 
 
when funds have an Income & growth objective (12 funds, 5.13 percent), whereas, 
conventional funds are the least when funds have a capital preservation objective (6 funds, 
2.56 percent). 
6. The hypothesis 
There are several restrictions and necessary adaptations to which Islamic mutual 
funds must commit before they can earn an Islamic title. Due to the nature of these 
restrictions and necessary adaptations, the following is hypothesized: first, an Islamic 
mutual fund exposes investors to less risk than a conventional mutual fund. Second, an 
Islamic mutual fund rewards investors with less return than its conventional mutual fund 
counterpart.  
To understand the development of this hypothesis, consider the following four 
examples. First, because Shariah law prohibits interest (riba); Islamic mutual funds can 
neither invest in securities of firms that finance their assets with interest-based debt nor 
they can invest in fixed-income instruments. This implies that securities of all interest-
based financial institutions (like conventional banks and conventional brokerage firms) as 
well as all fixed-income instruments (like conventional bonds both corporate and treasury, 
certificates of deposit (CDs), preferred stocks, and warrants) are excluded from the 
investment universe of Islamic funds. On the other hand, conventional funds are not 
restricted from investing in securities of firms that utilize interest-based debt nor they are 
restricted from investing in fixed-income instruments. As a result, Islamic funds are 
believed to be inherently less susceptible to financial risk and changes in interest rates than 
conventional funds.  
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Second, Islamic mutual funds cannot invest in risky instruments such as toxic assets 
and derivatives that have adversely affected conventional funds and triggered the recent 
2008 global financial crisis.  
Third, Islamic funds are restricted from investing in securities of companies whose 
major portion of revenues are generated from alcohol, life insurance, tobacco, gambling, 
adult entertainment, pork, and all other unethical related products. However, conventional 
funds can freely invest in securities across the spectrum of all industries and sectors, 
including those securities with high risks exposure.  
Fourth, Islamic funds cannot utilize many investment trading practices such as 
trading on margin, financing investments with interest-based debt, engaging in short-
selling, speculating, and/or resorting to the future and option markets. This is because 
most of these practices have elements of gharar. On the other hand, conventional funds are 
not restricted from utilizing any of the available investment trading practices. 
Overall, all these restrictions and necessary adaptations to earn an Islamic title 
make Islamic mutual funds enjoy a considerably smaller investment universe compared to 
that of conventional mutual funds. Not only that, but also these restrictions and necessary 
adaptations make Islamic mutual funds less vulnerable to instability and have less risk 
exposure when compared to conventional mutual funds. This, according to the risk-return 
tradeoff theory that suggests a positive relationship between risk and return (low risk is 
associated with low return and high risk is associated with high return), implies that 
Islamic funds should compensate investors with less return than conventional funds due to 
the lower level of risk assumed. 
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7. The Data 
This section discusses the data and its sources and it is divided into two subsections: 
the Saudi mutual fund data (section ‎7.1) and the multifactor model data (section ‎7.2). 
7.1. Saudi Mutual Fund Data 
Table 4: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Institutional Managers 
The following table presents the selected sample of 143 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July 
2004 to January 2010. Funds are categorized based on institutional managers that manage these funds. The 
second column shows the name of the institutional manager, the third column shows the total number of 
funds under their management, the fourth column shows the percentage of funds each manager manages, and 
the fifth column shows the number of funds each institutional manager manages in the selected sample. The 
last column shows the percentage of funds each manager manages in the selected sample. 
No Fund Manager Based on the Selected Sample 
No. of 
all MFs 
% 
No. of MFs 
in the Sample 
% 
1 HSBC SAUDI ARABIA LIMITED 21 9.25 21 14.69 
2 SAUDI HOLLANDI CAPITAL 15 6.61 13 9.09 
3 RIYADH CAPITAL 31 13.66 12 8.39 
4 NCB CAPITAL 27 11.89 11 7.69 
5 JADWA INVESTMENT 14 6.17 11 7.69 
6 AL RAJHI CAPITAL 14 6.17 10 6.99 
7 ANB INVEST 18 7.93 9 6.29 
8 SAIB BNP PARIBAS ASSET MANAGEMENT 10 4.41 9 6.29 
9 CAAM SAUDI FRANSI 12 5.29 8 5.59 
10 SAMBA CAPITAL & INVESTMENT MANAGEMENT 25 11.01 6 4.20 
11 FALCOM FINANCIAL SERVICES 6 2.64 6 4.20 
12 ALBILAD INVESTMENT 5 2.20 4 2.80 
13 KSB CAPITAL GROUP 5 2.20 3 2.10 
14 AUDI CAPITAL 3 1.32 3 2.10 
15 ALJAZIRA CAPITAL 5 2.20 2 1.40 
16 AL TAWFEEK FINANCIAL GROUP 3 1.32 2 1.40 
17 ALAWWAL FINANCIAL SERVICES CO 2 0.88 2 1.40 
18 BAKHEET INVESTMENT GROUP 2 0.88 2 1.40 
19 GLOBAL INVESTMENT HOUSE SAUDI 2 0.88 2 1.40 
20 RASMALA INVESTMENTS SAUDI 2 0.88 2 1.40 
21 THE INVESTOR FOR SECURITIES 2 0.88 2 1.40 
22 EFG-HERMES KSA 1 0.44 1 0.70 
23 MORGAN STANLEY SAUDI ARABIA 1 0.44 1 0.70 
24 WATAN INVESTMENT & SECURITIES 1 0.44 1 0.70 
Total 227 100 143 100 
It is worthy to note that the mutual fund sample very much represents the Saudi 
mutual fund industry in terms of geographical focuses, diversity, investment objectives, 
Shariah compliancy, and institutional management. The selected sample data consists of 
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daily net asset values (NAVs) of 143 out of 234 mutual funds available in Saudi Arabia 
during the period from July 2004 to January 2010. Information on these funds is obtained 
from three main sources: 1) the official site of the Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).20 2) 
The official site of HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited.21 And 3) Zawya database.22 
Table 4 shows that funds in the selected sample are managed by 24 out of 28 
Institutional managers. HSBC Saudi Arabia Limited manages the largest number of funds 
with 21 funds (14.69 percent). Following HSBC is the Saudi Hollandi Capital, Riyadh 
Capital, and then NCB Capital with 13, 12, and 11 funds (9.09, 8.39, and 7.69 percent ), 
respectively. 
Table 5: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Shariah Compliancy and Investment Goals  
This table presents the selected sample of 143 funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July 2004 to January 
2010. Funds are broken down based on their Shariah compliancy subcategory (Islamic and conventional) and 
investment goal classification [growth (G), income (I), capital preservation (CP), and income & growth (I&G)]. 
The percentage of funds is reported for each subcategory and classification. 
Subcategory 
Investment Goal Classification Total No. 
of MFs 
% 
G % I % CP % I&G % 
Islamic Funds 61 42.66 16 11.19 13 9.09 6 4.20 96 67.13 
Conventional Funds 28 19.58 8 5.59 6 4.20 5 3.50 47 32.87 
Total 89 
 
24 
 
19 
 
11 
 
143 100 
% 62.24 16.78 13.29 7.69 
Table 5 shows that the selected fund sample very well represents the entire Saudi 
mutual fund population in terms of the fund’s investment goal objectives and Shariah 
compliancy. There are 67.13 percent (96 out 143) Islamic mutual funds and 32.87 percent 
(47 out of 143) conventional mutual funds. These percentages are quite similar to those 
reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population presented in (Table 3), where there 
are 62.39 percent Islamic mutual funds and 37.61 percent conventional mutual funds.   
                                                        
20 Source is: http://www.tadawul.com.sa.  
21 Source is: http://www.hsbcsaudi.com. 
22 Zawya is one of leading Middle Eastern business information firms. Their main website is: 
http://www.zawya.com. I would like to express my deep appreciation to Mr. James Randall, the international 
business manager, for providing me a trial excess to the database. 
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Table 5 also indicates that when mutual funds in the sample are broken down based 
on their investment goal classifications; mutual funds that have a growth investment 
objective dominate the fund sample with 89 out of 143 funds (62.24 percent). This 
percentage is quite similar to that reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population 
presented in (Table 3), where 66.67 percent of all funds available in Saudi Arabia are 
growth oriented. Funds that have other investment objectives such as income, capital 
preservation, and income & growth objectives represent 16.78, 13.29, and 7.69 percent of 
the fund sample that consists of 143 Saudi mutual funds, respectively. These percentages 
are also close to the percentages reported for the entire Saudi mutual fund population 
shown in (Table 3), where 11.97, 11.54, and 9.83 percent of all available funds in Saudi 
Arabia have an income, capital preservation, and income & growth objectives, respectively.  
Table 5 also indicates that Islamic funds that are growth oriented dominate the fund 
sample with 61 out of 143 funds (42.66 percent). On the other hand, conventional funds 
that are income & growth oriented are considered the least in the fund sample with only 5 
out of 143 funds (3.50 percent). 
It is worthy to note that (Table 2) shows that Saudi mutual funds have six regional 
focuses: local, international, Arab, Asia, US, and Europe. To enhance comparability, this 
empirical study gathers all mutual funds in the sample that are US-, Asia-, Europe-, and 
internationally-focused and groups them together under one regional focus called 
“internationally-focused funds.” As a result, Saudi mutual funds that make up the sample 
used in this empirical study will have only three main geographical focuses (local, Arab, 
and international). As mentioned in the introduction, locally-focused funds are funds that 
invest in assets located only in Saudi Arabia. Arab-focused funds are funds that invest in 
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assets located only in countries that are members in the Arab league, excluding Saudi 
Arabia. Finally, internationally-focused funds are funds that invest in assets located in all 
countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and those that belong in the above Arab group. 
Table 6 breaks down the sample based on: the three main geographical focuses 
(local, Arab, and international), investment goal classifications (growth, income, capital 
preservation, and income & growth), and Shariah compliancy subcategories (Islamic and 
conventional). Results show that out of 143 funds in sample, there are 82 (57.34 percent), 
19 (13.29 percent), and 42 (29.37 percent) funds that are locally-, Arab-, and 
internationally-focused, respectively. Furthermore, results show that locally-focused 
Islamic funds that are growth orientated dominate the sample with 33 out of 143 funds 
(23.08 percent). However, both (Islamic and conventional) funds that are internationally-
focused and have an income & growth investment objective are considered the least in the 
fund sample where there are only 2 out of 143 funds (1.40 percent) of each type. Also, 
results show that all the 19 Arab-focused funds in the fund sample are only growth 
oriented and only invest in equity. This is very much similar to results observed when 
looking at the entire 20 available Arab-focused funds in Saudi Arabia (Table 2).  
From Bloomberg, the end-of-month Saudi Interbank Offering Rate (SIBOR) with 
one-month maturity is collected for the period from July 2004 to January 2010. In this 
empirical study, SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the monthly risk-
free rate. Note that it would be more appropriate to use the rate of return on sukuk instead 
of the rate of the risk-free asset since Shariah law forbids any return that is in the context of 
debt. But the problem is that data on sukuk rates are still not fully available to be used in 
Islamic finance empirical studies. 
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Table 6: Mutual Fund Sample Based on Geographical Focus, Investment Goal, and Shariah Compliancy  
The following table presents the selected sample of 143 mutual funds in Saudi Arabia for the period from July 2004 to January 2010. Funds are 
categorized based on three main geographic focus categories (local, Arab, and international), Shariah compliancy subcategories [Islamic (Is.) and 
conventional (Cn.)], and investment goal classifications [growth (G), income (I), capital preservation (CP), and income & growth (I&G)]. The final 
column presents the percentage of funds under each geographic focus category. The final row presents the percentage of funds under each investment 
goal classification and Shariah compliancy subcategory. 
Category 
Investment Goal Classifications and Shariah Compliancy subcategories 
Total % G I CP I&G 
Is. % Cn. % Is. % Cn. % Is. % Cn. % Is. % Cn. % 
Local 33 23.08 20 13.99 8 5.59 4 2.8 7 4.9 3 2.10 4 2.80 3 2.10 82 57.34 
Arab 14 9.79 5 3.50 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 19 13.29 
International 14 9.79 3 2.10 8 5.59 4 2.80 6 4.20 3 2.10 2 1.40 2 1.40 42 29.37 
Total 61  
 
28  
 
16  
 
8  
 
13  
 
6  
 
6  
 
5  
 
143 100 
% 42.66 19.58 11.19 5.59 9.09 4.2 4.2 3.5 
Total Funds  
Based on 
Investment 
Goal 
Classification 
89 24 19 11 
% 62.24 16.78 13.29 7.69 
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There are six different market indices used to benchmark the performance of Saudi 
funds and they fall under two main groups: Islamic and conventional indices. The Islamic 
indices group includes: 1) Global Index of the GCC Islamic (to mainly benchmark locally-
focused Islamic funds).23 2) MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic Index excluding Saudi 
Arabia (to mainly benchmark Arab-focused Islamic funds). And 3) MSCI World Islamic 
Index (to mainly benchmark internationally-focused Islamic funds). The conventional 
indices group includes: 1) Tadawul All Share Index: TASI (to mainly benchmark locally-
focused conventional funds). 2) MSCI Arabian Markets Domestic Index excluding Saudi 
Arabia (to mainly benchmark Arab-focused conventional funds). And 3) MSCI World Index 
IMI (to mainly benchmark internationally-focused conventional funds). 
The monthly historical prices of both Islamic and conventional indices from July 
2004 to January 2010 are obtained from three main sources: 1) the official website of the 
Saudi Stock Exchange (Tadawul).24 2) The official website of the Global Investment 
House.25 And 3) the MSCI Barra.26 
Finally, to enhance comparability, the sample period in this empirical study is 
divided into four different periods depending on different stock market trends in Saudi 
Arabia. Such division will hold throughout the entire study. These periods are: the overall 
sample period (from July 2004 to January 2010), the bullish period (from July 2004 to 
                                                        
23 GCC refers to the Gulf Cooperation Council, which is represented by six countries: Saudi Arabia, United Arab 
Emirates, Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and Oman. This index is used to benchmark locally-focused Islamic funds 
instead of the Saudi Arabia Islamic index. This is because the Saudi Arabia Islamic index is considered 
relatively new and do not have data that goes all the way back to July 2004.  
24 Source is: http://www.tadawul.com.sa/. 
25 Source is: http://www.globalinv.net. 
26 Source is: www.msci.com. The MSCI data contained herein is the property of MSCI Inc. (MSCI). MSCI, its 
affiliates and any other party involved in, or related to, making or compiling any MSCI data; make no 
warranties with respect to any such data. The MSCI data contained herein is used under license and may not 
be further used, distributed or disseminated without the express written consent of MSCI. 
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February 2006), the bearish period (from March 2006 to January 2010), and the recent 
2008 financial crisis period (from September 2008 to January 2010). 
7.2. Multifactor Model Data 
To further enhance comparability between Islamic and conventional funds, a 
multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997) four-factor model is used to control for 
common investment styles. Such model is constructed using all 135 stocks listed on the 
Saudi stock exchange (Tadawul) as of January 31, 2010. To be included in the test, all listed 
firms must have available data on stock prices, book values of equity, and total shares 
outstanding from July 2003 to January 2010. 
8. Methodology 
The methodology discussion is divided into three sections: Section (‎8.1) is the non 
risk-adjusted returns. Section (‎8.2) is the simple risk-adjusted performance measures. It 
discusses the Sharpe and modified Sharpe ratios, Modigliani and Modigliani index (MM), 
Treynor ratio, and TT index. Section (‎8.3) is the regression approach. It discusses three 
models: the single-factor model (CAPM) in order to estimate the Jensen alpha Index as well 
as the systematic risk (beta), the Treynor and Mazuy (1966) model in order to assess the 
selection and market timing abilities, and a multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart 
(1997) four-factor model in order to control for common investment styles when assessing 
the risk-return profile of funds. 
8.1. Non Risk-Adjusted Returns  
From the daily net asset values (NAVs), the monthly NAVs for all funds are 
calculated as follows: 
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(1)      
                           
                           
      
where     is the monthly return for fund (i) at month (t).27  
It is worthy to note that the methodology used to assess the risk-return profile of 
Saudi funds is not based on using individual funds. Instead, the methodology used is based 
on using a portfolio approach in order to diversify away fund-specific risks and to facilitate 
comparison between the entire Islamic and conventional Saudi mutual funds industries.  
Thus, Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are grouped into portfolios based 
on the following characteristics: the funds’ three main geographical focuses (local, Arab, 
and international), the funds’ Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional), and four 
different stock market trends in Saudi Arabia (overall, bull, bear, and the recent 2008 
financial crisis periods).  
Forming portfolios in that manner will create 24 (12 Islamic and 12 conventional) 
different types of portfolios (see Appendix A). Note that all formed portfolios are equally-
weighted and formed on monthly basis.28  
Fund portfolios are calculated as follows: 
(2)      
  
  
     
  
 
 where     is the monthly return for portfolio (p) during month (t),    is the total number 
of individual funds during month (t), and     is defined as in equation (1). 
                                                        
27 Conventionally, mutual fund returns are calculated as capital gains plus income (dividends). However, 
because obtaining data on dividends was very difficult, dividends are not accounted for in this study.  
28 According to Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec (2009), “It is common practice to analyze portfolios of assets with 
religious of ethical characteristics based on equal weighted rather than value weighted portfolios. This 
practice ensures a focus on the assets religious or ethical characteristics and substantially reduces the risk of 
bias due to idiosyncratic return characteristics of a specific asset.” This is why in this empirical study all 
formed portfolios are equally-weighted portfolios. 
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8.2. Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures 
8.2.1. Sharpe and Modified Sharpe Ratios 
The Sharpe ratio is derived by Sharpe (1966) as an absolute risk-adjusted 
performance measure. Thus, no market benchmark is needed to calculate the Sharpe ratio. 
The idea of this ratio is to see how much additional return is received for additional 
volatility of holding the risky asset over the risk-free asset. Thus, this ratio measures how 
well a portfolio compensates investors for the additional risk taken. The risk in the Sharpe 
ratio is measured by the portfolio’s standard deviation, which represents the total risk 
(diversified and undiversified risks). This ratio is useful in ranking portfolios because a 
higher ratio is only warranted if return is higher with the same level of risk or if the risk is 
lower with the same level of return. The Sharpe ratio is calculated as follows: 
(3)     
             
     
 
 where:  
           Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p) 
              Average of monthly return for portfolio (p) 
             The average risk-free rate measured by SIBOR one-month maturity 
       Standard deviation of the portfolio (p)  
However, the Sharpe ratio is very difficult to interpret and could lead to spurious 
portfolio ranking when the excess return is negative. In other words, it is not always true 
that the portfolio with the higher ratio is the best portfolio. For example, if two portfolios, A 
and B, have excess average returns of -5 percent and standard deviation of 20 and 25 
percent, respectively. Then the Sharpe ratio is -0.25 and -0.20 for A and B, respectively. 
According to the Sharpe ratio, portfolio B has a superior risk-return profile when compared 
to portfolio A. However, that is not true because B is considered more volatile than A. 
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As a result, Israelsen (2005) propose a modification to the Sharpe ratio to overcome 
the spurious portfolio ranking when excess return is negative. He introduces an exponent 
to the denominator of the Sharpe ratio that is equal to the portfolio excess return divided 
by its absolute value. It is worthy to note that the modified Sharpe ratio coincides with the 
original ratio when the excess return is positive, and is superior to the original ratio when 
the excess return is negative. Therefore, only the modified Sharpe ratio results are reported 
in this study and it is calculated as: 
(4) 
             
             
     
             
                 
 
where            is the modified Sharpe ratio for portfolio (p) and the reset is defined as 
in equation (3).  
8.2.2. MM Measure 
Modigliani & Modigliani (1997) propose this measure as a relative risk-adjusted 
performance measure. It is very intuitive and easy to interpret and it is also considered an 
extension to the Sharpe ratio. This measure shows the return the portfolio would have 
gained if it had the same risk as the market benchmark. The risk is measured using the total 
risk: the standard deviation. According to this measure, the most appealing portfolios are 
those with the highest MM values. MM is calculated as follows: 
(5)                      
     
     
         
where     is the Modigliani and Modigliani measure for portfolio (p),       is the 
standard deviation of the market index, and the rest is defined as in equation (3). 
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8.2.3. Treynor Ratio 
Treynor ratio measures the excess returns over the riskless asset that could be 
earned per unit of market risk. Market risk or systematic risk is measured by the portfolio’s 
beta, which measures the co-movement of the portfolio with the market. Since, the Treynor 
ratio normalizes excess return by the portfolio’s beta instead of the portfolio’s standard 
deviation, then the Treynor ratio is superior to the Sharpe ratio in assessing the risk-return 
profile if the fund is a part of a larger fully diversified portfolio. This is because the relevant 
risk is such circumstance is the market risk (beta). It is calculated as follows: 
(6)      
             
  
 
where                   are defined as in equation (3) and 
     Is  the Treynor ratio for portfolio (p) 
       Portfolio's beta. Estimated using a single-factor model (CAPM) as is shown in following 
equation: 
 (7)                              
where: 
        Returns for portfolio (p) at months (t) 
        Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR with one-month maturity at months (t) 
         The intercept for portfolio (p). In this model it is called the Jensen alpha index 
         Beta or the market risk for portfolio (p) 
      Return on the market index at months (t) 
        The error term with zero mean 
8.2.4. TT Index 
The TT index is an extension to the Treynor ratio. The TT measure is proposed by 
Bodie, Kane, & Marcus (2005) and it measures the excess return of a portfolio per unit of 
systematic risk (beta) above the excess return on the market, which by definition has a beta 
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of one. Thus, one can look at the TT measure as the difference between the portfolio and 
the market Treynor ratio. It is calculated as follows: 
(8)                           
where     is the TT index for portfolio (p),         is the average monthly return for the 
market index,     is defined as in equation (6), and        is defined as in equation (3).  
8.3. The Regression Approach 
8.3.1. The Single-Factor Model (CAPM) 
The single-factor model is used to estimate the Jensen alpha index as well as the 
systematic risk (beta). The Jensen alpha index is a relative risk-adjusted performance 
measure that was first introduced by Jensen (1967) to determine the abnormal return of a 
portfolio over the theoretical expected return using a capital asset pricing model (CAPM). 
Thus, the Jensen alpha index is the constant term in the single-factor model presented in 
equation (7). A portfolio is considered outperforming the market if the Jensen alpha is 
positive and statistically significant. 
The systematic risk (beta), which is also called the market risk, measures the 
portfolio’s co-movement with the employed market index. Thus, beta is considered 
superior to the standard deviation when assessing the risk of a very well diversified 
portfolio. A beta above (below) one indicates that the portfolio’ return is more (less) 
volatile than the return of the employed market index. A positive (negative) beta indicates 
that the portfolio’s return is positively (negatively) correlated with the return of the 
employed market index. However, a zero beta indicates that the portfolio’s return moves 
independently from the return of the employed market index. Beta is the coefficient on the 
excess market return portfolio (RM-RF) presented in equation (7).  
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8.3.2. The Treynor & Mazuy Model 
The Treynor & Mazuy (1966) model is used to assess both the selectivity and 
market timing skills. It extends the Jensen alpha model by adding a quadratic term.  
It is estimated as follows: 
(9)                                     
       
where    and    represent the selectivity and market timing skills for portfolio (p), 
respectively.              , and     are defined as in equation (7). 
A statistical significant positive alpha (  ) [gamma (  )] indicates that managers 
possess selectivity [market timing] skills. Selectivity skills mean that managers are able to 
pick good performing assets. Market timing skills mean that managers increase their funds’ 
exposure to the market when they believe that the market is going to do well and reduce 
their funds’ exposure to the market when they believe that the market will do badly. 
8.3.3. Multifactor Model 
Fama & French (1993) illustrate the CAPM insufficiency in explaining the cross-
sectional US stock returns and introduce a three-factor model that includes a risk factor 
related to size (SMB) and a risk factor related to book-to-market equity (HML) in addition 
to the market excess returns portfolio (RM-RF). The findings of Fama and French imply 
that the three-factor model is incrementally useful in explaining mutual fund returns if 
fund managers are significantly engaging in different investment strategies such as 
investing in small vs. large cap stocks or value (high book-to-market equity) vs. growth 
(low book-to-market equity) stocks. 
Nevertheless, there is a growing literature that indicates that the three-factor model 
could further be improved. That is, the three-factor model is still insufficiently capable in 
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explaining the Jegadeesh & Titman (1993) momentum strategy of buying the past 12-
month winners and selling the past 12-month losers. To overcome this issue, Carhart 
(1997) proposes a four-factor model where a risk factor related to momentum is added to 
the existing Fama and French three-factor model. 
As a result, in this study a multifactor model in the spirit of Carhart (1997) four-
factor model is employed to investigate the persistence in performance of Saudi mutual 
funds. Another reason for employing the four-factor model is that there is growing 
evidence that the performance of Islamic funds is indeed attributed to style tilts which 
cannot be accounted for using a single-factor model. For example, Hoepner, Rammal, & 
Rezec (2009) find that Islamic funds are biased towards small stocks. Also, Abderrezak 
(2008) finds that Islamic equity funds (IEFs) are biased towards both small cap firms and 
growth stocks. 
8.3.3.1. The Construction of the Four-Factor Model 
Eight value-weighted return portfolios are formed based on the intersection of two 
size groups, two book-to-market equity groups, and two momentum groups. The two size 
groups are [small (S) and big (B)] and they are split using the median size. The two book-
to-market equity groups are [low (L) and High (H)] and they are split using the median of 
book-to-market equity. And the momentum groups are [winners (W) and Losers (Z)] and 
they are split based on winners (good performers in the past 12-months) and losers (bad 
performers in the past 12-months).  
The eight return portfolios are as follows: (SLW, SHW, BLW, BHW, SLZ, SHZ, BLZ, 
and BHZ). For example, the SLW portfolio contains returns of stocks in the small size, low 
book-to-market equity, and winners groups. The BHZ portfolio contains returns of stocks in 
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the big size, high book-to-market equity, and losers groups. From these eight value-
weighted return portfolios, three risk factors are created. These risk factors are considered 
portfolios meant to mimic the risk factor in returns related to size (SMB), book-to-market 
equity (HML), and momentum (MOM). The construction of these factors is as follows: 
It is very well documented that there is a negative relationship between size and 
average returns. Thus, SMB (small minus big) is calculated by taking, in each month, the 
average return on the two small-winners and the two small-losers portfolios minus the 
average return on the two big-winners and the two big-losers portfolios. This difference is 
expected to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk factor that is related to size free, 
as much as possible, from both the book-to-market equity and momentum effects and more 
focused on the differences in return between small and big stocks. It is calculated as 
follows: 
(10)      
 
 
                                       
Also, it is very well documented that there is a positive relationship between book-
to-market equity and average returns. Thus, HML (high minus low) is calculated by taking, 
in each month, the average return on the two high-winners and the two high-losers 
portfolios minus the average return on the two low-winners and the two low-losers 
portfolios. This difference is expected to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk 
factor that is related to the book-to-market equity free, as much as possible, from both the 
size and momentum effects and more focused on the differences in return between value 
(high book-to-market equity) and growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. It is 
calculated as follows: 
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(11)     
 
 
                                       
MOM is calculated by taking, in each month, the average return on the four-winner 
portfolios minus the average return on the four-loser portfolios. This difference is expected 
to make the created portfolio mimicking the risk factor related to momentum free, as much 
as possible, from the size and book-to-market equity effects and more focused on the 
differences in return between momentum (buying past 12-month winners) and contrarian 
(selling past 12-month losers) stocks. It is calculated as follows: 
(12)     
 
 
                                       
The four-factor model is estimated as follows: 
(13)                                                    
where 
            Returns of portfolio (p) at month (t) 
           Risk-free rate measured by SIBOR one-month maturity at month (t) 
            The intercept of the model. It is the selectivity skill coefficient for portfolio (p) 
            Beta or the market risk for portfolio (p) 
         The return on the market index at month (t) 
             Loadings on the size risk factor for portfolio (p) 
        (Small minus big) size risk factor 
            Loadings on the book-to-market equity risk factor for portfolio (p) 
        (High minus low) book-to-market equity risk factor 
           Loadings on the momentum risk factor for portfolio (p) 
       (Winner minus losers) momentum risk factor 
            The error term with zero mean 
9. Empirical Results 
The following empirical results discussion is going to be presented based on the 
three main geographical focuses of the created fund portfolios. That is, section ‎9.1 
discusses the empirical results for the locally-focused fund portfolios. Section ‎9.2 discusses 
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the empirical results for the Arab-focused fund portfolios. And section ‎9.3 discusses the 
empirical results for the internationally-focused fund portfolios.  
In each section there is one main table that contains five different panels (A to E). 
Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted returns. Panel B reports the results from the simple 
risk-adjusted performance measures, which are the modified Sharpe ratio, MM index, 
Treynor ratio, and the TT index. Panels C to E report the results from the regression 
approach. That is, panel C reports the results from the single-factor model. Panel D reports 
the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And panel E reports the results from the 
four-factor model. 
9.1. Empirical Results for Locally-Focused Portfolios 
Table 7 reports the results for only the locally-focused fund portfolios. The market 
indices used to benchmark the performance of these locally-focused portfolios are also 
locally-focused and they are: 1) GCC Islamic: Global Index of the GCC Islamic and 2) TASI: 
Tadawul All Share Index. To enhance comparability, each of the Islamic and conventional 
locally-focused portfolios are benchmarked against the locally-focused Islamic market 
index (GCC Islamic) and then against the locally-focused conventional market index (TASI). 
Table 7-panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for 
the locally-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate that the 
locally-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire studied period is 0.17 percent less risky 
(using the variance) than its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio and that 
difference in the total risk is considered statistically significant at 1 percent. Even though 
the locally-focused Islamic portfolio has less total risk exposure than its peer, the results 
during the entire studied period indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows 
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any differences in the performance (non risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the 
conventional locally-focused fund portfolios. 
Table 7: Results for the Locally-Focused Portfolios 
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period 
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed 
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and 
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July 
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September 
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels 
in this table report the results for only the locally-focused portfolios. The market indices used to benchmark 
the performance of these locally-focused portfolios are also locally-focused and they are: 1) GCC Islamic: 
Global Index of the GCC Islamic and 2) TASI: Tadawul All Share Index. Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted 
return mean and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance 
measures (modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the results from the single-factor model 
(CAPM). Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And finally Panel E reports the results 
from the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity 
problems using White’s (1980) correction test.   
Table 7-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Locally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
Islamic portfolio 0.31% 0.17% 2.27% 0.04% -0.52% 0.21% -0.77% 0.20% 
Conventional portfolio 0.38% 0.34% 3.66% 0.08% -1.02% 0.39% -1.40% 0.48% 
The difference -0.07% -0.17%*** -1.38%* -0.04%* 0.49% -0.18%** 0.63% -0.28%** 
GCC Islamic 0.94% 0.96% 7.70% 0.29% -1.94% 0.97% -3.36% 0.98% 
TASI 0.46% 0.91% 5.89% 0.24% -1.85% 1.03% -1.61% 1.00% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, the results 
indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is also considered significantly less risky 
(using the variance) than its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio. That is, the 
locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.04, 0.18, and 0.28 percent less risky than 
its peer during the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods and that difference in the total risk 
is statistically significant at 10, 5, and 5 percent, respectively.  
Looking at the performance (non risk-adjusted return) of these portfolios during 
these three market trends (bull, bear and financial crisis periods), the results during the 
bull period reveal that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio significantly at 10 percent 
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underperforms the locally-focused conventional portfolio and that underperformance is 
around 1.38 percent per month. However, during the bear and financial crisis periods, the 
non risk-adjusted return results reveal that there is no statistical evidence that shows any 
differences in the performance between the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused 
portfolios. 
Table 7-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (Locally-Focused 
Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
Modified  Sharpe Ratio 0.96% 1.82% 96.23% 116.06% -0.04% -0.08% -0.04% -0.10% 
MM 
GCC Islamic 0.37% 0.45% 5.48% 6.55% -1.44% -1.75% -1.84% -2.05% 
TASI 0.36% 0.45% 5.00% 5.97% -1.49% -1.82% -1.86% -2.07% 
Treynor 
GCC Islamic 0.11% 0.21% 8.71% 9.85% -1.95% -2.34% -2.13% -2.43% 
TASI 0.09% 0.18% 5.11% 6.03% -1.81% -2.14% -1.99% -2.20% 
TT 
GCC Islamic -0.55% -0.46% 1.29% 2.43% 0.26% -0.13% 1.33% 1.03% 
TASI -0.09% -0.01% -0.49% 0.43% 0.31% -0.02% -0.28% -0.50% 
Table 7-panel B- reports the simple risk-adjusted performance measures for the 
locally-focused fund portfolios. The results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic 
portfolio underperforms its peer the locally-focused conventional portfolio during both the 
overall and bull periods, but performs less badly than its peer during the bear and financial 
crisis periods. This is true regardless of the simple risk-adjusted performance measure 
used and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark employed to adjust for risk. 
Table 7-panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During 
the overall studied period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and 
highly significant at 1 percent regardless what locally-focused market benchmark (GCC 
Islamic or TASI) is used to adjust for risk. Similar results are observed when the entire 
sample period is broken down to bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. This means that 
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both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are considered less volatile than 
both locally-focused market benchmarks. 
Table 7-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Locally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
GCC Islamic -0.002 -0.0024 0.0029 0.0083 0.001 -0.0007 0.0054 0.0064 
Diff 0.0003 -0.0054 0.0018 -0.0009 
TASI -0.0004 0.0000 -0.0019 0.0024 0.0014 -0.0001 -0.0012 -0.0034 
Diff -0.0004 -0.0043 0.0015 0.0022 
  
GCC Islamic 0.3654*** 0.5165*** 0.2285** 0.3423** 0.4047*** 0.5476*** 0.4069*** 0.6166*** 
Diff -0.1511** -0.1139 -0.1430* -0.2097* 
TASI 0.4225*** 0.5968*** 0.3896*** 0.5592*** 0.4366*** 0.5994*** 0.4356*** 0.6792*** 
Diff -0.1744*** -0.1696** -0.1628*** -0.2436*** 
Adj.  
R2 
GCC Islamic 72.70% 73.65% 32.12% 36.69% 75.28% 73.41% 79.62% 75.93% 
TASI 93.61% 94.73% 85.19% 87.82% 94.00% 94.42% 94.21% 95.56% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Looking at differences in the systematic risk (beta) during the overall studied 
period, the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 
significantly less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio; regardless what 
locally-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk. In other words, at 5 (1) 
percent level of significance, the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.1511 
(0.1744) less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio when the GCC Islamic 
(TASI) is used as the locally-focused market benchmark. Similar results are observed if the 
sample period is broken down to bull, bear, and financial crisis periods.  
However, there is one meaningless exception when the GCC Islamic index is used to 
adjust for risk during the bull period where the results indicate that still the locally-focused 
Islamic portfolio is less risky, but that beta-difference is statistically insignificant. This 
exception is meaningless because the adjusted R-squared results show that the locally-
focused conventional market index (TASI) is considered a better fit than the locally-focused 
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Islamic index (GCC Islamic) in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locally-
focused portfolios. To illustrate, when TASI is used, the adjusted R-squared values for the 
locally-focused Islamic (conventional) portfolio is 93.61 (94.73), 85.19 (87.82), 94.00 
(94.42), and 94.21 (95.56) percent versus 72.70 (73.65), 32.12 (36.69), 75.28 (73.41), and 
79.62 (75.93) percent when the GCC Islamic index is used during the overall, bull, bear, and 
financial crisis periods, respectively. 
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results during the 
overall period reveal that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) do not 
outperform both locally-focused market benchmarks. Similar results are observed during 
the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. That is, alphas are either negative or 
insignificantly positive.  
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional 
locally-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that 
shows any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results hold 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused 
market benchmark used. 
Table 7-panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. Consistent 
with the adjusted R-squared results obtained from the single-factor model (panel C), the 
adjusted R-squared results from this model still indicate that TASI is considered a better fit 
than the GCC Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locally-
focused fund portfolios. Thus, results that are based on using TASI provide a better picture 
when discussing the selectivity and market time skills than the results that are based on 
using the GCC Islamic index. 
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Table 7-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Locally-Focused Portfolios) 
Measure Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
GCC Islamic -0.0021 -0.0046 0.0028 0.0022 -0.0016 -0.0063 0.0069 0.0045 
Diff 0.0025 0.0006 0.0047 0.0024 
TASI 0.0033** 0.0026 -0.002 0.0028 0.0060*** 0.0029 0.004 0.0004 
Diff 0.0007 -0.0047 0.0031 0.0036 
  
GCC Islamic 0.005 0.2286 -0.0507 -1.822 0.3299 0.6932 -0.1949 0.2358 
Diff -0.2237 1.7713 -0.3632 -0.4307 
TASI -0.4036*** -0.294 -0.0149 0.1962 -0.4761*** -0.3133 -0.5657*** -0.4158 
Diff -0.1096 -0.2112 -0.1627 -0.1499 
Adj.  
R2 
GCC Islamic 72.27% 73.51% 28.14% 36.37% 75.65% 75.00% 78.54% 74.44% 
TASI 94.64% 94.95% 84.31% 87.12% 95.44% 94.66% 97.03% 95.98% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
As for the selectivity skills (alphas), the results when the GCC Islamic index is used 
as the locally-focused market index indicate that both locally-focused fund portfolios 
(Islamic and conventional) do not possess any selectivity skills; regardless of the sample 
period under examination. However, when TASI is used as the locally-focused market 
index, the results indicate that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio possesses some 
selectivity skills of 0.0033 (significant at 5 percent) and 0.0060 (significant at 1 percent) 
during only the overall and bear periods, respectively. The results during the bull and 
financial crisis periods indicate that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) possess no selectivity skills. 
As for the market timing skills (gammas), results reveal that both locally-focused 
fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) do not possess any market timing skills; 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused 
market benchmark used. 
Finally, the results reveal that there is no statistical evidence that shows any 
differences in both the selectivity and market timing skills between the Islamic and the 
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conventional locally-focused portfolios. This is true regardless of the sample period under 
examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for 
risk. 
Table 7-panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. Again, the adjusted 
R-squared result from this model indicate that TASI is considered by far a better fit than 
the GCC Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locally-
focused portfolios. Thus, results that are based on using TASI are more reliable than the 
results that are based on using the GCC Islamic index. 
The systematic risk (beta) results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and 
highly significant; regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the 
locally-focused market index used to adjust for risk. This supports the notion that both 
locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are less volatile than both locally-
focused market indices (GCC Islamic and TASI). Furthermore, the beta-difference results 
show that there is statistical evidence that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is 
considered less risky than the locally-focused conventional portfolio. However, there is one 
exception when the GCC Islamic index is employed during the bull period where the beta-
difference results still show that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is less risky than its 
respective peer, but that risk difference is statistically insignificant. 
Assessing the portfolios’ performance relative to locally-focused market indices, the 
alpha results when the locally-focused Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is used reveal that 
neither locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with 
abnormal return. However, when the locally-focused conventional index (TASI) is used, the 
alpha results indicate that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio provides investors with 
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a small abnormal return during only the overall and bear periods. That is, the locally-
focused Islamic portfolio outperforms TASI by only 0.0025 (significant at 10 percent) 
during the overall period and by 0.0042 (significant at 5 percent) during the bear period. 
Table 7-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Locally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
GCC Islamic 0.0014 0.0005 -0.0020 0.0005 0.0057 0.0055 0.0051 0.0033 
Diff 0.0009 -0.0024 0.0002 0.0018 
TASI 0.0025* 0.0021 -0.0033** -0.0004 0.0042** 0.0034 0.0020 -0.0030 
Diff 0.0004 -0.0029 0.0008 0.0049 
  
GCC Islamic 0.3640*** 0.5241*** 0.2234** 0.3222*** 0.3901*** 0.5374*** 0.4034*** 0.6358*** 
Diff -0.1601*** -0.0988 -0.1473* -0.2324** 
TASI 0.4177*** 0.6003*** 0.3968*** 0.5410*** 0.4303*** 0.5998*** 0.4149*** 0.6817*** 
Diff -0.1826*** -0.1443** -0.1695*** -0.2668*** 
  
GCC Islamic 0.0084 -0.0503 0.0036 -0.0682 0.0173 -0.0235 0.0492 -0.0371 
Diff 0.0586 0.0718 0.0408 0.0863 
TASI 0.0356*** -0.0109 0.0611*** 0.0109 0.0237 -0.0165 0.0342 -0.0767 
Diff 0.0465* 0.0502 0.0402 0.1109* 
  
GCC Islamic -0.1851*** -0.2072* -0.2311** -0.2380* -0.1974* -0.2633* -0.1709 -0.2872 
Diff 0.0221 0.0069 0.0660 0.1163 
TASI -0.0380 0.0041 -0.0728** -0.0215 -0.0301 -0.0277 -0.0926 -0.1606*** 
Diff -0.0422 -0.0513 -0.0024 0.0680 
  
GCC Islamic -0.0608 -0.0435 0.1073 0.1911 -0.1009 -0.1268 -0.0158 0.1008 
Diff -0.0173 -0.0838 0.0260 -0.1166 
TASI -0.0562** -0.0368 0.0077 0.0608 -0.0582* -0.0655* -0.0958 0.0223 
Diff -0.0193 -0.0531 0.0073 -0.1181 
Adj.  
R2 
GCC Islamic 75.52% 75.47% 43.04% 43.30% 76.94% 75.30% 79.93% 74.44% 
TASI 94.19% 94.71% 94.44% 86.80% 94.00% 94.64% 94.37% 96.54% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
 Consistent with the results obtained from the single-factor model (panel C), the 
alpha-difference results from the four-factor model indicate that there is no statistical 
evidence that shows any differences in the performance between the Islamic and 
conventional locally-focused portfolios. These results are observed regardless of the 
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sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark 
used to adjust for risk.  
The results from the SMB risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate 
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the SMB 
risk factor and that both portfolios exhibit identical sensitivities to the SMB risk factor. 
These results hold regardless of the sample period under examination. However, when 
TASI is used, the results from the SMB risk factor indicate that only the locally-focused 
Islamic portfolio is biased towards small capitalization stocks during only the overall and 
bull periods. That is, loading on the SMB risk factor during the overall (bull) period is 
0.0356 (0.0611) and it is statistically significant at 1 percent. Looking at the SMB-difference 
portfolio, the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is significantly at 10 
percent considered more sensitive to the SMB risk factor (more biased towards small 
capitalization stocks) than is the locally-focused conventional portfolio. This is observed 
during only the overall and the financial crisis periods. 
The results from the HML risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate 
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are more biased towards 
growth (low book-to-market equity) stocks. This is observed during all periods, but the 
financial crisis period. However, when TASI is used, the results from the HML risk factor 
indicate that during the overall and bear periods; there is no statistical evidence that both 
locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are biased towards either value (high 
book-to-market equity) or growth stocks. However, during the bull (financial crisis) period, 
the results indicate that the locally-focused Islamic (conventional) portfolio is biased 
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towards growth stocks where the loading on the HML risk factor is -0.0728 (-0.1606) and it 
is statistically significant at 5 (1) percent. 
The results from the MOM risk factor when the GCC Islamic index is used indicate 
that both locally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the 
MOM risk factor, regardless of the sample period under examination. However, when TASI 
is employed, results from the MOM risk factor during the overall sample period indicate 
that only the locally-focused Islamic portfolio is biased towards a contrarian investment 
strategy. Loading on the MOM risk factor is -0.0562 and it is statically significantly at 5 
percent. Furthermore, the results during the bear period indicate that both locally-focused 
portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are also biased towards a contrarian investment 
strategy. Loading on the MOM risk factor for the locally-focused Islamic (conventional) 
portfolio is -0.0582 (-0.0655) and it is considered statistically significant at 10 percent. 
However, results during both the bull and financial crisis periods indicate that both locally-
focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are not sensitive to the MOM risk factor. 
Finally, the HML- and MOM-difference portfolio results show that both Islamic and 
conventional locally-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to both HML 
and MOM risk factors. This is true regardless of the sample period under examination and 
regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
9.2. Empirical Results for Arab-Focused Portfolios 
Table 8 reports the results for only the Arab-focused fund portfolios. The market 
indices used to benchmark the performance of these Arab-focused portfolios are also Arab-
focused and they are: 1) MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic: MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic 
Index excluding Saudi Arabia and 2) MSCI Arab Mrk Index: MSCI Arabian Markets 
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Domestic Index excluding Saudi Arabia. To enhance comparability, each of the Islamic and 
the conventional Arab-focused portfolios are benchmarked against the Arab-focused 
Islamic market index (MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index) and then against the Arab-focused 
conventional market index (MSCI Arab Mrk Index). 
Table 8: Results for the Arab-Focused Portfolios 
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period 
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed 
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and 
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July 
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September 
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels 
in this table report the results for only the Arab-focused portfolios. The market indices used to benchmark the 
performance of these Arab-focused portfolios are also Arab-focused and they are: 1) MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic: 
MSCI Arab Markets Domestic Islamic Index excluding Saudi Arabia and 2) MSCI Arab Mrk Index: MSCI 
Arabian Markets Domestic Index excluding Saudi Arabia. Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted return mean 
and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance measures 
(modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). 
Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. And finally Panel E reports the results from 
the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are corrected for heteroscedasticity problems 
using White’s (1980) correction test. 
Table 8-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Arab-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
Islamic portfolio -0.03% 0.45% 2.54% 0.26% -1.12% 0.49% -2.43% 0.67% 
Conventional portfolio 0.70% 0.31% 3.67% 0.19% -0.56% 0.31% -1.69% 0.50% 
The difference -0.73% 0.14%* -1.13% 0.06% -0.56% 0.19%* -0.74% 0.17% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.98% 0.95% 6.33% 1.23% -1.29% 0.67% -3.64% 1.14% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.77% 0.61% 4.63% 0.58% -0.87% 0.55% -3.05% 0.99% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Table 8 -panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for 
the Arab-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate that the 
Arab-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire studied period is 0.14 percent more risky 
(using the variance) than its peer the Arab-focused conventional portfolio and that 
difference in the total risk is considered statistically significant at 10 percent. Even though 
the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio is more risky than its peer, the results during the entire 
studied period indicate that there is no statistical evidence that there exist any differences 
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in the performance (non risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional 
Arab-focused fund portfolios. 
Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods; the results 
show that during the bull and financial crisis periods, there is no statistical evidence that 
there exist any risk differences between the Islamic and conventional Arab-focused fund 
portfolios. However, the results during the bear period indicate that the Arab-focused 
Islamic fund portfolio is considered 0.19 percent more risky than its peer the Arab-focused 
conventional fund portfolio and that total risk difference is statistically significant at 10 
percent. 
Looking at the performance of these Arab-focused portfolios during these three 
periods (bull, bear, and financial crisis periods), the non risk-adjusted return results 
indicate that there is no statistical evidence that there exist any differences in the 
performance between the Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios. 
Table 8-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (Arab-Focused 
Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
Modified  Sharpe Ratio -0.02% 7.79% 44.48% 77.24% -0.10% -0.05% -0.21% -0.13% 
MM 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.16% 1.03% 5.21% 8.84% -1.35% -0.95% -3.18% -2.58% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.08% 0.88% 3.68% 6.18% -1.19% -0.84% -2.97% -2.41% 
Treynor 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.61% 0.94% 12.34% 12.54% -1.92% -1.43% -3.57% -3.04% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.47% 0.74% 6.83% 8.86% -1.79% -1.30% -3.45% -2.90% 
TT 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -1.33% 0.23% 6.30% 6.49% -0.37% 0.12% 0.17% 0.69% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.97% 0.24% 2.48% 4.51% -0.65% -0.16% -0.30% 0.25% 
Table 8 -panel B- reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance 
measures for the Arab-focused fund portfolios. The results indicate that the Arab-focused 
Islamic portfolio underperforms its peer the Arab-focused conventional portfolio during 
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both the overall and bull periods. However, contrary to what is observed when analyzing 
locally-focused portfolios (Table 7- panel B), the results from this panel reveal that the 
Arab-focused Islamic portfolio performs worse than the Arab-focused conventional 
portfolio during both the bear and financial crisis periods. These results hold regardless of 
the simple risk-adjusted performance measure used and regardless of the Arab-focused 
market benchmark employed to adjust for risk. 
Table 8-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Arab-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0065 0.0011 0.0115 0.0175** -0.0026 0.0007 0.0012 0.0041 
Diff -0.0075 -0.006 -0.0034 -0.0029 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.0062 0.0014 0.0082 0.0173* -0.005 -0.001 -0.0022 0.0015 
Diff -0.0076 -0.0091 -0.004 -0.0037 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.4865*** 0.4582*** 0.1825* 0.2701*** 0.7192*** 0.5758*** 0.7061*** 0.5865*** 
Diff 0.0283 -0.0877 0.1434 0.1196 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.6405*** 0.5800*** 0.3299** 0.3822*** 0.7735*** 0.6357*** 0.7312*** 0.6157*** 
Diff 0.0605 -0.0523 0.1377 0.1155 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 49.27% 63.84% 11.39% 43.32% 69.39% 71.63% 82.73% 75.54% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 55.76% 66.61% 20.74% 40.91% 65.53% 71.43% 77.08% 72.48% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Table 8 -panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During 
the overall sample period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and 
highly significant at 1 percent. This suggests that during the entire sample period, both 
Arab-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are considered less volatile than both 
Arab-focused market benchmarks (MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index and MSCI Arab Mrk 
Index). Furthermore, the beta-difference portfolio results during the overall period indicate 
that there is no statistical evidence that shows any systematic risk differences between the 
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios; regardless of Arab-focused 
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market benchmark used to adjust for risk. Similar results are observed during the bull, bear 
and financial crisis periods.  
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results indicate that 
there is no statistical evidence that both Islamic and conventional Arab-focused fund 
portfolios outperform both Arab-focused market indices. Similar results are observed 
during the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, but there is one exception during the bull 
period. That is, the results during the bull period indicate that only the Arab-focused 
conventional portfolio slightly outperforms both Arab-focused market benchmarks. In 
other words, the results show that the Arab-focused conventional portfolio outperforms 
both the MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index by 0.0175 (statistically significant at 5 percent) and 
the MSCI Arab Mrk Index by 0.0173 (statistically significant at 10 percent). 
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional 
Arab-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows 
any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results hold 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused 
market benchmark used. 
Table 8 -panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. The results 
show that there is no statistical evidence that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic 
and conventional) possess any selectivity and/or market timing skills during all four 
sample periods; regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
However, there is only one exception when looking at the selectivity skills of the Arab-
focused conventional fund portfolio during the bull period. That is, the results show that 
the Arab-focused conventional fund portfolio do possess some selectivity skills of 0.0183 -
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significant at 5 percent- (0.0166 -significant at 10 percent-) when the MSCI Arab Mrk 
Islamic Index (MSCI Arab Mrk Index) is employed as the Arab-focused market benchmark. 
Note that the selectivity skills results from this panel are very much consistent with the 
Jensen alpha index results observed above in (panel C). 
Table 8-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Arab-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.0029 0.0064 0.0095 0.0183** -0.0022 0.0006 0.0045 0.0033 
Diff -0.0035 -0.0088 -0.0028 0.0012 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.0025 0.0028 0.0035 0.0166* -0.0068 -0.0034 -0.0003 -0.0009 
Diff -0.0054 -0.0132 -0.0033 0.0006 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -1.0172** -0.5842* 0.3346 -0.1409 -0.0709 0.0248 -0.4385 0.0945 
Diff -0.433 0.4754 -0.0957 -0.533 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.5939 -0.2307 1.6775 0.2138 0.3681 0.523 -0.2658 0.3298 
Diff -0.3632 1.4636 -0.1548 -0.5956 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 54.46% 66.14% 7.06% 40.19% 68.70% 70.98% 82.01% 73.82% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 55.86% 66.26% 21.44% 37.55% 64.92% 71.36% 75.57% 70.77% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Furthermore, the results from this panel indicate that there is no statistical evidence 
that shows any differences in both the selectivity and market time skills between the 
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused portfolios during all four studied periods; 
regardless what Arab-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk. 
Table 8 -panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. The systematic risk 
(beta) results indicate that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) 
are less volatile than both Arab-focused market indices (Islamic and conventional). This is 
true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of Arab-focused 
market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception when looking at 
the beta results for the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio during the bull period where results 
indicate that there is no statistical evidence of any co-movement between such fund 
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portfolio and the Arab-focused Islamic index: MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index. Furthermore, 
the beta-difference results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows any 
systematic risk differences between the Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused 
portfolios; regardless of sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-
focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
The alpha results show that there is no statistical evidence that both Arab-focused 
portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with abnormal returns. 
Furthermore, the alpha-difference portfolio results indicate that there is no statistical 
evidence that shows any differences in the performance between the Islamic and the 
conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios. These results hold regardless of the sample 
period under examination and regardless of Arab-focused market benchmark used to 
adjust for risk. 
The results from the SMB and MOM risk factors indicate that there is no statistical 
evidence that both Arab-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are sensitive to 
either the SMB and/or MOM risk factors; regardless of sample period under examination 
and regardless of the Arab-focused index used. However, results from the HML risk factor 
indicate that only the Arab-focused Islamic portfolio is biased toward growth stocks during 
only the overall and bear periods; regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used. 
Loading on the HML risk factor is -0.2252 (-0.1968) during the overall period and -0.2613 
(-0.2938) during the bear period when the MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic Index (MSCI Arab Mrk 
Index) is used. All loadings are significantly at 10 percent. 
Finally, the SMB-, HML-, and MOM-difference portfolio results indicate that both 
Islamic and conventional Arab-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to 
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all these risk factors. These results hold regardless of the sample period under examination 
and regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
Table 8-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Arab-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0043 0.0029 -0.0069 0.0076 -0.0005 0.0032 0.0090 0.0068 
Diff -0.0072 -0.0145 -0.0036 0.0022 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.0057 0.0018 -0.0066 0.0097 -0.0020 0.0018 0.0089 0.0061 
Diff -0.0076 -0.0163 -0.0038 0.0028 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.4857*** 0.4594*** 0.1552 0.2569*** 0.7153*** 0.5750*** 0.6567*** 0.5749*** 
Diff 0.0263 -0.1017 0.1403 0.0817 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.6380*** 0.5814*** 0.2630* 0.3626** 0.7675*** 0.6311*** 0.6617*** 0.5941*** 
Diff 0.0566 -0.0997 0.1364 0.0676 
s 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 0.0371 -0.0098 0.0797 0.0143 -0.0027 -0.0309 0.0509 -0.0690 
Diff 0.0469 0.0654 0.0282 0.1200 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 0.0306 -0.0132 0.0694 0.0022 0.0268 -0.0095 0.0881 -0.0430 
Diff 0.0438 0.0672 0.0363 0.1312 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.2252* -0.0505 -0.3996 -0.1536 -0.2613* -0.0823 -0.1684 -0.0474 
Diff -0.1748 -0.2460 -0.1790 -0.1210 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.1968* -0.0231 -0.3172 -0.0481 -0.2938* -0.1072 -0.1284 -0.0088 
Diff -0.1736 -0.2690 -0.1866 -0.1196 
  
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic -0.0412 -0.0312 0.3451 0.1863 -0.0506 -0.0457 -0.2447 -0.0459 
Diff -0.0100 0.1587 -0.0049 -0.1987 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index -0.0104 -0.0052 0.3012 0.1408 -0.0701 -0.0566 -0.3423 -0.1044 
Diff -0.0052 0.1604 -0.0136 -0.2378 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI Arab Mrk Islamic 49.38% 62.38% 15.33% 37.64% 69.73% 70.52% 80.23% 70.73% 
MSCI Arab Mrk Index 55.65% 65.08% 19.39% 32.00% 66.33% 70.23% 73.41% 66.73% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
9.3. Empirical Results for Internationally-Focused Portfolios 
Table 9 reports the results for only the internationally-focused fund portfolios. The 
market indices used to benchmark the performance of these internationally-focused 
portfolios are also internationally-focused and they are: 1) MSCI World Islamic: MSCI 
World Islamic Index and 2) MSCI World Index: MSCI World Index IMI. To enhance 
comparability, each of the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused portfolios 
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are benchmarked against the internationally-focused Islamic market index (MSCI World 
Islamic Index) and then against the internationally-focused conventional market index 
(MSCI World Index). 
Table 9: Results for the Internationally-Focused Portfolios 
The total sample consists of 143 mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 conventional) in Saudi Arabia for the period 
from July 2004 to January 2010. From these funds, equally-weighted monthly-return portfolios are formed 
based on the funds’: 1) geographical focus (local, Arab, and international), 2) Shariah compliancy (Islamic and 
conventional), and 3) different market trends (overall period: July 2004 to January 2010, bull period: July 
2004 to February 2006, bear period: March 2006 to January 2010, and financial crisis period: September 
2008 to January 2010). The SIBOR with one-month maturity serves as a proxy for the risk-free rate. All panels 
in this table report the results for only the internationally-focused portfolios. The market indices used to 
benchmark the performance of these internationally-focused portfolios are also internationally-focused and 
they are: 1) MSCI World Islamic: MSCI World Islamic Index and 2) MSCI World Index: MSCI World Index IMI. 
Panel A reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results. Panel B reports the results from the 
simple risk-adjusted performance measures (modified Sharpe, MM, Treynor, and TT). Panel C repots the 
results from the single-factor model (CAPM). Panel D repots the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. 
And finally Panel E reports the results from the four-factor model. All standard errors from all regressions are 
corrected for heteroscedasticity problems using White’s (1980) correction test. 
Table 9-Panel A: Non Risk-Adjusted Returns (Internationally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
 
Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance Mean Variance 
Islamic portfolio 0.21% 0.02% 0.62% 0.004% 0.04% 0.03% -0.13% 0.06% 
Conventional portfolio 0.29% 0.01% 0.45% 0.001% 0.21% 0.02% 0.06% 0.03% 
The difference -0.08% 0.01%*** 0.17% 0.003%*** -0.18% 0.01%** -0.19% 0.04%* 
MSCI World Islamic 0.41% 0.21% 1.04% 0.08% 0.14% 0.26% -0.62% 0.57% 
MSCI World Index 0.24% 0.25% 1.15% 0.07% -0.15% 0.32% -0.66% 0.73% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Table 9 -panel A- reports the non risk-adjusted return mean and variance results for 
the internationally-focused: fund portfolios and market benchmarks. The results indicate 
that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio during the entire sample period is 0.01 
percent more risky (using the variance) than its peer the internationally-focused 
conventional portfolio and that difference in the total risk is considered statistically 
significant at 1 percent. Even though the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio has more 
total risk exposure than its peer, the results during the entire studied period indicate that 
there is no statistical evidence that shows any differences in the performance (non risk-
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adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused fund 
portfolios. 
Breaking the sample period to the bull, bear and financial crisis periods, the results 
indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is also considered significantly 
more risky (using the variance) than its peer the internationally-focused conventional 
portfolio. That is, the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered 0.003, 0.01, 
and 0.04 percent more risky than its peer during the bull, bear, and financial crisis periods 
and that total risk difference is statistically significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent, respectively. 
Although the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered more risky than its 
peer, there is no statistical evidence that shows any differences in the performance (non 
risk-adjusted return) between the Islamic and the conventional internationally-focused 
portfolios during these three periods. 
Table 9-Panel B: Simple Risk-Adjusted Performance Measures (Internationally-
Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
Modified  Sharpe Ratio -0.001% 1.17% 51.97% 53.19% -0.004% -0.001% -0.01% -0.001% 
MM 
MSCI World Islamic 0.08% 0.33% 1.73% 1.77% -0.43% 0.04% -0.58% -0.05% 
MSCI World Index 0.06% 0.33% 1.65% 1.68% -0.50% 0.02% -0.67% -0.07% 
Treynor 
MSCI World Islamic -0.22% 0.07% 2.12% 3.73% -0.79% -0.26% -0.71% -0.15% 
MSCI World Index -0.25% 0.07% 2.06% 3.79% -0.89% -0.29% -0.81% -0.17% 
TT 
MSCI World Islamic -0.36% -0.07% 1.36% 2.98% -0.66% -0.13% 0.01% 0.57% 
MSCI World Index -0.21% 0.11% 1.19% 2.92% -0.47% 0.13% -0.05% 0.58% 
Table 9 -panel B- reports the results from the simple risk-adjusted performance 
measures for the internationally-focused fund portfolios. The results from this panel are 
very much similar to the results reported in (Table 8 –panel B) when the Arab-focused 
portfolios are discussed. The results indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic fund 
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portfolio underperforms its peer the internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio. 
This is true using all measures, regardless of the sample period under examination and 
regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark employed to adjust for risk. 
Table 9-Panel C: Single-Factor Model (CAPM) (Internationally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI World Islamic -0.001 -0.0001 0.0021** 0.0013** -0.0019 -0.0003 0.0000 0.0011 
Diff -0.0009 0.0008 -0.0017 -0.0011 
MSCI World Index -0.0005 0.0002 0.0019* 0.0013* -0.0012 0.0002 -0.0001 0.001 
Diff -0.0007 0.0006 -0.0015 -0.0012 
  
MSCI World Islamic 0.2813*** 0.1879*** 0.1576*** 0.0448* 0.2930*** 0.2045*** 0.3109*** 0.2014*** 
Diff 0.0934*** 0.1127** 0.0885*** 0.1095*** 
MSCI World Index 0.2556*** 0.1727*** 0.1623*** 0.0442 0.2609*** 0.1840*** 0.2743*** 0.1772*** 
Diff 0.0829*** 0.1181** 0.0769** 0.0972*** 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI World Islamic 73.00% 66.04% 46.89% 13.24% 76.07% 71.52% 84.40% 79.72% 
MSCI World Index 71.60% 66.35% 43.78% 10.65% 73.32% 70.40% 83.93% 78.77% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Table 9 -panel C- reports the results from the single-factor model (CAPM). During 
the overall sample period, the results indicate that all betas are positive, less than 1, and 
highly significant at 1 percent; regardless what internationally-focused market benchmark 
(MSCI World Islamic Index or MSCI World Index) is used to adjust for risk. This means that 
during the entire sample period, both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) are considered less volatile than both internationally-focused market 
benchmarks. Similar results are observed when the entire sample period is broken down to 
bull, bear, and financial crisis periods. However, there is one exception where the results 
during the bull period indicate that there is no statistical evidence of any co-movement 
between the internationally-focused conventional portfolio and the internationally-focused 
conventional market index: MSCI World Index. 
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Looking at differences in beta, the beta-difference portfolio results suggest that the 
internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is, indeed, considered more risky than the 
internationally-focused conventional portfolio and these results are statistically significant 
of at least 5 percent. These findings are observed regardless of the sample period under 
examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to 
adjust for risk. 
Looking at the Jensen alpha index to assess performance, the results during the 
overall, bear, and financial crisis periods reveal that both internationally-focused portfolios 
(Islamic and conventional) do not outperform both internationally-focused market 
benchmarks (Islamic and conventional). That is, alphas are either negative or 
insignificantly positive. On the other hand, the results during the bull period indicate that 
there is statistical evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) slightly outperform both internationally-focused market benchmarks. That 
outperformance ranges from 0.0013 to only 0.0021. 
Looking at the alpha-difference portfolio between the Islamic and the conventional 
internationally-focused portfolios, the results indicate that there is no statistical evidence 
that shows any differences in the performance between these two portfolios. These results 
hold regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the 
internationally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
Table 9 -panel D- reports the results from the Treynor and Mazuy model. The results 
show that there is no statistical evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios 
(Islamic and conventional) possess any selectivity and/or market timing skills during all 
four sample periods; regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to 
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adjust for risk. However, there are two exceptions when the MSCI World Islamic Index is 
used to adjust for risk: 1) during the bull period, the internationally-focused Islamic 
portfolio possesses some selectivity skills of around 0.0030 and it is statistically significant 
at 10 percent; and 2) during the bear period, the internationally-focused conventional 
portfolio possesses market timing abilities of around 0.4290 and it is statistically 
significant at 1 percent. 
Table 9-Panel D: Treynor and Mazuy Model (Internationally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI World Islamic -0.0012 -0.0006 0.0030* 0.0012 -0.0027* -0.0014 -0.0019 -0.0012 
Diff -0.0006 0.0018 -0.0014 -0.0006 
MSCI World Index -0.0004 -0.0001 0.0023 0.0009 -0.0013 -0.0004 0.0001 -0.0001 
Diff -0.0003 0.0013 -0.001 0.0002 
  
MSCI World Islamic 0.0665 0.2071 -1.2298 0.1936 0.3182 0.4290*** 0.3719 0.474 
Diff -0.1406 -1.4234 -0.1108 -0.1022 
MSCI World Index -0.0607 0.1136 -0.535 0.5307 0.0393 0.2051 -0.0367 0.176 
Diff -0.1743 -1.0657 -0.1658 -0.2127 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI World Islamic 72.61% 66.07% 45.98% 8.38% 76.17% 73.12% 84.11% 81.28% 
MSCI World Index 71.20% 66.10% 40.80% 6.79% 72.73% 70.58% 82.79% 77.97% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
Results from this panel also shows that there is no statistical evidence that shows 
any differences in both the selectivity and market timing skills between the Islamic and the 
conventional internationally-focused portfolios during all four studied periods; regardless 
what internationally-focused market benchmark is used to adjust for risk. 
Table 9 -panel E- reports the results from the four-factor model. The beta results 
indicate that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are less 
volatile than both internationally-focused market indices (Islamic and conventional). That 
is, all betas are positive, less than 1, and highly significant. Furthermore, the beta-difference 
results indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is considered more risky 
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than the internationally-focused conventional portfolio. All these results hold regardless of 
the sample period under examination and regardless of internationally-focused market 
benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
Table 9-Panel E: Four-Factor Model (Internationally-Focused Portfolios) 
 
Index 
Overall period Bull Bear Financial Crisis 
Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. Islamic Conv. 
  
MSCI World Islamic -0.0004 0.0006 0.0010 -0.00003 0.0001 0.0019* -0.0010 0.0029 
Diff -0.0010 0.0010 -0.0018 -0.0039 
MSCI World Index -0.00002 0.0009 -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0008 0.0024** 0.0018 0.0044 
Diff -0.0009 0.0003 -0.0016 -0.0026 
  
MSCI World Islamic 0.2771*** 0.1851*** 0.1579*** 0.0535** 0.2829*** 0.1949*** 0.3308*** 0.1794*** 
Diff 0.0920*** 0.1044** 0.0880*** 0.1514* 
MSCI World Index 0.2522*** 0.1710*** 0.1733*** 0.0607** 0.2511*** 0.1756*** 0.2650*** 0.1444*** 
Diff 0.0813*** 0.1127** 0.0755** 0.1206* 
  
MSCI World Islamic 0.0148 0.0076 0.0155 0.0025 0.0204 0.0163 -0.0621 0.0085 
Diff 0.0072 0.0131 0.0041 -0.0705 
MSCI World Index 0.0153 0.0078 0.0162 0.0027 0.0210 0.0165 -0.0246 0.0283 
Diff 0.0075 0.0135 0.0045 -0.0529 
  
MSCI World Islamic -0.0147 0.0071 -0.0059 0.0036 -0.0542* -0.0254 -0.0513 -0.0576 
Diff -0.0218 -0.0095 -0.0288 0.0063 
MSCI World Index -0.0072 0.0125 -0.0150 0.0009 -0.0382 -0.0138 -0.0333 -0.0476 
Diff -0.0197 -0.0158 -0.0244 0.0143 
  
MSCI World Islamic -0.0123 -0.0145 0.0158 0.0202 -0.0423** -0.0433** 0.0510 -0.0484 
Diff 0.0022 -0.0044 0.0010 0.0994 
MSCI World Index -0.0112 -0.0133 0.0306 0.0254* -0.0418* -0.0423** -0.0372 -0.0947 
Diff 0.0021 0.0052 0.0004 0.0575 
Adj. 
R2 
MSCI World Islamic 72.62% 65.21% 45.39% 15.64% 76.99% 72.61% 84.43% 77.61% 
MSCI World Index 71.04% 65.70% 48.14% 19.00% 73.38% 71.28% 82.11% 76.33% 
*, **, *** significant at 10%, 5%, 1%, respectively 
The alpha results show that there is no statistical evidence that both internationally-
focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) reward investors with abnormal returns; 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the internationally-
focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception during 
the bear period where the results show that the internationally-focused conventional 
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portfolio slightly outperforms both internationally-focused market benchmarks. In other 
words, the results during the bear period indicate that the internationally-focused 
conventional portfolio outperforms: 1) the MSCI World Islamic Index by 0.0019 (significant 
at 10 percent), and 2) the MSCI World Index by 0.0024 (significant at 5 percent). 
The alpha-difference results indicate that there is no statistical evidence that shows 
any performance differences between the Islamic and the conventional internationally-
focused portfolios. These results holds regardless of the sample period under examination 
and regardless of internationally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. These 
results are also very much consistent with the results obtained from the single-factor 
model (panel C). 
The results from the SMB and HML risk factors indicate that there is no statistical 
evidence that both internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are 
sensitive to either the SMB and/or HML risk factors; regardless of sample period under 
examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used to 
adjust for risk. However, there is one exception where the results during the bear period 
indicate that the internationally-focused Islamic portfolio is biased toward growth stocks 
when it is benchmarked against the internationally-focused Islamic index (MSCI World 
Islamic Index). Loading on the HML risk factor is -0.0542 and it is statistically significant at 
10 percent. 
The results from the MOM risk factor indicate that during the overall, bull, and 
financial crisis periods, there is no statistical evidence that both portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) are sensitive to the MOM risk factor; regardless of the internationally-
focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception during 
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the bull period where the results indicate that the internationally-focused conventional 
portfolio is biased towards a momentum investment strategy when the internationally-
focused conventional index (MSCI World Index) is used to adjust for risk (loading on the 
MOM risk factor is 0.0254 and it is statistically significant at 10 percent). On the other hand, 
results during the bear period indicate that there is statistical evidence that both 
internationally-focused portfolios (Islamic and conventional) are biased towards a 
contrarian investment strategy; regardless what internationally-focused market 
benchmark is used to adjust for risk. That is, results show that loadings on the MOM risk 
factor during the bear period ranges from -0.0418 to -0.0433. 
Finally, the SMB-, HML-, and MOM-difference portfolio results indicate that both 
Islamic and conventional internationally-focused portfolios exhibit virtually identical 
sensitivities to all these risk factors. These results hold regardless of the sample period 
under examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market benchmark used 
to adjust for risk. 
10. Discussing the Empirical Results 
Before discussing the empirical results, it is essential to reiterate what is meant by 
locally-, Arab-, and internationally-focused fund portfolios. A locally-focused fund portfolio 
is a portfolio that contains Saudi mutual funds that invest in assets located only in Saudi 
Arabia. An Arab-focused fund portfolio is a portfolio that contains Saudi mutual funds that 
invest in assets located only in countries that are members of the Arab league, excluding 
Saudi Arabia. An internationally-focused fund portfolio is a portfolio that contains Saudi 
mutual funds that invest in assets located in all other countries, excluding Saudi Arabia and 
countries that belong in the previous Arab group. 
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10.1. Locally-Focused Fund Portfolios 
Assessing the locally-focused fund portfolios, the total risk (variance) results 
indicate, as hypothesized, that there is statistical evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is, 
indeed, less risky than the conventional fund portfolio. This is true regardless of the period 
under examination. Even though the Islamic fund portfolio is less risky, there is no 
statistical evidence that the performance (using non risk-adjusted returns) of such 
portfolio is different from that of the conventional fund portfolio (fail to reject the null 
hypothesis). This is true during all periods, but the bull period. 
However, when risk is adjusted, results provide a different story. As hypothesized, 
all simple risk-adjusted performance measures show that the locally-focused Islamic fund 
portfolio underperforms its peer the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio during 
both the overall and bull periods. That underperformance could mainly be attributed to the 
lower level of risk assumed. Furthermore, all risk-adjusted performance measures show 
that the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio performs less badly than its peer the locally-
focused conventional fund portfolio during both the bear and financial crisis periods. Such 
finding is not surprising given that the Islamic fund portfolio has less risk exposure, and 
therefore is not going to perform worse than the conventional fund portfolio in adverse 
market trends. However, it worthy to note that these differences in performance between 
the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios are very small using all 
these simple risk-adjusted performance measures during all studied periods, except when 
using the modified Sharpe ratio during the bull period.  
For example, during the overall period, the underperformance of the Islamic fund 
portfolio ranges from 0.08 to only 0.86 percent. Also, during the bull period, the 
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underperformance of the Islamic fund portfolio ranges from 0.92 to only 1.14 percent 
(excluding the results from the modified Sharpe ratio where the underperformance is 
around 19.83 percent). Lastly, during both the bear and financial crisis periods, the 
outperformance of the Islamic fund portfolio ranges from 0.04 to only 0.39 percent. 
In order to further examine the persistence of these small performance and risk 
differences between the Islamic and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios, a 
regression approach is employed. 
Looking at the risk differences (differences in beta), the results from both the single-
factor and four-factor models confirm the earlier finding that the locally-focused Islamic 
fund portfolio is, indeed, less risky than the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio 
(reject the null hypothesis of no risk differences between Islamic and conventional funds). 
This is true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the 
locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. However, there is one exception 
when the locally-focused Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is employed during the bull period 
where the beta-difference results from both models still indicate that the Islamic fund 
portfolio is less risky than its peer, but that risk difference is statistically insignificant. 
Nevertheless, it is worthy to note that such exception does not carry any importance 
because the locally-focused Islamic market benchmark (GCC Islamic) is considered by far 
inferior to the locally-focused conventional market index (TASI) in explaining returns of 
both Islamic and conventional locally-focused portfolios.  
Looking at the performance differences (differences in alpha), the results from all 
three models (single-factor, Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) indicate that 
there is no statistical evidence that shows any performance differences between the Islamic 
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and the conventional locally-focused fund portfolios (fail to reject the null hypothesis of no 
performance differences between Islamic and conventional funds). These findings are 
observed regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the locally-
focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
It is worthy to note that all findings from examining locally-focused fund portfolios 
suggest that the risk-return profile of the Islamic fund portfolio is considered superior to 
that of the conventional fund portfolio. This is considered good news for investors 
interested in investing in a portfolio of locally-focused Islamic funds because these 
investors are exposed to lower risk, but at the same time they are not penalized by less 
return. In other words, investors interested in locally-focused portfolios are better off 
investing in an Islamic fund portfolio than in a conventional fund portfolio because the 
Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to less risk for a return that is statistically no 
different from that earned when investing in the conventional fund portfolio. 
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no 
evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the Islamic 
and the conventional locally-focused portfolios. This is true regardless of the sample period 
under examination and regardless of the locally-focused market benchmark used to adjust 
for risk. 
Finally, the results from the four-factor model indicate that when the locally-focused 
Islamic index (GCC Islamic) is employed, both locally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and 
MOM. This is true regardless of the sample period under examination. However, as 
indicated earlier, the locally-focused conventional index (TASI) is much superior to the GCC 
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Islamic index in explaining returns of both Islamic and conventional locally-focused fund 
portfolios. Thus, the results that are based on using TASI shed more light on the behavior of 
locally-focused fund portfolios when common equity investment strategies are introduced 
into the picture. 
When TASI is used, results from the four-factor model indicate that the locally-
focused Islamic fund portfolio during only the overall and financial crisis periods is more 
sensitive to the SMB risk factor where such fund portfolio is more biased towards small 
capitalization stocks than is its peer the locally-focused conventional fund portfolio. Such 
findings are consistent with findings of Abderrezak (2008) and Hoepner, Rammal, & Rezec 
(2009) where they find that Islamic funds, in general, are biased towards small 
capitalization stocks. However, results from both HML and MOM risk factors indicate that 
both locally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) exhibit virtually identical 
sensitivities to these risk factors, regardless of sample period under examination. 
10.2. Arab-Focused Fund Portfolios 
Results from analyzing the Arab-focused fund portfolios suggest the following. 
Contrary to what is hypothesized; the variance results indicate that during only the overall 
and bear periods, there is statistical evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is more risky 
than the conventional fund portfolio. However, during the bull and financial crisis periods, 
there no evidence that there exist any differences in the variance. Nonetheless, the 
performance results (using non risk-adjusted returns) show that there is no statistical 
evidence, regardless of the sample period under examination, that there exist any 
differences in the performance between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios. 
However, when risk is adjusted, all simple risk-adjusted performance measures show that 
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the Islamic fund portfolio underperforms its peer the conventional fund portfolio. This is 
true regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused 
market benchmark used to adjust for risk.  
To further examine the risk-return profile of these Arab-focused fund portfolios, a 
regression approach is used. Assessing the riskiness of these fund portfolios, the beta-
difference results from both the single-factor and four-factor models indicate that the null 
hypothesis of no risk differences between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios 
cannot be rejected at all conventional levels. Assessing the performance of these Arab-
focused fund portfolios, the alpha-difference results from all three models (single-factor, 
Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) also indicate that the null hypothesis of no 
return differences between the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios cannot be 
rejected at all conventional levels. All these results are observed regardless of the sample 
period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused market benchmark used to 
adjust for risk. All these findings support the assertion that there is neither a cost nor a 
benefit from adhering to the Shariah law when investing in Arab-focused fund portfolios. 
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no 
statistical evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the 
Islamic and the conventional Arab-focused fund portfolios. Also, the results from the four-
factor model indicate that both Arab-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and conventional) 
exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and MOM. Again, all 
findings from both models (Treynor & Mazuy and the four-factor models) are observed 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the Arab-focused 
market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
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10.3. Internationally-Focused Fund Portfolios 
Results from analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios suggest the 
following. Contrary to what is hypothesized, the variance results indicate that there is 
strong evidence that the Islamic fund portfolio is slightly more risky than the conventional 
fund portfolio. This is true regardless of the period under examination. Nonetheless, the 
performance results (using non risk-adjusted returns) show that there is no statistical 
evidence that there exist any differences in the performance between the Islamic and the 
conventional fund portfolios; regardless of the sample period under examination.  
Consistent with the results from analyzing the Arab-focused fund portfolios; the 
results from analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios show that when risk is 
adjusted, all simple risk-adjusted performance measures indicate that the Islamic fund 
portfolio underperforms its peer the conventional fund portfolio. All these results hold 
regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the internationally-
focused market benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
In order to further examine and compare the risk-return profile between Islamic 
and conventional internationally-focused fund portfolios, a regression approach is 
employed. Consist with the variance results, the systematic risk (beta) results from both 
the single-factor and four-factor models indicate that the Islamic fund portfolio is, indeed, 
more risky than the conventional fund portfolio. Assessing the performance, the results 
from all three models (single-factor, Treynor & Mazuy, and the four-factor models) indicate 
that there is no statistical evidence that shows any performance differences between the 
Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios. All these findings are observed regardless of 
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the period under examination and regardless of the internationally-focused market 
benchmark used to adjust for risk. 
Furthermore, the results from the Treynor & Mazuy model indicate that there is no 
evidence that there exist any differences in the market timing skills between the Islamic 
and the conventional internationally-focused fund portfolios. Also, the results from the 
four-factor model indicate that both internationally-focused fund portfolios (Islamic and 
conventional) exhibit virtually identical sensitivities to all risk factors: SMB, HML, and 
MOM. All findings from both models (Treynor & Mazuy and the four-factor models) are 
observed regardless of the sample period under examination and regardless of the 
internationally-focused market index employed. 
It is worthy to note that when the locally-focused fund portfolios are analyzed, 
findings suggest that investors that invest in a locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio are 
better off than those who invest in a locally-focused conventional fund portfolio. However, 
the opposite is true when analyzing the internationally-focused fund portfolios. That is, 
investors are better off investing in an internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio 
than in an internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio. This is because the 
internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to more risk for a return 
that is statistically no different from that earned when investing in an internationally-
focused conventional fund portfolio. 
10.4. Final Note 
Analyzing portfolios of Saudi mutual funds indicates that the risk-return profile of 
the Islamic and the conventional fund portfolios changes depending on the portfolio’s 
geographical focus. A locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio has a superior risk-return 
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profile than a locally-focused conventional fund portfolio, whereas, the opposite is 
observed when investigating the internationally-focused fund portfolios. On the other 
hand, there is no statistical evidence that the risk-return profile of an Arab-focused Islamic 
fund portfolio is different from that of the Arab-focused conventional fund portfolio. All 
these findings are observed regardless of the sample period under examination (overall, 
bull, bear, and financial crisis periods). Also, all these findings are observed regardless of 
different appropriate market benchmarks used to adjust for risk. 
A possible explanation for the different risk-return profile between locally- and both 
Arab- and internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolios is that Shariah-compliant assets 
that are located outside of Saudi Arabia could not be as strict and consistent in adhering to 
the Shariah law as those located in Saudi Arabia. 
To elaborate, Saudi Arabia is considered one of the few countries that have a law 
that is strictly based on Shariah. Furthermore, the majority of the population embraces the 
Islamic religion and believes that such religion is not just a ritual practice, but instead it is a 
way of life where all Islamic rules and regulations must be implemented in all aspects of life 
including those aspects related to finance and investment. Thus, Shariah-compliant assets 
that are designed and marketed to attract strict Muslim investors are going to be under 
more scrutiny to ensure their strict adherence to the Shariah law when they are located in 
Saudi Arabia. This is because these assets are surrounded with two monitoring 
mechanisms: the Saudi law and strict Muslim investors in Saudi Arabia. Therefore, it is not 
surprising to know that Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused (funds invest in 
Shariah-compliant assets located only in Saudi Arabia) are adhering to the Shariah law in a 
very strict and consistent manner. 
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However, the case is more likely to be different when Shariah-compliant assets are 
examined in different countries or regions, especially in non-Muslim countries. That is, 
each country or region has its own way in complying with the Shariah law which results in 
a lack of standardization in Shariah screenings. For example, some countries require the 
ratio of ‘account receivables to total assets’, ‘interest-bearing debt to total assets’, and 
‘interest-bearing cash and investments to total assets’ to be less than 45, 30, and 30 
percent, respectively; while other countries require these ratios to be less than 33 percent. 
Another example is that some countries use total assets as the denominator when 
evaluating these financial filter ratios, while other countries use different variations of 
market capitalization (such as market capitalization itself, 12-, 24-, and 36-month market 
capitalization average). All these dissimilarities in setting the Islamic norms between 
countries will most likely affect the overall Shariah adherence decision from one country to 
another.29 
In other words, because there are some inconsistencies in setting the Islamic norms 
from one country to another, it is not unlikely for a firm to be classified as Islamic in one 
country, but as non-Islamic in another country. And this is the main reason why it is 
expected that Shariah-compliant assets that are located in countries other than Saudi 
Arabia are not as strict and consistent in adhering to the Shariah law as those assets that are 
located in Saudi Arabia. 
As a result, Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused are expected to better 
represent mutual funds that are not just comfortable with the Shariah law, but instead 
mutual funds that are consistently and strictly adhering to the Shariah law than Islamic 
                                                        
29 See Chapter 1: Islamic Finance, section ‎4.1: Screening for Shariah-Compliant Stocks for more details. 
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mutual funds that are either Arab- or internationally-focused (funds invest in Shariah-
compliant assets located in all counties, but Saudi Arabia). If this is the case, then this could 
explain why there are differences in the risk-return profile between the locally- and both 
Arab- and internationally-focused portfolios of Saudi Islamic mutual funds. However, the 
investigation of such issue is out of the scope of this paper and is left for future research. 
11. Conclusion 
This paper investigates one of the most important issues raised in the Islamic 
mutual fund literature. That issue is whether investing in Islamic mutual funds comes at 
any cost. To my knowledge, this is the first paper that comprehensively investigates this 
issue in the context of Saudi Arabia. 
To investigate whether Islamic mutual funds are associated with any costs, this 
paper employs a unique sample of 143 Saudi mutual funds (96 Islamic and 47 
conventional) during the period from July 2004 to January 2010. That Saudi mutual fund 
sample very much represents the Saudi mutual fund industry in terms of geographical 
focuses, diversity, investment objectives, Shariah compliancy, and institutional 
management.  
Furthermore, this paper utilizes a portfolio approach in order to help diversify away 
fund-specific risks. Thus, all Saudi mutual funds in the selected sample are grouped into 
portfolios based on the following characteristics: three main geographical focuses (local, 
Arab, and international), Shariah compliancy (Islamic and conventional), and four different 
Saudi stock market trends (overall, bull, bear, and the recent 2008 financial crisis periods). 
Grouping funds into portfolios in this manner facilitates comparability of the data and 
enhances reliability of results.  
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Then this paper employs very well known performance measures (such as the 
modified Sharpe ratio, MM index, Treynor ratio, and TT index) as well as very well known 
regression models (such as the single-factor model, the Treynor and Mazuy model, and a 
multifactor model that is in the spirit of Carhart (1997) four-factor model) in order to 
assess the risk-return profile of these Saudi mutual fund portfolios. 
Findings from this paper suggest that using portfolios of Saudi mutual funds to 
investigate the issue of whether investing in Islamic mutual funds is associated with any 
cost heavily depends on the geographical focuses of these fund portfolios.  
That is, investors are better off investing in the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio 
due to its superior risk-return profile than in the locally-focused conventional fund 
portfolio. That is, the locally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to less risk 
for the same level of return provided by its conventional peer: the locally-focused 
conventional fund portfolio.  
The opposite is true when internationally-focused fund portfolios are analyzed. That 
is, investors are better off investing in the internationally-focused conventional fund 
portfolio than in the internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio. This is because the 
internationally-focused Islamic fund portfolio exposes investors to more risk for the same 
level of return provided by the internationally-focused conventional fund portfolio. 
However, when Arab-focused fund portfolios are analyzed, findings indicate that 
there is neither a cost nor a benefit from adhering to the Shariah law. That is, results 
indicate that there is no statistical evidence that the risk-return profile of the Arab-focused 
Islamic fund portfolio is different from that of the Arab-focused conventional fund 
portfolio.  
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It is worthy to note that all these findings are observed regardless of the sample 
period under examination (overall, bull, bear, and financial crisis). Also, all these findings 
are robust regardless of different appropriate market benchmarks used to adjust for risk. 
Finally, findings from this paper raise an important question: Are Saudi Islamic 
mutual funds that are Arab- and/or internationally-focused adhere to the Shariah law in a 
manner that is different from Saudi Islamic mutual funds that are locally-focused? 
However, this issue is left for future research because investigating such issue is beyond 
the scope of this paper. 
  
151 
 
12. References 
Abderrezak, F. (2008). The Performance of Islamic Equity Funds: A Comparison to 
Conventional, Islamic and Ethical Benchmarks. Retrieved April 1, 2010, from Failaka: 
http://www.failaka.com/downloads/AbderrezakF_Perf_IslamicEquityFunds.pdf 
Abdullah, F., Hassan, T., & Mohamad, S. (2007). Investgation of performance of Malaysian 
Islamic unit trust funds . Managerial Finance, 33 (2) , 142-153. 
Ahmed, O. B. (2001). Islamic Equity Funds: The Mode of Resource Mobilization and 
Placement. Islamic Research and Training Institute, Islamic Development Bank, 
Jeddah, Saudi Arabia . 
Annuar, M., Shamsher, M., & Ngu, M. (1997). Selectivity and timing evidence from the 
performance of Malaysian unit trusts. Pertanika Journal of Social Science and 
Humanities, Vol. 5 , 45-57. 
Bodie, Z., Kane, A., & Marcus, A. (2005). Investments, 6th edition. New York: McGraw-Hill. 
Carhart, M. M. (1997). On persistance in Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Finance, 52 
(1) , 57-82. 
Chen, C., Cheng, F., Rahman, S., & Chan, A. (1992). A cross sectional analysis of mutual 
fund's market timing and security selection skill. Journal of Business Finance and 
Accounting, Vol. 19 , 659-674. 
Dabbeeru, R. N. (2006b, November). A four-step model to evaluate mutual funds: A case-
study for equity mutual funds in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved April 13, 2010, from Social 
Science Research Network (SSRN): http://ssrn.com/abstract=946937 
Dabbeeru, R. N. (2006c, December 21). Analyzing Balanced, Debt and Liquid Funds: A Case-
study of Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia. Retrieved April 20, 2010, from Social Science 
Research Network (SSRN): http://ssrn.com/abstract=952975 
Dabbeeru, R. N. (2006a, August 1). Performance Analysis of Mutual Funds in Saudi Arabia. 
Retrieved March 14, 2010, from Social Science Research Network (SSRN): 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=921523 
Elfakhani, S., & Hassan, M. K. (2005). Performance of Islamic Mutual Funds. Economic 
Research Forum, 12th Annual Conference, (pp. 1-33). Cairo, Egypt. 
Fama, E., & French, K. (1993). Common risk factors in the returns on stocks and bonds. 
Journal of Financial Economics 33 , 3−56. 
Grinblantt, M., & Titman, S. (1992). The Persistence of Mutual Fund Performance. The 
Journal of Finance, Vol. 47, No. 5 , 1977-1984. 
Hoepner, A. G., Rammal, H. G., & Rezec, M. (2009). Islamic Mutual Funds' Financial 
Performance and Investment Style: Evidence from 20 Countries. Retrieved May 1, 
2010, from Social Science Research Network (SSRN): 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1475037 
Israelsen, C. L. (2005). A Refinemen to the Sharpe Ratio and Information Ratio. Journal of 
Asset Management, vol.5 . 
Jegadeesh, N., & Titman, S. (1993). Returns to Buying Winners and Selling Losers: 
Implications for Stock Market Efficiency. Journal of Finance 48(1) , 65-91. 
Jensen, M. C. (1967). The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964. Journal of 
Finance, 23 (2) , 389-416. 
152 
 
Jensen, M. C. (1967). The Performance of Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964. Journal of 
Finance, 23 (2) , 389-416. 
Kon, S. (1983). The market timing performance of mutual fund managers. Journal of 
Business Vol. 56 , 321.347. 
Kon, S., & Jen, F. (1979). The investment performance of mutual funds: an empirical 
investigation of timing, selectivity and market efficiency. Journal of Business, Vol. 63 , 
261-278. 
Kräussl, R., & Hayat, R. (2008). Risk and Return Characteristics of Islamic Equity Funds. 
Retrieved May 19, 2010, from Social Science Research Network (SSRN): 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320712 
Lintner, J. (1965). The valuation of risk assets and the selection of risky investments in 
stock portfolios and capital budgets. Review of Economics and Statistics 47 , 13-37. 
McDonald, J. (1974). Objectives and performance of mutual funds. Journal of Finance and 
Quantitative Analysis, Vol. 13 , 311-333. 
McKenzie, D. (2010). Islamic Finance 2010. Retrieved April 22, 2010, from International 
Financial Services London: http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Islamic-
finance-2010.pdf 
McKenzie, D. (2011, May). Islamic Finance. Retrieved 11 27, 2011, from TheCityUK 
partnering prosperity: http://www.thecityuk.com/assets/Uploads/Islamic-finance-
2011.pdf 
Merdad, H., Hassan, M. K., & Alhenawi, Y. (2010). Islamic Versus Conventional Mutual 
Funds Performance in Saudi Arabia: A Case Study. Journal of King Abdulaziz 
University: Islamic Economics, Contents Volume 23 Number 2 , 161-198. 
Modigliani, F., & Modigliani, L. (1997). Risk adjusted performance. Journal of Portfolio 
Management, Vol. 23 , 45-54. 
Muhammad, N. M., & Mokhtar, M. (2008). Islamic Equity Mutual Fund Performance in 
Malaysia: Risk and Return Analysis. Paper presented in the Malaysina Finance 
Association (MFA): 11th International Conference at Kuching, Malaysia, 5-6 June . 
Obaidullah, M. (2005). Islamic Financial Services. Jeddah, Saudi Arabia: Islamic Economics 
Research Center. 
Shamsher, M., Annuar, M., & Taufiq, H. (2000). Investment in unit trusts: performance of 
active and passive funds . Proceedings of FEP Seminar 2000: Issues in Accounting and 
Finance 2, Universiti Putra Malaysia Press, Serdang , 129-141. 
Sharpe, W. F. (1964). Capital Asset Prices: A Theory of Market Equilibrium under 
Conditions of Risk . Journal of Finance, 19 (3) , 425-442. 
Sharpe, W. (1966). Mutual Fund Performance. Journal of Business 39 (1) , 119-138. 
Treynor, J., & Mazuy, K. (1966). Can mutual funds outguess the market? Harvard Business 
Review, Vol. 44 , 131-136. 
White, H. (1980). A Heteroscedasticity Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimator and a Direct 
Test of Heteroscedasticity. Econometrica, Vol. 48 , 817-838. 
 
 
153 
 
Appendices 
Appendix A: The Created 24 Different Types of Portfolios 
Panel A:  
Overall Sample Period  
(July 2004-Janurary 2010) 
Panel B:  
The Bull Period  
(July 2004-Feberuary 2006)  
Local Local 
Islamic portfolio 1 Islamic portfolio 4 
non- Islamic portfolio1 non- Islamic portfolio4 
Arab Arab 
Islamic portfolio 2 Islamic portfolio 5 
non-Islamic portfolio 2 non-Islamic portfolio 5 
International International 
Islamic portfolio 3 Islamic portfolio 6 
non-Islamic portfolio 3 non-Islamic portfolio 6 
Panel C:  
The Bear Period  
(March 2006-January2010)  
Panel D:  
The Financial Crisis Period  
(September 2008-January2010)  
Local Local 
Islamic portfolio 7 Islamic portfolio 10 
non- Islamic portfolio7 non- Islamic portfolio10 
Arab Arab 
Islamic portfolio 8 Islamic portfolio 11 
non-Islamic portfolio 8 non-Islamic portfolio 11 
International International 
Islamic portfolio 9 Islamic portfolio 12 
non-Islamic portfolio 9 non-Islamic portfolio 12 
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